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Preface and Acknowledgements 
 
This edited collection is the first book-length publication of Goldsmiths’ new Political 
Economy Research Centre (PERC). PERC was launched in early 2015 alongside its new PPE 
degree. It aims to promote research and debate around alternatives to mainstream neoclassical 
economics. Its board and members range across heterodox economics, political economy, 
cultural economy, economic sociology and economic history. The main things that unite 
PERC members are a sense of interdisciplinarity and an insistence that economics cannot be 
separated from social and political influences and events. Although based in academia the 
centre also encourages exchanges with interest groups, think tanks and others across civil 
society. 
 
This particular book comes out of our PERC Papers series. They began as short papers, a 
cross between a blog and academic working paper, and all were first published online over 
2015 and early 2016. The brief was to combine scholarly, informed writing with polemical 
commentary, applying this mix to contemporary events. Authors came from academia, 
journalism and campaigning organisations.  
 
All pieces were especially commissioned under the theme of the economics of public 
knowledge. Each explores what is happening to forms of public knowledge in its varied 
forms and settings, from mass media to public libraries and education, from financial markets 
to public policy-making in health care and defence. Each of the authors observes a very real 
erosion of the kinds of information, media and public knowledge that are considered essential 
for polities, markets and societies to function properly. The most obvious causes appear to 
stem from the pervasive influence of neoliberal free market thinking, which inculcates 
competition into every area of social and political life.  
 
But declining public knowledge has many other causes too. The online world has destabilised 
the long-term business models by which journalism, publishing and many forms of popular 
culture operated. Public knowledge and culture are hard to evaluate and justify in an era 
where audits and quantification are becoming the key mechanisms of modern political and 
market management. In a prolonged period of austerity and cuts, public knowledge in all its 
forms often suffers the first and deepest cuts. But, also, in a time when knowledge is more 
specialist, fast-moving and complex, it is also short-lived. Knowledge redundancy is hard-
wired into everything, from news to operating systems, from clothing fashions to investment 
fashions. Under such conditions it is only large corporations and the very wealthy that can 
afford to keep paying for it but then guard it fiercely for themselves. Thus, extremes of 
information inequality both reflect and contribute to those of material inequality.  
 
Thanks to all those who gave their time and expert knowledge to writing a short piece for a 
fledgling centre and website. Thanks also to all who have lent much-needed institutional 
support to get PERC and PPE up and running in its early years: Pat Loughrey, Roger 
Burrows and Saul Newman; to the core PERC management team of Will Davies, my Co-
Director, Johnna Montgomery and Zoe Lake Thomas. Lastly, thanks to Sarah Kember and 
the new team  at Goldsmiths Press for their work in taking on this project. 
 
Aeron Davis 
Co-Director of PERC 
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Chapter One  
Introduction: The Death of Public Knowledge? 
Aeron Davis 
Division and Distrust in the Post-Truth Era 
This edited collection looks at the erosion of public knowledge in all its forms and explores 
the consequences of its decline. In the summer of 2016, as this book goes into production, the 
issues addressed here look more pressing than ever. The UK appears to be a particularly 
divided and untrusting nation. It has just voted to leave the EU. Financial markets have gone 
haywire and seem ready to over-react to every new small piece of economic data. Both main 
parties appear thoroughly split, internally and externally. So does much of the country as EU 
Leavers and those who voted to Remain look at each other with utter incredulity. A great 
sense of unease has descended as no-one knows where Britain’s long-established political, 
economic and social systems are headed.  
Part of this sense of breakdown has emerged directly from the cynical and ill-informed public 
debates around Brexit. For many, the principal campaigners appeared to be arguing a case 
they hardly believed in. David Cameron, George Osborne and Jeremy Corbyn, campaigning 
for Remain, had all shown moderate Eurosceptic beliefs in the past. Boris Johnson, for Leave, 
had previously sounded more pro-European and even advocated Turkey’s entry in the EU 
(something presented as a threat by Leavers).  
Leave campaigners repeatedly lied about the economic gains and immigration cuts that would 
follow an EU exit. Economists, international leaders and institutions who argued to remain, 
were dismissed as the kind of “experts” that “people have had enough of”. Analysis of news 
coverage of the referendum period revealed that the large majority of print news content was 
biased and, if circulation figures are taken into account, 82% of it promoted the leave case 
(Loughborough, 2016).  
The UK now seems to have moved into an Orwellian, post-truth era where “facts”, leaders 
and rational arguments inspire little faith. But, as this book reveals, this era has long-term 
systemic roots. It is also not restricted to the UK. 
It was not so long ago that the UK and US governments spent billions propagating the myth 
of Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Since then, governments, not bankers, have 
somehow been held to blame for the financial crisis, and immigrants and the poor held to 
account for austerity and cuts. Such narratives are equally common across the US and EU 
nations (Picard, 2014). It’s also a time when stock markets, CEO salaries and property prices 
keep going up, all in spite of general economic stagnation. Inequality has been steadily rising 
everywhere since 1980s (Piketty, 2014), its pace quickening since the financial crash. 
Populist leaders and post-truth politics are springing up everywhere. In the US, Tea Party 
politics have produced gridlock in Washington. Donald Trump’s success owes much to a 
similar break down of faith in the established political, media and economic systems of the 
US. So too, system upheavals threaten across relatively wealthy and stable political 
economies, from France and Greece to Argentina and Brazil. Far right parties (Front 
National, Golden Dawn, Jobbik, DPP, UKIP) are making serious challenges across Europe 
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and upending long-established parties and coalitions. Undoubtedly, in all these cases, 
substantial economic, political, social and environmental shifts are key factors. Clearly, the 
forty-year failed neoliberal experiment, and the lack of post-financial crisis alternatives, has 
contributed.  
 
But, as this book argues, the long, slow death of public knowledge in all its forms is also a 
strong, causal factor. The generation and dissemination of shared public knowledge is a 
foundational element of democracies, markets and societies everywhere. Without it there is 
no social contract, no political legitimacy, no market transactions and no basis for common 
decision-making. There is also no sense of shared local or (inter)national identity or 
possibility of a more equal society.  
 
Yet, wherever austerity has bitten, competition has been propelled forward, or individual 
choice proclaimed, it is public knowledge which has suffered first. Its erosion encourages 
more of the same and sets in motion a vicious circle of decline. Part of the problem is that the 
generation of public knowledge is very much an economic endeavour, influenced by political 
and economic institutions. So is the generation of economically relevant knowledge itself. 
Yet, neither mainstream economics nor the political establishment shows much interest in 
something so taken-for-granted, unquantifiable and immaterial. Just as leaders everywhere 
continually focus on short-term gains at the expense of long-term investment, so the crisis of 
public knowledge mounts. Like global warming, inequality, and economic instability, the 
collapse of public knowledge systems is threatening critical consequences. 
 
The Perfect Storm Eroding Public Knowledge 
 
Currently, public knowledge is under threat as never before. A perfect storm of factors are 
eroding it in all its forms. One of these is the Internet. On the one hand, the web offers an 
abundance of information on all manner of topics and from a wide range of sources. On the 
other, it has undermined the business models on which public knowledge and cultural 
creation has relied. Advertising has steadily migrated away from traditional media. Copyright 
of content is impossible to enforce which, in turn, deters investment in its creation. The rise 
of new digital distributors with global power has weakened the hands of many content 
producers (McChesney, 2014). The second factor is everything that follows from the long 
march towards neoliberalism in the organisation of our society. Making public knowledge 
and culture a matter of individual choice means the “general intellect” is not treated as a 
social or national resource. State-funded knowledge and entertainment increasingly gives 
way to market-funded formats with no incentive to support worthy but unprofitable outputs.  
 
Third is budget cuts and austerity economics. For mainstream economists and right-wing 
parties public knowledge is no different from any other public provision and, consequently, 
should be produced by markets rather than states. For political economists and left-wing 
parties it is more important to protect the material than the cultural. Real food is more 
essential than food for the mind. Fourth, is the nature of modern knowledge itself. It is 
increasingly complex, technical, fast-moving and over-loaded. That puts it beyond the 
comprehension of most people, including those at the centre of decision-making processes. It 
also means a greater reliance on “experts” and “technicians” with specialist but narrow 
world-views; a world of disconnected information silos which few may access (Engelen et 
al., 2011).  
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Fifth is the rise of inequality, concentrated corporate power and the super-rich (Piketty, 
2014). It is extreme inequalities which allow the 1% to buy the best forms of specialist 
knowledge that were once more equally distributed: in accounting and taxation, in law, in 
economic and financial market research, in public affairs, and in advanced communication 
technologies. Public institutions cannot match the knowledge-producing and purchasing 
facilities of big finance and business, let alone offer them to wider publics. Thus the decline 
of public knowledge and knowledge inequalities are directly related to inequality more 
generally. Sixth, is the rise of forms of “econocracy” and “auditocracy” (or “audit society”, 
Power, 1997): the rise to the top of economically-oriented leaders in the fields of politics, 
public administration and business. Across Westminster, Whitehall and business associations, 
general knowledge and experience are giving way to economic knowledge, accountancy and 
targets. In many ways, forms of public knowledge production do not fit. Outputs of news, 
culture and specialist research can be easily quantified, but not so the resources involved in 
their production. The emphasis on increasing quantified outputs inevitably erodes the quality 
and degree of depth in their inputs. 
The Erosion of Public Knowledge Provision: A Business Model in Decline 
Most obviously, the erosion of public knowledge is observable in the decline and 
privatisation of institutions and organisations that traditionally generate and circulate it. In the 
immediate aftermath of the 2010 election, higher education was the first to be subjected to 
radical marketisation as fees tripled to £9,000 and the government attempted (but failed so 
far) to securitize the student loan book (McGettigan, 2013). Local library capacity has been 
cut back significantly as local authorities have been forced to endure drastic cuts. Combined 
library expenditure has fallen by a third since 2005/6. Expenditure on books and digital 
content is the lowest it has been for 20 years (Public Libraries News, 2014).  
Mainstream news providers in the UK, US and elsewhere have watched audiences and 
advertising revenues slowly decline over several decades. But the pace of decline has 
quickened considerably in the 21st Century, with the rise of online news outlets, news 
aggregators and digital entertainment. Pew (2012) calculated that the US newspaper industry 
had shrunk 43% and lost 28% of journalist jobs since 2000. In that time, on average, 15 
papers had gone bankrupt each year. In 2011, US newspapers gained $207 million in online 
advertising but lost $2.1 billion in print advertising. The Guardian, which led the UK press 
sector in developing its online presence, had gained 60 million unique users by December 
2011 but, at the same time, saw its pre-tax losses rise to £171 million for the year (Franklin, 
2012). Many areas of news, including local, investigative, parliamentary and foreign 
reporting, have all been particularly hard hit. 
In all these areas, institutions and organisations have been forced to adapt to survive, often 
reducing their product to something that only weakly resembles the services and contents 
they once produced. One survival strategy is to increase outputs per employee: bigger classes 
per teacher or academic tutor, more articles or broadcasts per journalist. Davies (2008) 
estimated that UK journalists were having to fill three times as much news space as they did 
in the 1980s. Another strategy involves the de-professionalisation of knowledge producing 
sectors and the harnessing of cheap or voluntary labour. So universities have increasingly 
come to rely on temporary visiting tutors to teach growing numbers of students. Since 2007 
two fifths of professionally qualified library staff have been cut while voluntary staff have 
increased two and a half fold (Public Libraries News, 2014). And news media has become 
more dependent on the contributions of freelancers, temporary staff, amateur citizen 
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journalists and user-generated content. So too, television production looks to reality TV 
shows and competitions, made with low cost participants, as a cheap alternative to higher cost 
documentaries and dramas. 
Most concerning of all is the third strategy of public knowledge producers: to become reliant 
on funding and “information subsidies” from the very sources they are supposed to report on. 
Academic and regulatory research institutions are pushed to seek out business funds and 
sponsors which then have a say on published outputs (Monbiot, 2000). Most news reporting 
outlets (public broadcasters apart) have always been reliant on commercial advertising to 
heavily subsidise content, thus leaving difficult professional conflicts of interest for 
journalists (Curran and Seaton, 2009). However, as news organisations struggle they have 
become increasingly dependent on a range of additional information subsidies – news wire 
services, recycled material, plagiarised copy from rival publications and, above all, public 
relations outputs from commercial and political sources.  
In the US, according to McChesney and Nichols (2010) there were four times as many public 
relations practitioners as media editorial staff working in 2008. An estimated 40-50% of 
newspaper stories began life as press releases, while only 14% originated from reporters. 
Lewis et al.’s study (2008) of UK news found that 19% of press stories and 17% of 
broadcasts were entirely or mainly reproduced PR material. 49% of press stories were either 
entirely or mainly dependent on news wire agency copy. Thus, be it reporting of foreign 
conflicts (Herman and Chomsky, 2002), scientific research and big pharma (Goldacre, 2013) 
or climate change (Klein, 2014), public news and information is far from autonomous and 
objective. 
The Free Market Corruption of Public Knowledge in Markets 
The breakdown of the economic model of public knowledge and culture has been matched by 
a similar decline in the creation of specialist, economically relevant information used by 
markets, regulators and policy-makers. “Big Bang” in the UK in 1985-6 was intended to 
create real competition and more efficient trading in the London Stock Exchange. But, 
instead, it created a system whereby international investment banks ended up providing 
information and advice to both buyers and sellers as well as their own investment arms 
(Augar, 2000). Market forces encouraged low cost trading and multiple participants but, at 
the same time, devalued and corrupted the production and dissemination of investment 
research and market-relevant information. Financial journalists and analysts alike became 
dependent on self-interested investor relations material produced by sellers and the self-
serving analyses of investment banks (Davis, 2007). The degradation of financial market 
information in the City was a strong contributory factor to the dot.com boom of the 1990s 
and the bust that followed in 2000. In effect, the application of extreme market forces to 
markets themselves has resulted in the corruption of market-relevant information within those 
markets. 
It has been a similar story with financial markets in the US and with a series of financial 
scandals, bubbles and crises in the US, UK and elsewhere (Lewis, 2011, 2014, Engelen et al., 
2011, Ferguson, 2012). The subprime mortgage bubble, the massive rise of derivatives 
markets, the general expansion of the shadow banking sector, the growth of high frequency 
trading, and the libor scandal all have much in common. They all involve abundant flows of 
low-cost lending, insiders and outsiders, and conflicts of interest. But, they also share 
problems associated with the production, dissemination and regulation of market information. 
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New communication technologies, deregulation and the complexity of modern finance, have 
each contributed to massive information inequalities and information corruption across 
markets. Not only are outsiders continually disadvantaged, regulators and credit-rating 
agencies cannot keep up. They are unable to access what is happening in the shadow banking 
sector, in the OTC derivatives market, and in “dark pool” trading centres of finance. Neither 
are they able to effectively rate the risks of new financial products nor spot cumulative 
market-wide risks building up.  
 
The Corruption of Public Knowledge Used to Inform Economic Policy, Regulation and 
Taxation 
 
A comparable set of problems are present when it comes to accounting, taxation and 
economic policy. It is the same big four accountancy firms that dominate when it comes to 
both auditing companies and offering these same organisations accounting services; and the 
same big four that advise governments and tax inspectors on accountancy regulations. It is 
the same investment bank managers who get senior positions in government treasuries and 
regulatory institutions, before returning to those same investment banks. And the same 
esteemed economists who write authoritative reports used in decision-making but which are 
paid for by vested interests (Ferguson, 2012, Shaxson, 2012, Murphy, 2013). In effect, the 
production of financial and economic information, that is used to inform decision-making on 
behalf of the public, is itself riddled with conflicts of interest. This allows tax avoidance by 
big business and the super-rich on a massive scale. It also produces regressive taxation 
systems that facilitate the continuing transfer of capital from the poorest to the richest 1%. 
 
If accountancy and taxation public knowledge is compromised so are other areas of public 
knowledge that inform public policy and regulation of the economy. Rich and powerful 
individuals and organisations have always had more privileged access to political and 
administrative decision-makers (Lukes, 2005). But, they are now advantaged more than ever 
because of their influence over the creation of specialist economic and market knowledge 
which becomes used by non-expert politicians and civil servants. As economics, finance and 
science become more fast-moving and complex, so has come the age of technical experts and 
specialist information intermediaries. These include lawyers, lobbyists, think tankers and 
financiers as well as economists and accountants (Cave and Rowell, 2014). It is the super-rich 
and large corporations which can now afford to pay for the brightest and most able in these 
professions and to buy as much expertise and research as is necessary.  
 
Thus, it is financiers themselves and their many information intermediaries who have had 
most input into how the financial sector is regulated since 2007-08. In the US, annual 
lobbying expenditure from the securities and investment sectors, between 1998 and 2012, 
amounted to $932 million. From the insurance sector it was $1,700 million (Opensecrets, 
2012). In the UK, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (2012) found that, in 2011, the UK 
financial sector spent an estimated £92.8 million lobbying the UK Government. They 
identified 129 organisations engaged in lobbying for finance. Firms of accountants, lobbyists, 
PR experts and financiers also directly fund or offer pro bono expertise to all the main parties 
and their think tanks. In recent years the financial sector has provided over 50% of the 
Conservative Party’s funds (Peston, 9.2.11). In effect, once again, it is the rich and powerful 
who are funding or creating public policy information on economic and financial matters. 
Public policy-making research and analysis has been contracted out to the organisations 
whose main pursuit is self-interest rather than public interest (Crouch, 2004). Consequently, 
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rational public decision-making on economic and financial matters, based on “independent 
expert research”, results in tainted and partial outcomes, regardless of the party in power.  
 
To conclude, any progressive form of politics and economics, one that values equality and a 
notion of a shared society, must acknowledge the importance of public knowledge. Public 
knowledge and culture, in all its forms, must be seen to be a fundamental right, not an 
additional luxury, to be supported accordingly. Its valuation must resist the tendency to a 
crude reductionism based on numbers and competition logics. Content creation and 
authorship needs to be more rigorously upheld by law. The generation of specialist 
knowledge and public policy needs to be funded by the public purse rather than vested 
interests. Legal, political and market institutions must operate independently of market forces 
and partial “information subsidies”, when it comes to generating and disseminating wider 
public information. 
 
References 
 
Augar, P (2000) The Death of Gentlemanly Capitalism, London: Penguin 
 
Bureau of Investigative Journalism (July 2012) Online Site at: 
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com, London 
 
Cave, T and Rowell, A (2014) A Quiet Word: Crony Capitalism and Broken Politics in 
Britain, London: Bodley Head 
 
Crouch, C (2004) Post Democracy, Cambridge: Polity 
 
Curran, J and Seaton, J (2009) Power Without Responsibility: Press, Broadcasting and the 
Internet in Britain, London: Routledge 
 
Davies, N (2008) Flat Earth News, London: Chatto and Windus 
 
Davis, A (2007) The Mediation of Power: A Critical Introduction, London: Routledge 
 
Engelen, E, Erturk, I, Froud, J, Johal, S, Leaver, A, Moran, M, Nilsson, A and Williams, K 
(2011) After the Great Complacence: Financial Crisis and the Politics of Reform, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 
 
Ferguson, C (2012) Inside Job: The Financiers Who Pulled Off the Heist of the Century, 
Oxford: Oneworld 
 
Franklin, B. (2012) ‘The Future of Journalism: Developments and Debates’, Journalism 
Studies, 13/5–6: 663–81 
 
Goldacre, B (2013) Bad Pharma: How Medicine is Broken and How We Can Fix it, London: 
Fourth Estate 
 
Herman, E and Chomsky, N (2002) Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the 
Mass Media, 2nd Edn., New York: Pantheon Books 
 
This is a pre-print accepted manuscript version of the original title from 
Goldsmiths Press http://www.gold.ac.uk/goldsmiths-press/
7 
 
Klein, N (2014) This Changes Everything: Capitalism Versus the Climate, London: Allen 
Lane 
 
Lewis, J, Williams, A and Franklin, B (2008) ‘A Compromised Fourth Estate? UK News 
Journalism, Public Relations and News Sources’ in Journalism Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp 1-
20 
 
Lewis, M (2011) The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine, London: Penguin 
 
Lewis, M (2014) Flashboys, London: Allen Lane 
 
Loughborough University EU Referendum 2016: http://www.lboro.ac.uk/news-events/eu-
referendum/ 
 
Lukes, S (2005) Power: A Radical View, Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
McChesney, R and Nichols, J (2010) The Death and Life of American Journalism, New 
York: Nation Books 
 
McChesney, R (2014) Digital Disconnect: How Capitalism is Turning the Internet Against 
Democracy, New York: The New Press 
 
McGettigan, A (2013) The Great University Gamble: Money, Markets and the Future of 
Higher Education, London: Pluto Press 
 
Monbiot, G (2000) Captive State: The Corporate Takeover of Britain, Basingstoke, Pan 
Books 
 
Murphy, R (2013) Over Here and Undertaxed: Multinationals, Tax Avoidance and You, 
London: Vintage Digital 
 
Opensecrets (2012) Online site at: http://www.opensecrets.org/index.php, Washington DC 
 
Pew (2012) The State of the News Media Reports, Washington DC: Pew/The Project for 
Excellence in Journalism 
 
Picard, R. ed. (2014) The Euro Crisis in the Media, I.B Taurus 
 
Piketty, T (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University 
Press 
 
Power, M (1997) The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification, Oxford: OUP Press 
 
Public Libraries News (2014) Online Site at: http://www.publiclibrariesnews.com 
 
Shaxson, N (2012) Treasure Islands: Tax Havens and the Men Who Stole the World, London: 
Vintag
This is a pre-print accepted manuscript version of the original title from 
Goldsmiths Press http://www.gold.ac.uk/goldsmiths-press/
8 
 
Section One: Public News Media 
 
The future of public service media is of special concern in the UK where, following the 2015 
election, the Conservatives have made a series of cuts to the BBC and set in motion reviews 
about its future funding and governance. Likewise, the future status of Channel Four, the 
UK’s commercially-funded public service broadcaster, is also being reconsidered. The threat 
to the public service remits of both organisations is a particular worry when the large 
majority of print media are owned by Conservative-supporting owners. But, of course, as the 
other papers in this section reveal, public service media is now struggling to survive in many 
nations. Several offer insights into what a future British media landscape might look like. 
 
In the first paper here, Toril Aalberg reviews the evidence comparing public and private 
media systems across a range of nations. Toril, who has worked on a number of international, 
comparative projects finds public service media do more to inform citizens in democracies. 
Sifting through the conclusions of multiple studies, she finds that public service media 
systems, on balance, offer more depth and hard news coverage and, consequently, their 
citizens are more informed about current affairs.  
  
Next, Aris Nikolaidis investigates what has happened to Greek public media since the 
financial crisis hit and harsh austerity measures were imposed on the country. As he explains, 
Greek private media was already overly-linked with big business before. Since the crisis, 
public news media have been significantly cut back, leaving private media in a dominant 
position to set reporting agendas and frames. In consequence, mainstream media coverage 
heavily favours corporate interests and right-wing politics. Thus it has continued to argue for 
austerity measures and strongly supported acceptance of the recent EU bailout agreement. 
 
The third paper recounts the recent history of news and current affairs media in New Zealand. 
The lurch towards neoliberalism was quicker  in New Zealand in the 1980s as the 
then Labour Government embraced market reforms with greater zeal than the US or UK. As 
Wayne Hope recounts, the consequences are that a thriving public media has been decimated, 
leaving foreign multinationals – often investment banks and private equity firms – largely in 
control. Thus, the New Zealand experience offers a stark warning about how neoliberal 
communication policies can lead to a financialized public sphere.  
 
The BBC is generally seen as a publicly-funded broadcaster, independent of advertising and 
kept fairly autonomous from government. However, as Kate Wright’s paper here shows, 
large, post-2010 cuts have encouraged the corporation to seek additional advertising from its 
international-facing online version. Over a relatively short period this has meant changes to 
editorial parameters and to the way the BBC presents itself. Just look at how popular features 
are currently displacing hard news on the home screen. This paper demonstrates the nature of 
the shift with her study of NGO coverage in Africa.  
 
In the final paper in the section, Rod Benson looks at the evolving digitalised news media 
environment in the hyper-commercialised US system. Here, the combination of the internet, 
under-supported public media and financial crises, have hit traditional news operations hard 
but failed to spawn a set of independent, financially-viable online alternatives. The choice is 
stark: elite news subscriptions or entirely commercialised news operations where 
Pulitzer prizes mean lower share prices. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Does Public Media Enhance Citizen Knowledge? Sifting Through the Evidence 
 
Toril Aalberg 
 
‘Political information is to democratic politics what money is to economics: it is the currency of 
citizenship’ (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996, p8) 
 
Introduction 
 
Although there are disagreements about how politically knowledgeable citizens should be for 
democracy to function well, few argue against the notion that an informed citizenry is good 
for democracy.  As most citizens get their information about politics and current affairs from 
the media, a key concern for political communication scholars has been to investigate the 
links between media funding and organization, and the supply of political information and 
public knowledge.  
 
To understand these mechanisms is perhaps more important now than ever before, as the 
media landscape is radically expanding and the number of commercial media channels 
multiplying. The challenge to existing media brought by this expansion is assumed to be a 
positive development, as citizen choices are enhanced. Such positive expectations about the 
emerging commercial media are mirrored by a rise in questions about the relevance of 
publicly-funded journalism. In many countries, there is now a heated debate on whether 
public media is distortive and stifles growth, innovation and plurality in the sector. However, 
as argued here, more commercial media does not automatically mean a more informed 
public. In fact, paradoxically, a higher number of information providers may result in a less 
informed democracy.  
 
The purpose of this text is not to review these national political disputes. Rather its aim is to 
provide a short and accessible assessment of current research on the supply and quality of 
hard news reporting in public and more commercially driven news media, and to discuss how 
this may influence political knowledge and public awareness.  
 
Public Versus Commercial Media in the Supply of News and Current Affairs. 
 
Recent comparative studies have shown that the status of public service media and their 
market impact vary considerably between nations (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, Benson and 
Powers, 2011, Rövekamp, 2014). In some countries, the media system is highly fragmented 
and mostly commercial, like the American and the Australian media sectors. In most other 
Western democratic states however, there is a more balanced mix of public and private 
media. In many cases, public broadcasters are also the dominant media outlet, both in terms 
of audience size and in terms of quality and independence. In Western and Northern regions 
of Europe, public service broadcasters have received large governmental support. In contrast, 
audiences for public service channels in Australia, the US, Canada and many countries in 
Eastern and Southern Europe, tend to be significantly smaller.  
 
Many public service broadcasters have experienced a severe funding crisis in recent years, as 
politicians and publics become more skeptical about the role public media can (and should) 
play in the future. To remain relevant in a 21st century media landscape, public service 
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broadcasters have begun supplying online and social media platforms and, in the process, 
become known as public service media (Donders et al., 2012). Nevertheless, they have 
continued to operate to a remit that promotes the ‘public good’ and serves the needs of all 
citizens (Cushion, 2012, Hendy, 2012). Typically, it is thus argued that public media should 
be distinctive from commercial competitors, and pursue normative values such as producing 
appealing content to all citizens – including minority groups – and pursuing an editorially 
diverse and independent agenda (Tracy, 1998). Public media are also justified on the basis of 
their ability to better inform citizens as commercial media chase audiences and advertisers to 
survive. It is argued that market incentives will therefore lead to an overproduction of content 
that is popular to the detriment of that which informs and empower citizens about public 
affairs. Side-stepping entrenched political positions, what does the empirical research 
contribute to this debate? 
 
The research evidence is somewhat mixed, but a majority of studies tend to support the 
assessment that there are significant differences between public and private media content.  
For instance, the general conclusion from schedule analyses, presented by Aalberg et al. 
(2010) and Esser et al. (2012), show that public service media offer better political 
information opportunities than commercial media.  Comparing the top two public service and 
commercial broadcasters in each country, in periods when many media markets were 
deregulated and commercialized, a common finding was that market-driven channels 
gradually enhanced the availability of news. This challenged the belief that 
commercialization has diminished the supply of news altogether.  
 
However, both studies also stressed that the presence of public service broadcasting within a 
national media ecology appeared to ensure that news continued to be scheduled at peak time. 
In other words ‘countries where public television has a stronger standing, the public are 
offered more prime-time news and current affairs, not only by PBS channels but also by 
commercial ones’ (Aalberg et al 2010, p 266). In contrast, in the market-driven media 
environment of the US, there was a distinct lack of news programming and current affairs, 
less at peak times and less on the most popular channels.  These studies also demonstrate that 
established public service channels generally deliver more news than their commercial 
counterparts. This finding is supported by van Santen and Vliengenhart’s (2013) study of 
Dutch TV programming over a 50 year period. This recorded that commercial broadcasters 
spent less time on information but more time on ‘infotainment’ and entertainment than the 
Dutch public service channels.  
 
An important limitation to studying broadcasting schedules however is that they cannot 
provide evidence on the quality of information provided. Accordingly, Esser et al., (2012) 
speculate about whether or not the positive effect of the growing amount of information is at 
least partly wiped out by rising levels of soft news with less relevance to the democratic 
process. One approach to evaluate the quality of news is to distinguish between ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ news, or pure information and infotainment. Reinemann et al (2012, p 234) define hard 
news as media content that is politically relevant for society as a whole, and based on 
impersonal and unemotional reporting. Soft news, on the other hand, is viewed as less 
political and more focused on individuals, personal and emotional reporting.  
 
Research evidence about longitudinal changes in the supply of hard versus soft news is mixed 
(Reinemann et al. 2012). While some studies suggest that news has not become ‘softer’ over 
recent decades (Scott and Gobetz, 1992, Waldahl et al., 2009) others have found evidence to 
suggest the opposite (Patterson, 2000, Donsbach and Büttner, 2005, Sinardet et al., 2004). It 
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is also important to note that public service broadcasters with large audiences do not 
automatically foster hard news environments. For instance, while widely watched, the Italian 
public service broadcaster does not seem to generate a lot of hard news (Aalberg et al 2013, 
Reinemann et al 2016).   
 
However, several recent studies have identified clear differences in terms of hard and soft 
news content in public service and commercial media. Maier et al.’s (2009) study, of seven 
different German television newscasts between 1992 and 2007, found a significant 
difference. While there is a linear increase of non-political content in commercial channels, 
this is not the case in newscasts provided by the public service channels. Aalberg et al (2013) 
found that public service providers across nine different countries supplied more hard news 
on foreign affairs than commercial broadcasters, who pursued more of an international soft 
news agenda. As it is costly to assemble hard, thematic news, especially in foreign countries, 
the authors suggest that this may be a response to corporate commercial considerations. 
Reinemann et al.’s (2016) comprehensive study of 16 western democracies, demonstrated 
that public service broadcasters in general provided more hard news than commercial 
television networks, even after controlling for how commercialized the media system was.  
 
Hence, one of the main conclusions of much of this literature, is that the ‘ecological effects’ 
of strong public service television is that it contributes to a general climate in which media 
are more likely to report about politics in more substantial ways.  
 
Media Systems and Public Knowledge 
 
Publicly supported media systems tend to provide greater opportunities for citizens to 
encounter informative news, and many comparative studies therefore argue that citizens also 
are more likely to learn from it (Aalberg and Curran 2012, Curran et al 2009, Iyengar et al 
2010, Soroka et al 2013). Put simply, countries that support and help fund public journalism, 
and who therefore offer a larger share of substantive news-content to large audiences, 
produce a better learning environment than market-driven media systems, where quality news 
is less easily available.  
 
These favorable opportunity structures are determined not only by the sheer volume of news 
and information, but also by their extensive distribution to a large and heterogenic audience. 
For instance, the placement of news and current affairs between popular shows and in 
attractive timeslots is seen to engage “inadvertent” audiences; i.e., those viewers who had not 
planned to watch the news but came across it accidently. Blumler (1970) first recognized the 
democratic value of reaching such audiences through these smart ‘traps’.  
 
Several recent empirical studies have supported this thesis (Curran et al 2009, Iyengar et al 
2009) with reference to the public service versus commercial media debate. Aalberg and 
Curran (2012) demonstrate, for instance, that the knowledge gap between the interested and 
the uninterested is relatively small in many of European countries, while this gap is quite 
dramatic in the US. Citizens who were very interested in politics, and who declared that they 
follow domestic politics closely, were indeed very well informed across all countries and 
media systems, including the commercial US system. But, while uninterested citizens in 
Europe still managed to be relatively well informed, this was not the case in the US, where a 
substantial minority had minimal news media exposure and remained politically uninformed. 
Insights from these studies suggest that the larger and increased knowledge gap in the more 
market-oriented US media-system indicates that learning about politics is a more active 
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process than in many European countries. US citizens are now required to work harder in 
actively seeking out the news (Prior, 2007).  
 
The more extensive information environments offered by media systems with stronger public 
service providers, by contrast, stimulate more passive learning. Shehata’s (2013) study, using 
Swedish panel data, found that exposure to news at election time had stronger effects on 
current affairs learning among citizens with lower levels of general political knowledge. This 
happened despite the fact that these programs are watched less extensively by this group of 
citizens, simply because they learn more from news exposure than high-information groups 
(2013). Shehata thus concluded that ‘the smaller current affairs knowledge gaps found in 
public service-oriented countries are, at least partly, the result of passive learning from 
television’s inadvertent audiences who are captured by the extensive political information 
opportunities provided by the major television channels’ (2013, p 217). The new tendency of 
watching television content online, rather than live, may however reduce this inadvertent 
audience effect (Prior, 2007).   
 
Shehata (2013) did not control for the different effects of exposure to public service versus 
commercial media. But, as in other studies, his data suggested that the most knowledgeable 
citizens tended to prefer public service channels, while the less informed, to a larger extent, 
watch commercial news.  Strömbäck’s Swedish study (2015) however, did find that exposure 
to public service news lead to positive knowledge effects whereas exposure to commercial 
news had negative knowledge effects. These results hold even after stringent controls, 
including general prior political knowledge.  
 
An important innovation in media effects research is to control for self-selection tendencies 
within particular audiences (Soroka et al., 2013, Fraile and Iyengar, 2014). Soroka and his 
colleagues found that, compared to commercial news, public service broadcasters had a 
positive influence on news knowledge. However, not all public service providers were 
equally effective in this way (the effect of exposure to the Italian public broadcaster was 
actually negative). In the UK there was a clear positive effect of exposure to news from 
public service broadcasters and a clear negative effect of exposure to commercial news. Also 
controlling for self-selection of news, Fraile and Iyengar (2014) found that public 
broadcasters had more informative effects than commercial broadcasters on unmotivated 
citizens, but exposure to broadsheets newspapers generally overshadow the positive effect of 
public service news exposure.  
 
The empirical evidence also suggests that differences in national news supply not only 
influence how much citizens know about politics, but also the type of knowledge learnt. One 
of the patterns found in many studies is that Americans are less informed about international 
news compared to people in less market-driven media systems (e.g., Aalberg et al., 2013). 
Another, and perhaps more important type of current affairs knowledge, is citizens’ ability to 
describe the issue positions of the main political parties. A surprisingly large number of 
citizens however, find it impossible to do this (Jenssen et al., 2012, p 144). Among citizens 
with low hard current affairs knowledge more than half of the respondents were unable to 
describe the parties issue position. Jenssen et al (2012) investigated if the media was able to 
help lift people out of this political ignorance and found that exposure to public service news 
had the most positive effect, while exposure to news from commercial broadcasters was less 
important. Similarly, Banducci et al (2015) using the European Election Study from 2009, 
showed that citizens who obtain information via quality news outlets (including public 
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service broadcasters) had a better understanding of parties’ policy positions than voters who 
received their information through low quality outlets (including commercial broadcasters).  
 
Conclusion 
 
This review suggests that citizens are more likely to be exposed to hard news and be more 
knowledgeable about current affairs if they watch public service news, or news in public 
service dominated media systems, compared to more market-driven news environments. 
Although there is some mixed evidence, the overall picture indicates that the media economy 
and public knowledge is related. The quality of the information environment and the positive 
effect of public service providers are based on institutional independence. Commercial 
broadcasters clearly provide the citizens with more news opportunities if they need to comply 
with certain regulations and compete with a relatively strong public broadcaster. Despite the 
amount of news steadily increasing over recent decades, with more commercial choice and 
competition, the review suggests public service media remain distinctly different from 
market-driven news, and that they clearly are more effective in engendering informed 
citizenship.  
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Chapter Three 
 
The Impact of Austerity on the Greek News Media and Public Sphere 
 
Aris Nikolaidis 
 
Introduction: Capitalism, Crisis and the Media 
 
The case of contemporary Greece demonstrates that despite the ongoing capitalist crisis 
neoliberalism has been entrenched rather than discredited. According to Hall, Massey and 
Rustin, ‘[t]he burden of ‘solving’ the crisis has been disproportionately off-loaded on to 
working people, targeting vulnerable, marginalised groups’ (2013, p 4, 5); and has served as 
an excuse for the ‘further restructuring of state and society along market lines, with a raft of 
ideologically-driven ‘reforms’ designed to advance privatisation and marketisation’.  
 
The dynamic of change unleashed in the context of capitalist crises concomitantly involves 
significant ideological and institutional shifts in the field of politics and culture (Harvey 
2014, p ix). The media system is central to this very process as media portrayals constitute 
how the ‘reality’ of the crisis is constructed, mapped out and contextualized. This paper 
addresses such recent shifts within the Greek media system in relation to its political role, the 
breadth of opinions represented and the open spaces it provides to alternative views. It also 
discusses some examples from my research on the representation of the crisis in Greece from 
2011 to 2015, which is part of an interdisciplinary project addressing media coverage of crisis 
in the European Union (Coen and Nikolaidis forthcoming 2016, Nikolaidis 2015a, 2015b).  
 
Public Communication During the Crisis: the Greek Case 
 
The effects of the crisis on the media field may be seen as being driven by a combination of 
polarization and fragmentation. It is characterized by three key developments. First, the chief 
tendency of the mainstream, privately owned and market-driven media has been to provide 
ideological legitimacy to the so-called memorandum/bail-out agreements, the policies of 
austerity stemming from them, and the political elites implementing them. Second, while 
mainstream Greek journalism sustained and reproduced the hegemonic neoliberal agenda 
(Doudaki 2015, Mylonas 2014), a simultaneous counter-tendency has emerged: the growth of 
a multitude of alternative news outlets mostly online. These have been a source of critical 
views on the memorandum policies. Katalipsi ESIEA, the blog of the 2009 occupation of the 
Athenian Union of Journalists headquarters (Siapera, Papadopoulou and Archontakis 2014), 
is a typically radical example highlighting, among other things, the impact of austerity in the 
form of redundancies and exploitative precarious labour in the Greek media industries. 
 
Third, is the closing down of the public broadcaster ERT in 2013, a development which made 
the clash between the mainstream and alternative online news agendas all the more stark. 
ERT was abruptly shut down by the previous Conservative-led government as part of its 
policy of cuts. The staff occupied the headquarters and continued to broadcast online with the 
support of EBU and Greek alternative news websites until they were evicted by riot police. 
ERT was succeeded by a failed attempt to establish a new broadcaster, and was eventually 
restored by the current government.  
 
The closing down of ERT has been rightly seen as a blow to media pluralism (Iosifidis and 
Boucas 2015, p 19), but it is also part of a wider set of pressures on journalists, including 
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censorship, self-censorship, prosecution and police violence (Syllas, 2013). As a result, the 
country has the European Union’s second lowest ranking in the 2015 World Press Freedom 
Index (2015), having fallen 56 places during the years of the crisis. 
 
The Political Economy of a Media Oligopoly 
 
An analysis of public communication in such a context of crisis and change needs to take into 
account the ways in which major media organizations operate as privately owned and profit-
orientated capitalist enterprises. Not least of all because the Greek case is characterised by 
highly concentrated ownership across media sectors (Leandros, 2010), and has often been 
seen as constituting a media oligopoly with connections to political elites (Iosifidis and 
Boucas, 2015, p 14). The existing concentration of media power is the outcome of major 
structural shifts in media ownership during the 1980s. Finance, originating mainly from 
construction, shipping and the oil industries, was then invested in the print media sector. 
Along with the remaining traditional publishers, private capital then gained control of 
broadcasting through the emergence of private television, which has remained practically 
unlicensed and unregulated (Nikolaidis 1999).  
 
Furthermore, privately owned media organizations have accumulated severe levels of debt 
(Darzanou, 2013). They largely operate through bank loans, into which a judicial inquiry was 
recently launched (Kitsios, 2015), as well as through favourable treatment of their debt by 
pro-memorandum political elites (Papadopoulos, 2013). Media debt characteristically 
includes more than 24m euro of unpaid tax for the use of broadcasting frequencies during the 
2011-2014 period. The overall picture is that private economic interests have achieved 
significant control over the public sphere in Greece under politically privileged and 
economically unhealthy terms. This is not to suggest that there is a deterministic, cause-and-
effect type of relation between capitalist control of the media and journalistic content. It is, 
however, to suggest that the market is not neutral, and that the economic aspects of media 
companies set the general limits of their operation. Thus, the activity of private and 
concentrated media ownership in a deregulated market is first and foremost a political issue, 
which threatens to undermine the quality of contemporary democracy (Nikolaidis, 1999, 
2008). The latter is characteristically demonstrated in the coverage of the economic crisis. 
 
Mainstream Media and the Politics of Austerity 
 
The Greek case reveals an increasingly homogenised content appearing across the 
mainstream media. This has resulted in a coherent support for the bail-out agreements, the 
implementation of the neoliberal policies they involve, and hostile coverage of opposition 
and critique by left-wing parties and movements. The editorials and opinion columns of the 
mainstream newspapers To Vima and Kathimerini, ideologically positioned in the centre and 
the right respectively, are exemplary of this. They both share a distinctly ideological narrative 
that depoliticises the crisis by neutralizing its systemic character.  
 
The crisis is discursively constructed as a national emergency. This demands a consensus 
response from all the major political parties (Kathimerini, 2014c, To Vima 2011a) in order to 
avert imminent financial and social meltdown (Karakousis, 2011). Under such terms, 
austerity is legitimized as an objective economic necessity and/or a necessary lesser evil 
(Mandravelis, 2011). Unsurprisingly, economic recovery is often interpreted in explicitly pro-
business terms. To Vima urges workers unions to willingly succumb to wage losses so as to 
“facilitate” industrialists in their activities (2011b), and appeals to the patriotism of 
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businessmen in the hope of turning Greece ‘into a contemporary El Dorado’ (2012). 
Kathimerini celebrates both the identification of countries as brands (2014a) and the equation 
of politics with management (2014b).  
 
The interpretation of the crisis in national terms constitutes the prevalence of consensus 
politics which, at the same time, is also manifested in mainstream media attacks on left-wing 
critics of the bail-out agreements and austerity. In one characteristic example, the left is 
repeatedly addressed as “loony” (Mandravelis, 2012, 2015), in a fashion reminiscent of 
Thatcher era British tabloids. The Greek case, however, is paradigmatic of a far more 
aggressive rhetorical strategy, the so-called ‘theory of the two extremes,’ aiming to 
delegitimise the left by equating it with the violence of the Nazi party Golden Dawn. In two 
notorious examples, this strategy was manifested in almost identical titles in different 
newspapers (Kasimatis 2012, Pretenteris 2012). Ironically, it was the mainstream media that 
contributed to the rise of the Nazi party amidst the crisis (Psarras, 2012). Golden Dawn was 
whitewashed through high profile interviews on private television (horis mantra, 2015) and 
fake news was manufactured in their favour (Ios, 2013). Just five days before the murder of 
the anti-fascist musician Pavlos Fyssas by Golden Dawn, which obliged authorities to begin 
long-overdue prosecutions of the party as a criminal organization, they were still considered 
as a potential part of a conservative alliance (Papadimitriou, 2013).   
 
Alternative Media and Meta-Journalism 
 
Such an overwhelmingly flawed performance of the media’s democratic role was also 
displayed during the recent referendum on further austerity measures. The mainstream media 
were accused of fear mongering and bias in favour of the ‘Yes’ vote. Subsequently the 
Athenian union of journalists referred nine prominent private television journalists to its 
disciplinary board. In two well-known Facebook posts which went viral, content analysis of 
television revealed the striking imbalance of coverage of the rallies for the ‘no’ and the ‘yes’ 
vote, which strongly favoured the latter (Petropoulos, 2015a, 2015b).  
 
Alternative media has offered an important counter to the mainstream. In Greece it is a 
multifaceted field consisting of independent websites and magazines, crowdfunded 
documentaries, digital radio stations, and a thriving community of bloggers and social 
network users. It has been enriched by the online presence of anti-austerity groups, the 
antifascist movement, grassroots syndicalism and left-wing organizations. As a whole, this 
field represents key features of citizen journalism and includes an active tradition of open 
publishing.  
 
However, it also has limitations. First, the emerging relationship between, on the one hand, 
alternative news and social movements and, on the other, commercial social media platforms, 
displays the effectiveness but also the contradictions that characterize cases such as Occupy 
(Fuchs 2014). Secondly, the exploitation of digital platforms by the Nazi party Golden Dawn 
(Kompatsiaris and Mylonas, 2015) remains a politically dangerous blind spot. 
 
The political and journalistic implications of the emergence of bottom-up pressures online 
may be demonstrated in the case of Twitter, where the mainstream media have been given 
hashtags consisting of the names of private television stations and the slang word for 
‘ridiculous’ (#mega_xeftiles, #skai_xeftiles, etc.). In one characteristic case, a trending 
hashtag titled ‘flying anarchists’ (#iptamenoi_anarxikoi) was used to effectively ridicule and 
contradict the coverage of clashes between police and protestors on the private television 
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channel Ant1. Its reporter claimed to have access to exclusive information on, among other 
things, an “airborne anarchist brigade”, and was eventually held accountable by the online 
community for his adoption of the perspective of the police (Haralampopoulos, 2014). This 
example demonstrates the potential of challenging official definitions and contesting the 
power of sources from below. At the same time, however, it also demonstrates that, despite 
important meta-journalistic victories against the mainstream media, the latter maintain their 
dominant reach towards large audiences, and that official power holders continue to enjoy 
privileged access to them. 
 
Austerity, Consensus Politics and the Media System 
 
The multi-layered economic, political and social changes driven by the current crisis pose 
continuous challenges to the political role of the media system. Current ideological and 
institutional shifts suggest the formation of an unprecedented elite political consensus in 
support of the neoliberal restructuring of Greek society. Pivotal to this development has been 
the shift of the SYRIZA-led Government away from its anti-austerity electoral platform, and 
its endorsement of a third memorandum agreement to more austerity measures and 
privatizations. Perhaps more importantly, however, the prevailing consensus has also 
entrenched national narratives. These frame the crisis in terms of an opposition between 
Greece and powerful EU member states such as Germany, at the expense of a critique of 
neoliberalism and class politics both in Greece and across the EU.  
 
The extent to which alternative online media may be able to rejuvenate public 
communication in an era of consensus politics remains to be seen. However, the 
implementation of austerity, as a principle means of devaluing labour power and 
redistributing wealth towards capital, depends upon the disciplining of the affected workforce 
and the ideological assimilation of opposition. Thus, the direct connection between the 
economics and the politics of the crisis suggests that law and order news remain a key media 
topic necessary for contesting official definitions. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Impoverishing the Mediated Public Sphere in Aotearoa New Zealand: The Slow Demise 
of Television News and Current Affairs  
 
Wayne Hope 
 
The last episode of TV3’s Campbell Live on 29 May 2015 signalled the end of primetime 
current affairs on New Zealand television. In many ways, its demise also marks the end of the 
once thriving mediated public sphere that had developed in the country since the 1960s; to be 
replaced by a set of transnational, financialized corporations with market goals. 
 
Campbell Live succeeded inspite of the prevailing conditions. Today in New Zealand, apart 
from the Maori Television Network (established in 2004), free-to-air channels are saturated 
with tabloid infotainment shows, sponsored reality TV formats, advertising segments and 
product placements. Interviews with public figures and issues-based reporting were 
consigned to early morning weekend slots. Against the trend, Campbell Live began on 21 
March 2005 at 7pm with Carol Hirschfield as producer and John Campbell as 
presenter/correspondent/reporter. The show was always a hybrid. Interviews with politicians 
and public figures and issue-driven stories mingled with lighter infotainment pieces and 
programme sponsorship. The then owner of TV3 and sister channel TV4, Canada’s Canwest 
media conglomerate, exemplified the North American model of commercial television. Each 
successful network required a high profile news brand and news presenter to push primetime 
ratings. John Campbell was TV3’s major identity and investment. The rise and fall of 
Campbell Live, amidst a changing media landscape, reflects the worsening plight of 
primetime current affairs television and the mediated public sphere. 
  
Roll back a few decades, to before the neoliberal policy shifts of the Labour government in 
the 1980s, and the country was experiencing a thriving public sphere. My conception of the 
public sphere refers to guaranteed freedoms of association, expression and publication, and 
their independence from arbitrary state power, religious authority, and private commercial 
interests. Actually existing public spheres of communication within legal environments, 
artistic and literary communities, political parties, representative institutions, universities, and 
media domains can be outlined and evaluated against their own implicit value claims 
(Habermas, 1992, Hope 2012). On these criteria, a nationally-mediated public sphere had 
emerged in the 1960s and 1970s.  
 
In the context of a Keynesian Social Democratic polity and a Westminster two-party system, 
a semi-independent network, the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation (NZBC), was 
established (1961). This ended formal ministerial control of the airwaves and initiated a new 
relationship between government, broadcasting and journalism. Although NZBC bureaucrats 
were paternalistic, broadcasting journalists were, for the first time, able to interpret political 
issues (Cleveland, 1969). Radio programmes, such as In the News, Checkpoint and Viewpoint 
introduced listeners to political commentary. On the NZBC’s single television channel, the 
current affairs programme Gallery, fronted by Brian Edwards, challenged government 
ministers and criticized official institutions, such as the Police and the Security Intelligence 
Service. In 1973, the year after Labour gained office, a new Broadcasting Act further 
enhanced the autonomy of broadcast journalism. The Broadcasting Ministry portfolio was 
abolished and replaced by a 7-member council presiding over Radio New Zealand (RNZ) and 
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a competitive two-channel, colour television network. This represented a public broadcasting 
system loosely based on the BBC model.   
 
Although the National Government of 1975 introduced a new Broadcasting Act reducing the 
institutional autonomy of Television New Zealand (TVNZ) and RNZ, governments could no 
longer manage news independently of news professionals. The stock figures of journalists 
and politicians were at the foreground of mediated public life. Audiences became accustomed 
to interview formats and adversarial debate over economic, social and foreign policy. 
Television programmes, such as Close Up, Dateline Monday, and News at 10, combined 
interviews, studio discussion formats and investigative pieces (Hope, 2012).  
 
Over the same period, newspapers from the four major centres – Dunedin Christchurch, 
Wellington and Auckland – advanced the range and depth of news coverage. The New 
Zealand Press Association (NZPA), a conservative newsgathering organization, was 
complemented by the Parliamentary Press Gallery. Each major newspaper had between one 
and six journalists reporting daily. Outside of controversial issues, gallery correspondents 
provided day-to-day coverage of Parliament, along with reportage on farming, commerce, 
industry, finance and pubic administration. Although such journalism was not critical or 
investigative, the available range of commentary was extended. In some newspapers and 
magazines, such as The Listener, enterprising journalists could tackle volatile topics, such as 
race relations, youth culture and protest activism.  
 
Thus, the 1960s and 1970s saw the emergence of a nationally-mediated public sphere shaped 
by a semi-independent broadcasting system, a modern commercial press, and current affairs 
journalism. Meanwhile, traditional constructions of national identity, which had shaped the 
officially-mediated public sphere, were challenged by new social movements. Most 
importantly, against the backdrop of white settler capitalism, a Māori cultural resurgence and 
an associated struggle for land rights openly contradicted the colony-to-nation progress myth 
upon which kiwi national identity had been founded. Second wave feminists, Green activists, 
anti-Vietnam war protestors, and an anti-apartheid movement, opposed to sporting ties with 
White South Africa, also challenged conventional notions of New Zealand-ness. The political 
issues of women’s reproduction rights, equal pay, New Zealand’s involvement in US military 
interventions, forest and lake conservation, and All Black rugby contacts with South Africa 
dominated news and current affairs. Māori land occupations, women’s conventions, protests 
against US dignitaries, South African sports teams and environmentally-destructive energy 
projects were national media events.  
 
From 1984, under neo-liberal policies introduced by the Fourth Labour Government, 
broadcasting was deregulated and media communication infrastructures were absorbed by 
transnational corporations. TVNZ and RNZ were turned into dividend-gathering state-owned 
enterprises (1989). The entry of Sky, a pay-television network, allowed its subsequent 
principal shareholder, News Corporation, to acquire live match rights for major sporting 
codes: rugby union, rugby league, cricket, netball, English premier league soccer. The 
concurrent entry of TV3, as a regionally-owned private television network, was initially 
unprofitable and local shareholders went bankrupt. As of 1994, the new principal 
shareholders were Canadian media conglomerate Canwest (10%), Westpac Bank (48%) and 
an official receiver (32%) (Rosenberg, 1994). Canwest was then Canada’s largest media 
corporate with film, print, television and other off-shore holdings in Ireland, Northern 
Ireland, the United States and Australia. Between 1996 and 2000, it assumed control of the 
consortium running TV3 (and later TV4) and acquired a raft of commercial radio stations. In 
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1990, New Zealand’s telecommunications infrastructure was sold to Bell Atlantic and 
Ameritech (34.2% each) along with local banks and businesses. The following year, under a 
National Government even more committed to neo-liberalism, all restrictions on foreign 
media ownership were lifted. 
 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, transnational media communication conglomerates 
continued to colonise the mediated public sphere (Hope, 2012). The effects upon broadcast 
news journalism and current affairs were multiple and long-lasting. Soon after broadcasting 
deregulation, Radio New Zealand management received 15% salary cuts, other staff either 
lost overtime rates of pay or were placed on part-time contracts. At TVNZ, intense 
competition with TV3 for advertising revenue resulted in major lay-offs across news desks 
and among production staff. In December 1990, regional news services in Christchurch and 
Dunedin were removed as were Sunday night news shows (Scott, 1995).  
 
In the case of prime time television news bulletins, a team of American news consultants 
transformed the existing format into infotainment packages. The central purpose was to build 
and maintain ratings flow between advertising segments. Content analysis undertaken by Joe 
Atkinson for the period 1985 to 1992, demonstrated a marked decline in item length and a 
prevalence of brief sound bites. Emphasis shifted from issues relating to politics, economics, 
public policy and industrial relations to those of crime, human interest and natural disaster 
(Atkinson, 1994). Daniel Cook’s analysis of TVNZ’s One Network News from 1984 to 1996 
found that the average news item length fell from 90 to 70 seconds and commercial breaks 
increased from 12% to 23% of the entire bulletin (Cook, 2001).  
 
The style and content of television current affairs on TVNZ and TV3 also changed markedly. 
Sarah Baker’s analysis of such programmes from 1984 to 2004 indicates a diminishing item 
length and a “significant decline in the coverage of serious political and informational 
subjects and a sustained and measurable move to more entertainment-oriented current affairs 
programmes” (Baker, 2012, p 221). In 1984, on TVNZ’s Sunday and Close Up programmes, 
median item lengths were 19.1 and 16 minutes respectively. By 2004, Sunday’s median 
figure was 13.3 minutes. In 1994, five years after TVNZ introduced the magazine-style 
Holmes show, its median item length was a paltry 5.7 minutes (p 129). This long-running 
programme, fronted by media personality Paul Holmes, encapsulated the growing prevalence 
of tabloid formats. Baker’s research also indicated an increase in crime, celebrity, human 
interest, and other entertainment-oriented stories. In 1994, Holmes and TV3’s 20/20 devoted 
45% and 56% respectively of programme time to such content. By 2004, these figures had 
risen to 62% and 79% (p.146). 
 
Within this unforgiving commercial environment, Campbell Live from its inception 
developed a real national presence. A public sphere ethos drove stories about security service 
surveillance, environmental pollution, public health, declining real wages, overcrowded 
housing, and New Zealand residency scams. Ordinary citizens spoke straight to camera minus 
the elaborate formatting typical of infotainment and reality TV shows. Campbell Live’s 
resilience in a non-public service setting was truly remarkable.  
 
However, the show’s future became problematic from 2007 when Canwest sold its 70% stake 
in Mediaworks to HT Media, a subsidiary of the Australian private equity firm Ironbridge 
Capital for NZ$790 million. This exemplified a new financialized phase in the transnational 
colonization of domestic media. Mediaworks was the holding company for TV3, TV4 and a 
nationwide stable of commercial radio stations. After the 2008 global financial collapse and 
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global recession, falling advertising revenues worsened Mediaworks’ financial position. In 
the year to 2009, it posted a NZ$314 million loss (Mollgaard & Rosenberg, 2010). 
Subsequently, Ironbridge swapped its own financial debt for equity injections from Goldman 
Sachs, the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), and Bank of New Zealand (BNZ). By mid-2012, 
Mediaworks’ debt restructuring involved two new major debt holders – TPG Capital and 
Oaktree Capital Management. The latter group bought NZ$125 million worth of 
Mediaworks’ debt from the RBS and BNZ. By late 2013, Mediaworks was owned by Oaktree 
Capital (26.7%), RBS (21.9%), TPG Capital (15.7%), Westpac (14.6%), RABO  Bank 
(14.6%), and JP Morgan (6.5%) (Myllylahti, 2012). Oaktree Capital raised its ownership 
stake to 43% in 2014 and 100% in May this year. With these developments, Campbell Live 
was in mortal danger; short-termist financial imperatives required a new business model for 
TV3.  
 
Julie Christie, Mark Weldon and other Mediaworks managers favoured multi-platform 
broadcasting, low-cost reality TV shows and infotainment programmes with a skeletal 
staffing structure. The phrase ‘current affairs’ would be maintained to obscure the objectives 
of restructuring and to taint Campbell Live’s accomplishments as a dated, tiresome form of 
the genre. In the latter context, a New Zealand Herald report on May 23 this year reported 
that “Mediaworks management viewed Campbell Live’s crusading journalism as a liability 
that stretched viewer patience”. They described on-going coverage of the November 2010 
Pike River coalmine explosion and resulting controversies as a cause of viewer “fatigue” and 
criticized the emphasis given to “the aftermath of the Christchurch earthquake, “GCSB 
spying” and “child poverty” (Nippert and Thompson, 2015).  
 
The eventual demise of Campbell Live marked the end of a historical trajectory. State-run 
broadcasting without current affairs formats lasted from the early 1920s until around 1960. 
The subsequent development of a semi-independent broadcasting system fostered a culture of 
television journalism based on public sphere principles. New Zealand’s neoliberal policy 
revolution, broadcasting deregulation, and the transnational corporate absorption of national 
media reshaped television news and current affairs such that tabloid-infotainment formats 
prevailed. The financialization of media ownership generally and of Mediaworks in particular 
completes the trajectory. After Campbell Live, Māori Television’s Native Affairs is all that 
remains of prime time current affairs. Yes, there is the internet and a thriving political 
blogosphere and an advertising-free though cash-strapped radio national network where 
public issues are debated. However, the commercially-blasted television landscape has 
impoverished the journalistic public sphere. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Public-Commercial Hybridity at BBC News Online: Covering Non-Governmental 
Organisations in Africa 
 
Introduction 
 
BBC News Online is one of the most popular news websites in the world (Jones and Salter, 
2011), with enormous credibility in the UK (Hendy, 2013) and overseas, especially in the US 
(Bicket and Wall 2009, Thurman 2007). It sits at the heart of the BBC’s broader efforts to 
respond to the challenges of commercialisation, digitalisation and convergence, whilst remaining 
mindful of its commitment to public service values (Allan and Thorsen, 2010, Thorsen et al. 
2010). Yet serious concerns have been raised by Goldsmiths researchers about the ways in which 
the increased webcentricity of the Corporation’s journalism has been shaped by its executives’ 
privileging of speed, technology, and the homogeneity produced by recycling journalistic content 
(Lee-Wright 2010, Redden and Witschge, 2010), so comprising part of a broader shift within the 
BBC towards marketised values. 
 
My work (Wright 2015) serves to develop this research, as well as that carried out by Phillips 
into online journalists’ changing sourcing practices (2010). This is because it found that the 
pressure to increase advertising revenue via the international-facing English-language site 
(BBCNews.com), together with the cost-cutting carried out before and after the licence fee freeze 
in 2010 (Hendy 2013, Tumber 2011), had begun to alter journalists’ approach to sourcing and 
other forms of production practice. However, traditional Reithian values have not been 
marginalised by the intrusion of marketised norms. Instead, normative and economic values were 
found to modify one another via journalists’ deliberative decision-making in ways which 
prompted them to reconstruct their approach to public service journalism. 
 
The cases I examined involved journalists’ use of multimedia provided by Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) in the news coverage of Africa. But in the course of conducting semi-
structured interviews with those who made key decisions shaping the production of the two 
media items in question (Copnall and Hegarty 2012, Crowley and Fleming 20101), it became 
clear that this relatively narrowly focused study had significant implications for the study of the 
Corporation’s broader engagement in different forms of public-commercial hybridity (Born 
2004, Steemers 1999, 2006). In particular, it raises serious questions about the extent to which 
these internal and external changes are eroding the organisational policies and structures put in 
place historically by senior BBC executives to separate commercial from editorial decision-
making. 
 
An ‘Absolute Division Between Church and State?’ 
 
In a rarely granted interview, Mark Byford, the former Deputy Director General of the BBC, 
explained that BBC News Online was not initially conceptualised by senior managers as a 
                                                
1 Both items were about South Sudan and appeared on the Africa page of BBC News Online during a single week in 
August 2012. However, the second item had been republished as part of a Special Collection of archived material to 
mark the first anniversary of the country’s independence. 
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money-making venture (interview 5 Feb. 2014). But the rapid increase in the site’s international 
audience, especially after the bombing of the World Trade Centre in 2001 and the London 
Underground in 2005, led him to decide to allow advertising on BBCNews.com (interview 
Byford 2014). Whilst this was legitimised in terms of fairness to licence fee payers, Richard 
Sambrook, who was the Head of Global News at that time, stressed that BBC executives had also 
hoped that the income raised by Online would help them pay for the soaring costs of 
international coverage and for further digital expansion (interview 14 April 2014). In particular, 
he stressed that executives hoped that advertising revenue would be significant enough to allow 
them to divert the Foreign Office Grant-in-Aid (which was at that time funding the international-
facing section of the website, as well as World Service Radio) to Arabic satellite TV, because the 
Iraq war had led to this being ‘a big priority’ for the Corporation (interview Sambrook 2014). 
 
However, Byford was eager that ‘public trust in the authority of the BBC’s journalism’ should 
not be endangered by perceived threats to journalists’ political impartiality and editorial 
independence (interview 2014). So he tasked Sambrook with chairing a special committee of 
senior executives, whose responsibility was to establish organisational structures and policies in 
order to ‘ensure a clear divide’ between editorial and commercial decision-making (interview 
Byford 2014). Sambrook spoke rather more frankly about this: arguing that there had been 
‘enormous’ internal tensions between the senior journalists in BBC News and the commercial 
executives in BBC Worldwide, who he said ‘thought they could make a fortune’ from the site, 
but didn’t understand the editorial and political ‘sensitivities’ involved, so needed formal 
structures and policies in place to ‘keep them honest’ (interview 2014). 
 
For these reasons, the committee worked with the BBC Trust in order to pass organisational 
policy placing the journalists at BBC News firmly in charge of all editorial commissioning, as 
well as clarifying where adverts could and could not be placed, and specifying which kinds of 
adverts were appropriate (interview 2014). The latter included banning adverts from NGOs, 
along with all other ‘political…lobby or pressure groups’ following a test-case relating to Oxfam 
(BBC Strategic Approval Committee 2009, p10).  
 
Nevertheless, large quantities of NGO-provided photos were found on BBC News Online in 
2012. This was indirectly shaped by serious changes to the BBC’s political economy, for in 
March 2010, Mark Thompson, the BBC’s then Director General, decided to cut the budget 
for Online by twenty-five per cent. This was a ‘tactical move’ to try and ward off attacks by the 
Corporation’s commercial rivals and by the pro-market Conservative party who looked likely to 
win the General Election in May (Franklin, 2012, p7). The strategy didn’t work, and the licence 
fee freeze announced by the new Conservative-led Coalition government led to the BBC 
experiencing a sixteen per cent drop in income in real terms: so compounding the effects of 
earlier cuts at BBC News Online. 
 
As David Moody, the Head of Strategy at Worldwide, explained the revenue generated by 
advertising placed on BBCNews.com is ‘but a drop in the ocean’ compared to the amount 
generated by licence fee, but finding ways to increase it became increasingly important to the 
Corporation after 2010 (interview 24 Jan. 2014). Because of the pressure to raise advertising 
income, Worldwide had begun to take some editorial decisions. This began with commercial 
executives’ engagement in ‘rejigging’ visuals and running orders, in order to ‘represent content 
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so that it is more relevant to international audiences’ (interview Moody 2014). But soon this 
‘representation’ began to involve Worldwide commissioning ‘supplementary content’ for 
international audiences, albeit ‘in consultation’ with BBC News (interview 2014). This appears 
to undermine the organisational separation of editorial and commercial decision-making agreed 
historically by Sambrook’s committee, even though Moody maintained that there was still an 
‘absolute divide between Church and State’ (interview 2014). 
 
The editorial direction taken by Worldwide executives also merits further research because 
Moody described his priority as commissioning the kinds of ‘up-beat’ lifestyle features which 
advertisers would like to ‘associate their brand’ with (interview 2014). These included items 
 
‘… around Business, around Finance, around Health and Well-being, around Motoring 
… All the things that in their extreme form would be in what The Financial 
Times publishes in “How to Spend” on a Saturday.’(interview Moody 2014) 
 
But Moody complained that BBC journalists simply didn’t make enough of the kinds of features 
which would appeal to advertisers seeking to reach those kinds of markets, so he ‘had to’ spend 
money commissioning these features from ‘the market’ (email communication 2014). Indeed, he 
stressed that these kinds of Worldwide-commissioned features now comprise ‘an increasingly 
large part – often the majority’ of the features on BBC News.com (correspondence Moody 2014). 
 
NGO-provided multimedia and public-commercial hybridity 
 
No evidence was found that such commissioning processes shaped the use of NGO-provided 
multimedia directly. But the privileging of ‘feel-good’ features which trickled down from senior 
managers, together with cost-cutting measures designed to stimulate the publication of larger 
numbers of features, via the recycling of other BBC content, was important (Redden and 
Witschge 2010). For the production of the first media item studied involved the incorporation of 
photos taken by the South Sudanese media collective, Woyee Film and Theatre Ltd, in a feature 
article (Copnall and Hegarty, 2012), and this hinged on the decision-making of Stephanie 
Hegarty, a World Service journalist tasked with combing the radio station’s English-language 
output for non-news material suitable for publication online.  
 
Hegarty stressed that her personal views and practices had become more nuanced since gaining 
more experience in the coverage of Africa and that the BBC’s use of NGO-provided multimedia 
online was continuing to change rapidly, especially since the Ebola crisis in West Africa (email 
communication 11 May 2015). However, at the time of sampling, Hegarty said that senior 
managers had simply said that the site ‘needed more features’ and she had noticed that positive’ 
‘human interest’ features were particularly warmly received (interview 27 November 2012). 
 
So Hegarty did not see herself as deliberately selecting media items on the basis of their appeal 
to advertisers. Instead, she described herself as serving other commercial aims (interview 2012), 
although these also helped make the site more ‘advertiser-friendly’ (interview Moody 2014).  
 
Such aims included supplying Online journalists with immediately appealing ‘human interest’ 
stories which would be popular with, and ‘fun to read’ for audiences (interview Hegarty 2012, 
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see also Sambrook et al. 2013), as well as sourcing stories about more unusual actors and place 
in order to differentiate BBC News Online from its competitors, and sourcing large amounts of 
high-quality, visually appealing material, so that the sight looked immediately striking. 
 
All of these considerations shaped Hegarty’s decision to recycle media items about small African 
collectives and cooperatives, such as the South Sudanese NGO, Woyee Film and Theatre 
Industry Ltd which was represented by the item forming the basis of the first case study (Copnall 
and Hegarty, 2012). This group had been represented initially in an arts radio package, composed 
by the BBC’s Sudan and South Sudan Correspondent, James Copnall, so Hegarty said she had 
much of the editorial material she needed already (interview 2012). Although she did go on to 
conduct one additional interview herself, she stressed that the main purpose of this was to ask 
permission to use the NGO’s photos, which she had seen displayed on the group’s Facebook site 
and which were of an unusually high technical quality for an African NGO because of their own 
focus on media production (interview 2012). 
 
Hegarty regarded relished the opportunity to represent the members of this NGO as adept film-
makers, seeing this as striking a blow against stereotypical ‘negative’ and ‘disempowering’ 
representations of Africans by others (interview 2012). In this way, she argued she was enabling 
the BBC’s public service journalism to function as a form of Reithian education (interview 
2012). But in her eagerness to prepare a story which would be immediately appealing to the 
site’s readers, she focused upon the entrepreneurialism and technical expertise of the NGO to 
such an extent that she inadvertently marginalised its more alternative, communitarian values 
(interview Danis 20 Feb 2013). 
 
Nevertheless, using photos provided by a smaller, African NGO was quite unusual at BBC News 
Online. Joseph Winter, the site’s Africa Editor, said a much more common use of NGO-provided 
multimedia involved his compilation of photo slideshows using images provided by major 
International NGOs (INGOs), despite the BBC’s ban on accepting adverts from them (interview 
7 May 2012). Yet again, a key consideration here was how to make the site immediately 
appealing and visually distinctive, although Winter linked this far more explicitly to advertising 
than Hegarty. As he explained: 
 
‘There has been, if not exactly pressure, then talk of experiments about advertisers, 
because … if there’s a special event coming up then there’s so many adverts around 
it. And if there’s a special page, then … for example, banks operating in South 
Sudan, you know, the likes of them may like to advertise around that so the page has 
to look really snazzy’ (interview Winter 2013) 
 
The lack of many internal photographers at BBC News Online and budgetary constraints 
therefore drove Winter to use the photographs provided by INGOs who were able and willing to 
hire experienced freelance photojournalists whom he ‘could not afford to employ’ himself 
(interview 2013). The technical and aesthetic qualities of these photos also meant that such 
slideshows were often republished in ‘special reports’ of archived material, such as the item on 
which the second case study was based, which used photos provided by Save the Children 
(Crowley and Fleming 2010). 
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Although Winter was uncomfortable about repeatedly reinforcing the definitional advantages 
enjoyed by INGOs in the construction of knowledge about Africa, like Hegarty, he justified his 
actions according to Reithian ideas about the educative purpose of the BBC’s public service 
journalism. For he claimed that his rapid re-versioning of INGO-provided photos for slideshows 
enabled him to cope with the loss of one team member in the rounds of cost-cutting which had 
taken place (Fenton 2010): arguing that then he could focus on ‘the real public service…the real 
journalism’, which he re/defined as breaking news (interview 2013). 
 
Yet perhaps the most worrying way in which the use of NGO-provided multimedia functioned in 
the reconstruction of public service journalism at BBC News Online involved its role in 
entrenching the promotional culture that shaped journalists’ relationships with each other and 
with their audiences (Davis, 2013). For editorial discussions between colleagues had not only 
speeded up because of the loss of several Online journalists, but they had also become laden with 
noticeably commercial norms. For example, Hegarty stressed that she had to pitch re-versioned 
material to the journalists on the Africa page which would be immediately appealing to them, as 
they were so busy  they would not have the time or energy to engage with more than ‘a quick 
sell’ (interview 2012). 
 
Likewise, Lucy Fleming, the other journalist working on the Africa page, described herself as 
‘pushing’ or ‘selling’ stories to the editors of main news pages, who then ‘sold’ or ‘promoted’ 
these stories to audiences (interview 16 November 2012).  Fleming then went on to explain that 
INGO-provided multimedia was particularly useful in such processes, not only because it 
required little re-versioning (Fenton, 2010), but also because INGOs had usually already 
identified saleable events, as well as stories about saleable individuals with significant emotional 
appeal to audiences (interview Fleming, 2012, see also Davis, 2013). 
 
Indeed, Fleming even described the former child soldier, who appeared in the photos provided by 
Save the Children, as ‘a really easy sell’ (interview 2012). But what was most interesting about 
this was the way in which Fleming blended even this heavily marketised approach with Reithian 
ideals in order to reconstruct her understanding of the normative purpose of public service 
journalism. For she argued that the ‘whole point’ of such promotional processes was to try and 
get as many Online readers as possible to click on items about Africa, reasoning that then ‘they 
should understand at least some of the issues involved’ (interview Fleming 2012). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Whilst this study pertained specifically to the use of NGO-provided multimedia in the coverage 
of Africa provided by BBC News Online, it shows that journalists’ sourcing and other production 
practices are changing. This is because of the pressures exerted by both organisational cost-
cutting and the need to generate more advertising revenue, both of which are linked to issues 
regarding audience popularity, market differentiation, speed and staffing. Further research 
clearly needs to be done in this area, but it appears that the intensity of such pressures has 
brought about the partial erosion of organisational structures designed historically to prevent the 
Corporation’s commercial aims from interfering with its journalists’ editorial decision-making. 
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These findings develop previous work conducted at Goldsmiths regarding the marketisation 
of BBC News Online (Lee-Wright 2010, Redden and Witschge, 2010) because they show that 
normative values are not necessarily marginalised in such processes. Rather, economic and 
normative values interact with, and modify, each other in the course of journalists’ deliberative 
decision-making, so transforming their approaches to public service journalism. The new, value-
laden practices which emerge from these deliberations also have a complex relationship to 
homogeneity (Lee-Wright 2010, Redden and Witschge, 2010). For on the one hand, cash and 
time-poor journalists used NGO-provided multimedia because they thought it would help them 
differentiate their content from other news outlets visually, as well as in terms of the people and 
places covered (Phillips, 2010). But on the other hand, the kinds of content these journalists 
selected, as well as the marketised ways in which they processed it, tended to strip out its alterity. 
 
Such changing production practices re-legitimise the BBC’s reputation to offer a ‘global’ public 
news service, as well as enhancing its ability to compete for audiences and advertisers online. 
But this article raises serious questions about which and whose capabilities are enhanced by 
journalists’ use of NGO-provided photos on BBC News Online. Therefore this study speaks to 
current debates about the future funding of BBC journalism, demonstrating that organisational 
cost-cutting does not just produce greater efficiency. Rather, it tends to produce unintended 
qualitative changes in what journalists do, how they do it, and how they view the purpose/s of 
journalism. The risk is that these changes further marginalise the values and perspectives of 
those who are already disadvantaged and disempowered in the world. 
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Chapter Six 
 
The New American Media Landscape 
 
Rodney Benson 
 
US journalism has taken a fresh turn in recent years. A small group of major digital 
commercial and nonprofit news ventures seem to be here to stay, and they are providing real 
competition to the still dominant legacy media outlets. New and old media alike are creating 
new forms of civically valuable journalism, but in the shadow of increasingly concentrated 
and opaque economic wealth.  
 
Since the 1990s, the US commercial journalistic field has sub-divided into three segments, all 
of them operating online and some with still substantial offline components: a mass 
infotainment segment consisting of well-established websites such as Yahoo, Buzzfeed, and 
Huffington Post and rising stars such as Vice and Vox, as well as local commercial television 
news; a partisan segment represented by (conservative) Fox and (left-liberal) MSNBC, 
mostly conservative talk radio, and the political blogosphere; and a ‘mainstream’ quality 
segment led by national newspapers such as the New York Times and Wall Street Journal, the 
national network news, and general news magazines such as Time and leading regional 
newspapers.  
 
The boundaries between these categories are fluid (many outlets, including network 
television news and digital outlets such as Huffington Post and Vox, attempt to straddle the 
quality/mass divide) and often contested (conservative critics dismiss attempts by the New 
York Times and other mainstream media to present themselves as nonpartisan). Although 
audiences tend to concentrate in one of the three segments or sub-segments (in the case of 
partisan media, left or right, respectively), there is also some movement from one to the other 
either through conscious effort or social media-led serendipity. As I argue below, the small 
but dynamic US public and nonprofit sectors are mostly not a counterforce to this market-
based system, but rather supplement and increasingly cooperate with commercial outlets.  
 
America’s ongoing natural experiment can provide important lessons for the rest of the 
world: What new forms of journalism are US commercial and nonprofit media bringing into 
being? How do these projects map on to the demographics and media usage patterns of the 
citizenry? And, what are the civic possibilities and limitations of this commercial system?  
 
But before we try to answer these questions, we need to set the stage by taking a closer look 
at the causes and consequences of the financial crisis that began in earnest in the mid-2000s 
and continues to shape the American journalistic field.  
 
The Financial Crisis in American Journalism 
 
The ongoing US journalistic financial crisis needs to be understood in relative terms. At least 
until around 2005, news media companies were among the most profitable companies in the 
United States, regularly earning 20 to 30 percent profit margins (O’Shea, 2011). Media 
companies relied heavily on advertising for their revenues; American newspapers earned 80 
percent of their revenues from advertising, the highest proportion in the world (WAN, 2007). 
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The tradeoff between this hyper-commercial logic and public service commitment was 
evident when Wall Street sent Knight-Ridder stock prices tumbling in 1986 on the day the 
newspaper chain won seven Pulitzer Prizes. Reportedly, Knight-Ridder executive Frank 
Hawkins phoned a stock analyst who followed the company to ask him why the shares had 
lost so much value. ‘“Because,” he was told, “you win too many Pulitzers.” The money spent 
on those projects, the analyst said, should be left to fall to the bottom line’ (Meyer, 2006, p 
6). Pressures continued to intensify during the 1990s as profit maximization came to 
dominate all other considerations.  
 
It was in the midst of this less than idyllic situation that the crisis, or rather a series of crises, 
arrived after the dawn of the new century: notably, the decline of print classified and display 
advertising and their meager replacement by online advertising, and the financial crises of 
2001 and 2008 which further depressed advertising revenues. From the historic peak year of 
2005 up to 2013, advertising revenues for newspapers plummeted from $49 billion to just 
over $20 billion; only about 10 percent of the current total comes from digital advertising 
(Pew, 2014a).  
 
Despite the dramatic drop in revenues, newspaper companies have continued to maintain 
profits of 8 to 15 percent by digging ever deeper for newsroom cuts (Mitchell, 2012). Over 
the past decade, full-time newspaper journalism jobs have been reduced from 60,000 to 
40,000 (Downie and Schudson 2009). In particular, public affairs reporting – especially 
investigative reporting – from the local to the international level has been hit especially hard 
(Walton, 2010, Enda, 2011).  
 
Publicly-traded companies, once the dominant form of newspaper ownership, are 
increasingly selling off major outlets to wealthy individuals such as Amazon founder Jeff 
Bezos (Washington Post), Boston Red Sox owner John Henry (Boston Globe), Minnesota 
Timberwolves owner Glen Taylor (Minneapolis Star-Tribune), and conservative activist 
billionaire Sheldon Adelson (Las Vegas Review-Journal). The Washington Post, under 
Bezo’s stewardship, has expanded and thrived; the Las Vegas Review-Journal, on the other 
hand, has been rocked by accusations of publisher political meddling. The new media 
moguls, even when they seem benevolent, raise new problems of transparency and 
accountability in the exercise of public power. 
 
To address the shortcomings of the commercial system – what economists would call ‘market 
failure’ (Baker, 2002) – in most other democracies the logical step would be for the state to 
intervene in some way. But in the United States a public policy solution is vigorously 
opposed by an uneasy coalition of anti-government conservatives and professional 
journalists, the latter motivated by a strict interpretation of the First Amendment, which they 
see as prohibiting any government involvement with the press.  
 
Compared to any other leading democratic nation-state, the United States has the smallest 
taxpayer-funded public media sector by far. The pillars of this system are PBS (Public 
Broadcasting Service) and NPR (National Public Radio); public funding amounts to $4 
(slightly less than 4 euros) per capita, compared to $50 for the public service media of 
France, $91 for Great Britain, and $130 for Germany, Norway and Denmark. To be clear, 
PBS and NPR are a public/nonprofit ‘hybrid’: they receive the majority of their revenues 
from charitable donations, large and small. Yet even when these donations are added to the 
mix, total funding of America’s public media is still less than $10 per capita (Benson and 
Powers, 2011).  
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The Online Pecking Order: Legacy Media Still Dominate 
 
Despite the financial crisis and the downsizing of their journalistic mission and ambitions, it 
must be emphasized that ‘legacy’ commercial media (companies originally producing 
newspapers, magazines, and/or television) continue to dominate the US media system in two 
market metrics: revenues/profits and online audiences.   
 
The largest online-only news outlets, Huffington Post (#4 in online monthly unique users) 
and Buzzfeed (#7), are actually making subpar or even zero profits (these and all subsequent 
rankings and online audience sizes are from Pew 2015a). For example, in 2014, Huffington 
Post’s net profit (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization, or EBITDA, 
the generally accepted measure) was zero, rising slightly in 2015 to a net profit of 6 percent 
(Berman 2015). This contrasts to newspaper companies’ continued average of 8 to 15 
percent, not to mention the much larger profit rates for cable TV news (Pew, 2015b, p 33-34). 
 
Digital media’s sole reliance on online revenues underwrites only skeletal, mostly low-paid 
staffs compared to those of their print or television counterparts. For instance, the US 
Huffington Post with its ‘monthly uniques’ audience over 100 million supports 260 full-time 
editorial workers, most of whom spend their time recycling content produced by other news 
organizations (Calderone, 2016).  In contrast, the New York Times, with its online audience of 
57 million and a subscribing audience of 2 million (1 million each for print and online), 
maintains a full-time professional news staff of 1,300 (Pew, 2014c, Doctor, 2013), none of 
which is involved in aggregation. 
 
Legacy media also have the largest audiences online. In order, old lions like ABC (in 
partnership with Yahoo!), CNN, NBC, CBS, USA Today, The New York Times, and Fox 
make up eight of the top nine news websites in the United States. Legacy media make up 29 
of the top 50 online news outlets by audience. 
 
Even so, we can begin to discern some significant ways that this new digital media system 
differs from the relatively low-choice ‘broadcast’ system that preceded it (Prior, 2007). For 
one thing, the Internet has broken down international barriers. Six of the top 50 US media are 
now British imports: Daily Mail (#10), BBC (#15), The Guardian (#17), Telegraph Media 
Group (#29), Mirror Online (#40), and The Independent (#42). In addition to the BBC, non-
commercial media are represented in the top 50 by the US NPR (#19).  
 
Beyond the top 10 that includes Huffington Post and Buzzfeed, online-only commercial news 
include a range of outlets devoted to politics, sports, business, and technology. Compared to 
the low-choice broadcast era of media, the fragmented digital system offers increased topical 
and often ideological diversity. There is also an increase in the diversity of forms and formats 
of journalistic practice.  
 
Two US digital media outlets in particular are worth highlighting for their unique and in 
many ways admirable journalistic practices: Vox.com and ViceNews.com.  
 
Instead of breaking news, Vox writers take complex issues – such as the Syrian conflict, 
Obama’s health care plan, climate change, etc. – and provide in-depth explanations  
enlivened by graphs, questions and answers, and slide shows. So-called Vox “card stacks” 
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provide serious but lively backgrounders on topics ranging from “The 18 best TV shows 
airing right now” (updated weekly) and “Police shootings and brutality: 9 things you should 
know” (both posted on January 4, 2016) to “Bitcoin: explained” (posted November 3, 2015) 
and “The basics of the US immigration system” (posted August 4, 2015).  
 
Vice, for its part, is unique for its highly personal, visually stunning, ‘immersive’ journalism. 
In its acclaimed series for HBO (also available for free on its website or YouTube channel), 
Vice documentaries provide rare glimpses of daily life in places like Syria, Ukraine, North 
Korea, Central African Republic, and even ISIS’s ‘Islamic State’ (the latter a recipient of a 
Peabody Award for journalistic excellence). As Vice correspondent Danny Gold explained at 
a recent New York event, the goal is to ‘get out of the way’ and act ‘as a conduit’ for 
documentary subjects to express their own views (Gold, 2015). Vice is doing reporting no 
one else is doing and reaching younger audiences (average age 26) few if any other news 
outlets are attracting (Ip, 2015). 
 
Less admirably, Vice (along with Buzzfeed) is a pioneer in producing ‘sponsored content’ 
(also known as ‘native advertising’ or ‘brand publishing’), which it actively courts through its 
slyly named marketing agency ‘Virtue’. For instance, a Vice website vertical ‘The Creators 
Project’ sponsored by ‘founding partner Intel’ often features news stories with engineers and 
artists using Intel products (Widdicombe, 2013). The label ‘founding partner’ – rather than 
sponsor – is worth noting: it signals that today’s corporate funders are not content with 
attaching their name to a program but rather seek to actively shape the content to suit their 
interests. Vice cultivates an edgy, alternative vibe, but the commercial formula behind it is 
full-throttle capitalism. Its investors include Fox (James Murdoch now sits on the board), 
Time Warner Inc., Hearst, Disney, A&E Network, and numerous venture capital firms.  
 
In sum, the new digital outlets are a mixed bag. Even their virtues may just be part of a 
swiftly passing liminal moment, as intriguing experiments are tamed and captured by the 
usual commercial imperatives.  
 
The conventional wisdom is that whatever commercial media cannot or will not do  – local 
investigative reporting, sustained in-depth reporting on enduring social problems, and the like 
– will somehow be taken care of by philanthropy. But can nonprofit journalism really fill the 
gap?  
 
The Nonprofit ‘Alternative’ 
 
In 2011, a New York conference of foundation funders of media enterprises publicly declared 
that given the lack of adequate commercial and government support, foundations bore a 
major civic responsibility for finding solutions to the crisis of journalism (Grantmakers in 
Film + Electronic Media 2011). A 2014 survey of 93 nonprofit news organizations found that 
about three-quarters received foundation funding, which usually made up the majority of 
their total revenues (Pew, 2014a p 19). 
 
Leading nonprofit news media clearly see their work as a form of public service. A Knight 
Foundation (2013) study of 18 non-profits, representing local, state, and national 
investigative organizations, found that they devoted from 34% to 85% of their budgets to 
editorial, compared to an average for commercial news operations of 12% to 16%. In another 
recent comprehensive survey of 172 non-profit news organizations founded since 1987, the 
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Pew Research Center (2013, p 6) showed that more than half focus on investigative reporting 
(21%), government (17%), or public and foreign affairs (13%).   
 
Investigative journalism has received a significant boost from nonprofit news organizations, 
most notably ProPublica (founded in 2008), which has won two Pulitzer Prizes, as well as the 
longer established but expanding Center for Investigative Reporting (founded in 1977) and 
Center for Public Integrity (founded in 1989). In 2015, ProPublica’s targets included the Red 
Cross (‘How the Red Cross Raised Half a Billion Dollars for Haiti and Built Six Homes’), the 
New York Federal Reserve (‘shining a bright light on the Fed’s culture, a culture that seems 
to stifle dissent and has made regulators excessively cozy with the financial giants they are 
supposedly overseeing…’), and hospitals’ overly aggressive efforts to collect debts from 
working class families (ProPublica, 2014). Despite such successes – all firmly within the 
realm of a modest left-liberal reformist agenda – there are significant limits to the foundation 
‘solution’ to the market failure of American commercial journalism.   
 
Annual donations to news organizations are $150 million (Pew, 2014b, p 4, 20), a drop in the 
bucket compared to total US foundation annual giving of $55 billion (Foundation Center 
2014) or to the decreased $1.6 billion in annual commercial spending on editorial budgets 
since 2008 (Waldman, 2011). Put another way, total revenues for all types of US news are 
about $60 billion: two-thirds of this amount still comes from advertising, while paying 
audiences account for most of the rest. Foundation contributions make up less than 1 percent 
of the total (Pew, 2014a p 3).  
 
The nonprofit sector remains small however you measure it. The largest national nonprofit 
news organizations, the Christian Science Monitor and ProPublica, both have annual total 
budgets of around $10 million and employ 80 and 50 fulltime journalists, respectively 
(Lewis, 2010). At the regional and local level, the largest nonprofits are the Texas Tribune 
($7 million budget, 42 full-time journalists), followed at some distance by MinnPost ($1.6 
million, 17 journalists) and Voice of San Diego ($1.3 million, 11 journalists) (Knight, 2015, p 
6).  
 
Most major foundations do not see themselves as providing an antidote to the market but 
rather short-term startup support with the expectation that nonprofits will eventually achieve 
commercial “sustainability” (Edmonds, 2015). To achieve sustainability, elite nonprofit 
media are encouraged to get their audiences to donate or subscribe. This formula moves 
nonprofit media toward an increasingly exclusive mission, news by and for elites. MinnPost 
publisher Joel Kramer has been quoted saying that monthly ‘uniques’ to his website are 
‘worse than worthless’ and that he is really aiming for an elite, repeat readership of ‘one-sixth 
of adults’ (Edmonds, 2013). Even at their most expansive, nonprofit news sites measure their 
total audiences in the thousands rather than millions (Knight, 2013, p 14): for example, 
270,000 at the MinnPost and 560,000 at Texas Tribune, while the overall average for 
nonprofits is less than 50,000. Some outlets, such as ProPublica, also share their content with 
commercial outlets, expanding their reach but adding little or nothing to their bottom line. 
 
Corporate sponsorships have become a key element of nonprofit sustainability. Lacking both 
major foundation and business support, as the case of the San Francisco Public Press shows, 
most nonprofit enterprises are doomed to marginality.  
 
The San Francisco Public Press was launched in 2009 as a self-proclaimed ‘Wall Street 
Journal for Working People’. The Public Press refuses advertising or corporate sponsorships 
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as a matter of principle. Asked by the Columbia Journalism Review in 2009 to write an 
‘imaginary retrospective’ of the Public Press for the year 2014, Stoll (2009) ‘recalled’ the 
‘daily print launch in 2012’ that ‘allowed us to reach a whole new audience: the working-
class population in San Francisco’. Stoll continued: ‘Low-income folk are of little value to 
the luxury-goods advertisers targeted by traditional papers, and the Internet doesn’t 
ameliorate this because even in 2014, a third of that segment of the population has limited or 
no broadband Internet access at home’. 
 
Stoll was right about the lack of advertiser interest in working-class audiences. Unfortunately, 
lacking adequate non-advertising support, his paper has not yet been able to find an effective 
way to reach them either. As of the end of 2015, the Public Press maintained a website 
(updated twice-weekly) and sells a few thousand copies of a 16-page print magazine, priced 
at a dollar, four times a year. The Public Press remains a lean operation relying almost 
entirely on volunteer labor and an annual budget of less than $100,000 per year, half from 
local philanthropic organizations, thirty percent from individual donations, and the remaining 
20 percent from print newspaper sales and other sources. The lesson is clear: Nonprofit media 
truly committed to overcoming market failure will struggle as long as major foundations are 
only looking for the next market solution.  
 
Ultimately, it should also be remembered that foundation donations are not ‘free’ but rather 
constitute a redirection of public resources (dollars that could go to government if it were not 
for generous tax deductions) to nontransparent and unaccountable entities that have 
effectively assumed media policy responsibilities. As one leading media foundation official 
volunteered to me: 
 
‘We’re not regulated. There’s no accountability. I don’t have to meet with anybody I 
don’t want to meet with. None of us do. And I don’t think that’s a great system. So 
my responsibility is to be the best steward, but as a culture, as a democracy I don’t 
actually think foundations are the best way of providing public goods’ (Foundation 
official, 2013). 
 
Despite the language of civic duty that surrounds the foundation world like a golden haze, 
there are also often specific strings and metrics attached to grants. Foundations increasingly 
prefer funding specific projects to general operations. This obviously creates the possibility 
of a conflict of interest, or appearance as such.  
 
Far from being a source of independence, US ‘public’ media’s reliance on philanthropy has 
created constant pressures to skew content to meet donors’ demands. In recent years, a 
number of revelations have shown the depth of the problem: in 2012, PBS created a multi-
part series on the US economy sponsored by Dow Chemical that closely tracked the 
company’s major business interests; in 2013, it created a documentary about drones funded 
by Lockheed Martin, a drone manufacturer; and in 2014, it created a series entitled ‘Pension 
Peril’ about the problems caused by public employee pensions, funded by a billionaire 
investor’s personal foundation that is, by its own account, pushing state and local legislators 
across the US to ‘stop promising a (retirement) benefit’ to public employees (Sirota, 2014). 
As PBS’s ombudsman admitted: These scandals ‘shine a light on … ethical compromises in 
funding arrangements and lack of real transparency for viewers caused, in part, by the 
complicated funding demands needed to support public broadcasting’ (Getler, 2014). 
 
Conclusion: Creeping Towards Oligarchy 
This is a pre-print accepted manuscript version of the original title from 
Goldsmiths Press http://www.gold.ac.uk/goldsmiths-press/
42 
 
 
The US hyper commercial media system contrasts sharply with that of most other leading 
democracies, which anchor their own systems with a strong public media sector. A growing 
body of international comparative research has demonstrated that public media consistently 
provide more in-depth, ideologically diverse, and critical news about public domestic and 
international affairs than commercial media (Benson, 2013, p 201-205) and play an important 
role in increasing citizen confidence and engagement in democratic institutions (Albæk et al., 
2014). 
 
What will be the end result of the American experiment in hyper commercialism and 
philanthropy? While there are some bright spots, a number of problems loom on the horizon 
for American news media.  
 
If current trends hold, full-time professional journalism will continue to be downsized. The 
tens of thousands of journalists being laid off at major legacy news organizations are not 
being replaced by the trickle of new jobs at digital and nonprofit news organizations, not even 
close.  
 
Digital-only commercial media are subject to even greater commercial pressures than their 
legacy predecessors were, as advertisers gain greater control over the editorial process via 
native advertising. The only escape from advertiser control seems to be increased reliance on 
reader contributions and subscriptions, which tend to favor high-income demographics and 
ultimately wall off most people from the promised civic and cultural benefits of the Internet.    
 
As a whole, the US media system – increasingly privately-held or foundation-funded – seems 
to be moving back toward the corrupt and agenda-driven media system that prevailed in the 
US and most of Western Europe prior to World War II, and probably still is the global norm. 
In this kind of system, global oligarchs accept less than maximal profits in exchange for the 
obvious publicity – and silencing – power of the media. This doesn’t mean there won’t be 
quality journalism anymore. But there are clearly limits, and as economic power becomes 
increasingly concentrated, these limits will degrade the quality of democratic life. Any media 
reform worthy of the name will need to address these new challenges.  
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Section Two: Public Knowledge in Britain 
 
Section two looks at other forms of public knowledge in Britain and their erosion since 2010. 
Across a variety of sectors, the Coalition and then Conservative Governments, have applied a 
mix of severe cuts, covert privatization measures and market-inspired public sector 
reorganisations. In each case the transition, as well as its wider impacts, have been obscured, 
with public debate squeezed, official statistics buried, and government and corporate spin 
liberally disseminated. In the case of legal aid and libraries, the pathways and outcomes are 
simple: severe cuts with the mass of ordinary citizens being deprived of legal and other forms 
of public knowledge. In education, the story is more complex. Large parts of the higher 
education system have already been privatized. The academisation of schools suggests, like 
the recent restructuring of the NHS, that full-scale marketization of education may not be far 
away. Ironically, marketization in this case does not mean greater individual and 
organisational choice and autonomy but, instead, seems to be leading to more centralised 
government control.  
 
The first chapter in this section asks: what exactly is happening to our school system since 
post-2010 administrations began forcing through a mixture of academisation and 
centralisation? What does it mean for children and teachers and where is it all leading? Ken 
Jones sketches out the bigger picture: one in which education is increasingly driven by a 
conflicting mixture of private, market-let bodies and state-set targets and audits, with prior 
educational ideals dropping down the priority order.  
 
Next, Andrew McGettigan, explores the economic and financial logic through which the UK 
Treasury has justified transformations in the funding and financing of higher education in the 
UK. Following the tripling of university fees and the botched introduction of an unsustainable 
loan system, the government has made further attempts to make HE “a market”. The Treasury 
in particular looks at education as a form of “human capital” and wants to redirect student 
and HE institutional choices towards a logic of investment and future returns. 
 
One of the most controversial sets of cuts imposed by the Coalition Government was to legal 
aid provision and related legal services. In the third paper here Roger Smith asks, quite apart 
from the social consequences of this move, what are the larger economic outcomes of it? He 
makes the case that a clear discussion of this has been obstructed by noise from all sides, but 
dominated especially by official sources. In the process the true direct and indirect costs, both 
financial and social, are being obscured. Equally concerning, the great gains of the “welfare 
rights” movement, as they related to the justice system, are now being cast out altogether. 
 
In the last chapter, Ian Anstice offers an overview of how local library services across the UK 
have been affected by cuts. As he explains, although only 10% have been axed since 2010, 
the hidden real-terms cuts go far deeper. Services and provision offered have been drastically 
reduced and reshaped in a number of ways that only partially paper over what is happening. 
As with other public institutions, such cuts, tacitly supported by the Coalition and 
Conservative Governments, have undermined the very principles upon which local libraries 
were built. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
The Autonomous School, the Strong State, the Problems of Education 
 
Ken Jones 
 
Since its election victory, the Conservative Party has wasted no time in getting on with its 
education programme – essentially an acceleration and extension of policies developed by the 
previous Coalition government. Its centrepiece is the attempt to convert most English schools 
into academies – institutions that are publicly financed but are not accountable to any elected 
body, other than central government itself2. 
 
In some ways, this looks like a programme of marketization: the creation of a landscape 
buzzing with the activity of private companies, filled with autonomous schools managed by 
leaders incentivised to innovate and to discover through experiment ‘what works’ and what 
can drive standards ever higher. But this is not the whole picture. Ever since the Education 
Reform Act of 1988, the measures of marketization introduced to English schooling have 
been intertwined with the strengthening of the powers of central government. Making sense 
of this private-public amalgam, sketching its trajectory and anticipating its problems, is both 
a complex analytical task and a worthwhile political project. It brings into view the outlines 
of a dynamic and unstable system, which has had powerful effects on knowledge production 
and educational work – effects that merit both exploration and challenge. 
 
Towards Academisation 
 
There are around 22,000 state schools in England – about 17,000 are primaries, and 3200 
secondaries. There are a diminishing number of nursery schools – around 500 – and nearly 
1000 special schools. Since 2010, governments have been trying to persuade and in some 
cases compel schools to become academies. The result of this recruitment drive, which is 
supported by a special unit of the Department for Education (DfE), is that as of June 2015, 
there are 4,676 academies of all types open across England (HoC Library, 2015). 61 per cent 
of secondary schools are academies, and 14 per cent of primaries (DoE, 2015). A school 
becomes an academy either by conversion, or sponsorship. Conversion is a process through 
which the existing governing body takes over from an elected local authority control over 
admissions, performance, assets and finances. By this means, billions of pounds of public 
wealth have been transferred into private hands. With sponsorship the same ends are achieved 
through the intervention of an outside agency, approved by the DfE to take over an 
‘underperforming’ school. Sponsors can include other educational institutions, and also 
‘businesses and entrepreneurs, educational foundations, charities and philanthropists and faith 
communities’ (DfE, 2015). 
 
In this variegated landscape, where the old forms of co-ordination and governance, exercised 
through local authorities and local representation on governing bodies, are in decline, new 
forms arise. The multi-academy chain – a group of academies with a single sponsor – is one 
such form. Under the Coalition the number of chains increased, as did the number of schools 
that they controlled. In 2010, ARK (Absolute Return for Kids) managed 8 schools; by the end 
of 2014, the number had risen to 31; the Harris Federation – 9 in 2010 – by 2014 controlled 
                                                
2 For a concise (ten-page) explanation of the different types of school in the English system, see the New 
Schools Network (2015) 
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27; United Learning, linked to the Church of England, had increased from 13 to 41. In June 
2014 the DfE listed 192 chains, some running more than 50 schools, the majority only three 
or four (Hutchings et al., 2015). 
 
The influence of these organisations has spilled over from school management to wider fields 
of policy. ARK, for instance – closely involved with the financial sector from which it draws 
much of its funding – has become involved in professional development, teacher training, 
curriculum and learning strategies development. In the process it has brought ‘new practices 
and methods from the business sector to bear upon the education problems it addressed’ and 
became an ‘active agent of education reform’ (Junemann and Ball, 2013). The DfE is keen 
that this process of agency should be extended and works to achieve the appointment of 
‘exceptional business leaders to the boards of multi-academy trusts’ (Morgan, 2015). As the 
influence of business leaders grows, the role of parents and teachers on governing bodies will 
be reduced. 
 
Government as Co-ordinator 
 
Many aspects of state schooling are thus shaped by private sector influence and there is profit 
to be made in many places, from the provision of supply teachers to the maintenance of 
buildings, to consultancy, research and policy advice. But it would be a mistake to see this 
proliferation of activity as a sign that the future of schooling will be organised along full 
market lines, with change being driven by competition between private educational entities 
seeking to maximise their market share. From the supplier’s standpoint, it is difficult to make 
a consistent profit from a business in which staff costs as a percentage of total expenditure are 
so high; from the regulator’s standpoint, it is difficult to guarantee standards across the 
diversity of a fully marketised system. Thus, while policy has favoured private sector 
involvement in schooling, it has not adopted a voucher-based or ‘user pays’ approach. That 
decisive step towards marketisation, is something that governments shrink from taking. 
 
The emphasis of policy has thus fallen elsewhere. Both New Labour and Conservative 
administrations have held on tightly to the role that government was allocated in 1988, one of 
steering the system so that it follows procedures and pursues goals that are ever more closely 
specified by central authority. It is not to parental demand that the system answers but to the 
central state – a form of accountability that is stronger, now, than ever. 
 
Steering is based on the collection of data about school performance, focused on levels of 
success in tests and exams. The widely-publicised league tables provide one way of doing 
this. Another, more powerful instrument is the Ofsted Data Dashboard. This ‘provides a 
snapshot of performance in a school’ to which Ofsted inspectors will refer ‘to compare the 
performance of a school with others with which it is deemed to be comparable’ (Ofstead). 
Likewise, another Ofsted site, Raise Online, provides teachers with ‘interactive analysis of 
school and pupil performance data’, intended as a resource for school improvement 
(Raiseonline). The appeal to the authority of data underlies also the mechanisms that the 
government proposes for further academisation. ‘Coasting schools’- those destined for forced 
academisation – are defined by their failure to meet targets of pupil attainment and pupil 
progress (Schools Week, 2015). 
 
In short, schooling is at many levels ‘governed by data’, subject to what Jenny Ozga calls 
highly centralised system steering (Ozga, 2009). Decisions over such matters as how pupils 
should be grouped how teachers should be managed, and who should own an academy 
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(Rosen, 2014) are arrived at and justified with reference to ‘what the data tells us’. But while 
policy-makers continue to believe in the truth of data, the processes through which it is 
collected and reported are elsewhere called into question. ‘It’s hard to put numbers on to 
knowledge’, writes the blogger Jack Marwood, ‘but that hasn’t stopped people trying to do 
just that’, and since the National Curriculum was introduced in 1988 children have been 
assessed as being at different levels based on what knowledge, skills and understanding 
various experts have said they should have. Once possessed of such ‘numbers’, Marwood 
goes on, government agencies have processed them in statistically disreputable ways – 
treating schools with very different populations as if they are comparable (Marwood, 2014). 
 
Effects 
 
Recent research by Merryn Hutchings reports the effects of this data-driven system on pupils. 
Schools have to maximise their scores, in the narrow range of subjects that policy prescribes. 
Teachers spoke to Hutchings of a primary timetable ‘dominated by Maths and English 
lessons, plus daily spelling/reading/mental maths’; Year Six pupils in one primary school did 
no subjects other than Maths and English in the months between their return to school in 
September and their SATs tests the following May. Secondary teachers made similar 
comments: ‘ultimately, if you are going to put in an accountability system … you’re going to 
have other aspects that are not accounted for, and I’m talking holistic development of a child’ 
(Hutchings, 2015). The much-discussed problems of stress and unhappiness among young 
people stem in important part from the priorities of the school system. 
 
Teachers, operationally central to this system, are themselves under great pressure. Whatever 
they demand of children, is demanded of them first. Hutchings’ report is full of their 
testimonies: ‘There is a real sense of fear and we are driven by SLT [the Senior Leadership 
Team] to work harder and harder and push the pupils harder and harder’; ‘I am totally 
exhausted all the time. I work 60–70 hours a week just to keep up with what I am expected to 
do … Many teachers in my workplace are feeling permanently stressed and demoralised. 
More of us are looking to leave as more and more workload is being given with no regard to 
its impact on teachers or the children’ (Hutchings, 2015). 
 
For governments, the capacity of managements to exert pressure on teachers to improve test 
scores is central to school improvement. The Conservative government, like every other 
government this century, has expanded this capacity, with an armoury of incentives and 
punitive resources. Under the Coalition, the national pay system was dismantled, and 
managements were given greater discretion over pay levels. All pay progression is now 
linked to performance, in a salary system based on individualised decision. Likewise, there 
are no effective limits to the working day. Teaching remains one of the most strongly 
unionised occupations, and unions have in some schools been able to hold in check the 
demands of ‘senior leadership teams’. But the overall shift in power is unmistakeable – away 
from a professionalism centred on notions of expertise and discretion, and towards a 
conception of teachers’ work based on the effective implementation of procedures 
determined by management. 
 
Knowledge 
 
In the current school system, questions of educational value tend to be non-negotiable. Value 
is measured in test results, which provide the data for arguments about the respective 
effectiveness of different types of school, different styles of teaching and so on. The initial 
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training and later professional development of teachers is discussed from a similar standpoint. 
This is one reason why universities, which historically have been places where education has 
been discussed in wider terms and the meaning of ‘effectiveness’ has been up for debate, are 
being pushed out of a central role in teacher education. Increasingly, what counts as 
knowledge is supplied from other sources. The Education Endowment Foundation, funded 
partly by government and partly by a private trust, is dedicated to ‘extending the evidence 
base of what works’ and making it available to teachers (EDF). It compiles reviews of largely 
quantitative research into strategies for improving attainment, and rates them for 
effectiveness. Other organisations – the Teachers Development Trust, the emergent College 
of Teaching, local Teaching Schools Alliances – convey a similar message: teachers should 
‘draw upon (and contribute to) readily-available sources of leading evidence-based 
approaches, confidently engaging with high quality research and evaluation’ (TDT, 2014). 
 
Tensions 
 
The growing involvement of the private sector and the strengthening of the central apparatus 
of government are intertwined developments in a coherent reshaping of the governance of 
English schooling. The logic of the ‘state form’ of English schooling has unfolded over 
nearly 30 years, and now reached a new level of intensity. The lineaments of an early system 
– based on control of schools by local authorities, with strong teacher influence on 
curriculum and pedagogy – can no longer be discerned. The powers of the central apparatus 
to shape educational process through the identification, collection and management of data 
are stronger than at any point since 1988. Equally unrestricted is the capacity of the school 
leaderships of autonomised schools to micro-manage the work of teachers. 
 
Yet the system which these changes constitute exacerbates rather than resolves long-standing 
problems of education. Most evidently, it imposes a set of constraints that prevent schools 
from innovating at any level of depth. The curriculum enforced through tests and exam 
syllabuses is narrow and in some subject areas flagrantly regressive – it sets aside, for 
instance, most of what researchers know about language and learning, in favour of a ‘naming 
of parts’ approach focused on grammatical understandings that were popular early in the 
previous century (Rosen, 2013). An anachronism even at the time of its birth, it is hard to see 
this codification of knowledge surviving for long. 
 
The rigidities of the curriculum are matched by other features of the system which may well 
prove equally problematic. Despite the regulatory programme of government, the outcomes 
of schooling differ considerably between academy chains, and the gap between the best and 
the worst is increasing (Hutchings et al., 2015). The harsh discipline inflicted on teachers 
may produce compliance in the short term, but as a means of encouraging engagement in 
educational improvement it will be ineffective. Likewise, the incessant pressure on students, 
especially in the upper years of schooling, will not continue to produce generations of 
diligent exam-takers. Education and training up to the age of 18 have become compulsory 
precisely at the moment when the promise that educational success will be rewarded with 
career security has plainly become impossible to deliver. If it is reasonable to think that the 
precarity of social life in the long transition between ‘youth’ and ‘adulthood’ will lead to 
explosive moments of protest, then it will equally be unsurprising if they do not spread to 16 
year olds. In the school, as elsewhere, the very inventiveness of neo-liberalism, and its 
tendency to dissolve the solidities of an established system, may now have created tensions 
that threaten its existence. 
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Chapter Eight 
 
The Treasury View of HE: variable human capital investment3 
 
Andrew McGettigan 
 
If we are concerned about public knowledge and the political economy of its production, then 
we need to attend to the manner in which the funding of undergraduate study in England was 
transformed in 2012. Higher tuition fees were licensed by government at publicly funded 
institutions so that the latter could use fee income to cover large cuts to the direct public 
funding of tuition. Grants to universities and colleges were cut by roughly £3 bn per year and 
students pursuing ‘classroom’ subjects, such as politics and economics, are now solely 
funded by fee income. At the same time, loans to students were extended so that a maximum 
of £9,000 per year could be borrowed to cover these fees. 
 
This generalised fee-loan regime is more than a temporary austerity measure. Its architect, 
David Willetts, the former Minister for Universities and Science, wrote in 2013 that 
‘unleashing the forces of consumerism is the best single way we’ve got of restoring high 
academic standards’. Flagging up the course costs to students is meant to make them think 
more carefully about their university choices and make them demand more when they arrive 
to study. 
 
But that is only the first step on the transition. The focus of policy has been the 
transformation of higher education into the private good of training and the positional good of 
opportunity, where the returns on both are higher earnings. Initiation into the production and 
dissemination of public knowledge? It does not appear to be a concern of current policy. 
   
Such an anti-vision of higher education - let the market determine what should be offered - 
unfortunately meshes with a stratified higher education sector which mirrors an increasingly 
unequal society. This paper outlines the next phase of higher education policy which will 
exacerbate the erosion of public knowledge from the institutions traditionally most associated 
with it. 
 
The Coalition government has quietly put in place a series of measures designed to support a 
new performance metric: repayment of loans by course and institution. It could become the 
one metric to dominate all others and will be theorised under the rubric of ‘human capital 
investment’.  
 
The Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act received Royal Assent at the end of 
March 2015.  
  
Section Six of the bill is titled ‘Education Evaluation’ (UK Gov, 2015). It proposes 
amendments to existing legislation to allow the co-ordination of data collected by the Higher 
Education Statistics Agency and HM Revenue & Customs. The Department for Business, 
Innovation & Skills (BIS) has provided a gloss on the measures (BiS). Potential applicants to 
                                                
3 This is a companion paper to Andrew McGettigan, ‘The Treasury View of Higher Education: Student loans, 
Illiquid Assets and Fiscal Control’ in PERC e-book , Forging Economic Discovery in 21st Century Britain, pp 
47-51. What is outlined here as performance is coeval with the kind of data the private sector wants in order to 
price loan-assets. 
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colleges and universities will in future benefit from information on the ‘employability and 
earnings’ of each institution’s alumni and alumnae. I quote: 
 
[The measures] will also help to create an incentive and reward structure at 
universities by distinguishing the universities that are delivering the strongest 
enterprise ethos and labour market outcomes for their students. 
 
The ‘reward and incentive’ being that applicants could inform themselves about the future 
earnings of those who followed a particular course and choose where to study accordingly. In 
its 2015 Manifesto, the Conservative party pledges to ‘require more data to be openly 
available to potential students so that they can make decisions informed by the career paths of 
past graduates’ (BiS). 
 
The Act is the latest move in a new phase of tertiary education policy. In 2012, a new 
question was added to the annual Labour Force Survey to allow ‘analysis of long-run 
earnings outcomes from specific institutions’. In July last year, Lord Young’s report for 
government, Enterprise for All, recommended that each course at each institution should have 
to publish a Future Earnings and Employment Record ‘so that students can assess the full 
costs and likely benefits of specific courses at specific institutions.’ One section of the report 
was helpfully titled, ‘What FEER can do’ (PMO, 2015). In October 2013, David Willetts, 
then minister for science and universities, expressed his enthusiasm for a new research 
project funded by the Nuffield Foundation: 
 
Professor Neil Shephard of Harvard University and Professor Anna Vignoles of 
Cambridge University are currently merging a wealth of data from the Student 
Loans Company and HM Revenue and Customs which should deliver a 
significant improvement in the current data on labour market outcomes of similar 
courses at different institutions (Willetts, 2013). (my emphasis) 
 
The research cited here has not yet reported, though we are promised some results ‘in the 
second half of 2015’ (Nuffield). The project is titled ‘Estimating Human Capital of 
Graduates’ and seeks to assess how the future earnings of ‘similar students’ vary ‘by 
institution type and subject’: 
 
If different degrees from different institutions result in very different levels of 
earnings for students with similar pre-university qualifications and from similar 
socio-economic backgrounds, then this might affect both student choice and 
policies designed to increase participation and improve social mobility (Nuffield). 
 
That paragraph captures the two angles to this debate: it is not just applicants who want to 
know what their monetary return on further study might be. Moving beyond consumer 
choice, the government as lender is becoming increasingly concerned by the size of the 
subsidy built-in to the student loan scheme as the latter is buffeted by recession, low bank 
base rates, a troubling graduate labour market and earlier mistakes in the modelling of future 
repayments.  
 
In England, annual student loan issues are now over £10 bn and are set to continue climbing 
to about £14 bn by 2018/19. Repayments languish at around £1.5bn. BIS reckons it will only 
get back the equivalent of 55 per cent of the £10 bn issued each year. 45 per cent is therefore 
lost as non-repayment. When the new higher maximum tuition fee was voted through in 
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December 2010, it was assumed that the relevant repayment figure would be 70 per cent. 
Each percentage point of variance is the equivalent of £100 m in lost value (1 per cent of £10 
bn). So a drop of fifteen percentage points means BIS is £1.5 bn worse off than expected on a 
single year’s outlay.  
 
There are various methods open to government to manage such shortfalls. But the Treasury is 
loath to abandon the new funding regime as a low return on a loan is still better than money 
spent on grants, where no money comes back. What the Treasury wants is information on 
good institutions. 
 
The 2011 Higher Education White Paper presented undergraduate degrees as a human capital 
investment that benefits the private individual insofar as it enables that individual to boost 
future earnings. Universities and colleges are then to be judged on how well they provide 
training that does indeed boost earnings profiles. Such ‘value add’ would displace current 
statistical concoctions based on prior attainment and final degree classification. The key 
device is loans: they go out into the world and the manner in which they are repaid generates 
information. Graduates then become the bearers of the units of account by which HE 
performance is set into a system of accountability: ‘What level of repayments is this graduate 
of this course likely to produce over the next 35 years?’ 
 
As Willetts had previously argued in 2012, the figures for non-repayment of loans in the 
departmental accounts, that 45 per cent, is an aggregate for a sector comprising over 100 
HEIs, 300 FE colleges offering HE, and 100 private providers ‘designated’ as eligible for 
student support. This overall non-repayment figure masks variation in performance by subject 
(e.g. medicine and law graduates repay more), institution and sex. Willetts has indicated 
enthusiasm for robust disaggregation of the figures:  
 
I expect that, in the future, as the data accrue, the policy debate will be about the 
[non-repayment rate] for individual institutions … the actual Exchequer risk from 
lending to students at specific universities (Willetts, 2011).  (my emphasis) 
 
It is this question of risk that returns us to what is the ur-text for English higher education 
policy, Milton Friedman’s 1955 essay ‘The Role for Government in Education’ (Friedman, 
1955). In the second half of that text, Friedman discusses higher education, in particular 
professional and vocational education, and offers his understanding of human capital: 
 
[Education is] a form of investment in human capital precisely analogous to 
investment in machinery, buildings, or other forms of non-human capital. Its 
function is to raise the economic productivity of the human being. If it does so, the 
individual is rewarded in a free enterprise society by receiving a higher return for 
his services. 
 
There is a role for government to provide loans to individuals for such study because capital 
market imperfections render such loans expensive or impossible to secure without collateral.4 
                                                
4 What is often missed - for example, by Foucault (2004) - is that the family in Gary Becker’s work is 
reconceived as a Coasian intergenerational firm making investment decisions. Social mobility is then 
accordingly calibrated so that no individual should be hamstrung by the decisions of their parents and 
antecedents. Socioeconomic Status (SES) is therefore a counter-concept to ‘class’. In a society with high social 
mobility, SES can always be revised by good investment decisions - there is no systematic disadvantage - and 
the situation is competitive. But the role for government is to ensure that the human capital markets are 
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Existing imperfections in the capital market tend to restrict the more expensive vocational 
and professional training to individuals whose parents or benefactors can finance the training 
required. They make such individuals a ‘non-competing’ group sheltered from competition by 
the unavailability of the necessary capital to many individuals, among whom must be large 
numbers with equal ability. The result is to perpetuate inequalities in wealth and status. (my 
emphasis) 
 
The problem from a national perspective is therefore ‘underinvestment’ and inequity (a lack 
of social mobility). Government intervention is justified if there are too few graduates or if 
graduates only come from the privileged classes. In the same essay, Friedman sketches a 
precursor to the income-contingent repayment loan underpinning English tuition fee policy. 
He proposes that the government ‘buy a share in an individual’s earning prospects’. That is to 
say, the government ‘advances [the student] the funds needed to finance his training on 
condition that he agree to pay the lender a specified fraction of his future earnings’ [sic].  
 
As England has transitioned towards Friedman’s idea over the last twenty years (add the 
current policy to write-off outstanding balances thirty-one years after graduation and you have 
ICR loans), we have reached a hybrid loan-voucher scheme with a large subsidy provided by 
government (that 45 per cent of estimated non-repayment again). Friedman was explicit - a 
loan scheme should be self-financing and individuals should ‘bear the costs of investing in 
themselves’. That said, he goes on to argue that money should follow the individual in either 
form, as loan or voucher, rather than being paid to institutions:  
 
The subsidisation of institutions rather than of people has led to an indiscriminate 
subsidization of whatever activities it is appropriate for such institutions to 
undertake, rather than of activities it is appropriate for the state to subsidise. The 
problem is not primarily that we are spending too little money ... but that we are 
getting so little per dollar spent. 
 
And here is the rub. The growing and unexpectedly large subsidy built into the current 
iteration of fee-loan regime points to that same problem: the government is not getting the 
maximum from borrowers or from universities (which are using tuition fees to subsidise other 
activities like research). One might blame universities that set fees for classroom subjects at 
the same rate as lab-based subjects, that blanket £9 000 per annum, or loan funding offered 
for subjects that do nothing to boost graduate productivity. Either way, it points to the issue 
of mis-investment rather than underinvestment. Indeed, given the statistics on graduates 
filling posts that do not require graduate qualifications, from the human capital theory 
perspective, one might even use the language of overinvestment in HE. It is not clear to many 
whether the problems of the graduate labour market are recessionary, structural, secular or a 
combination of all three.5  
                                                                                                                                                  
functional and so inherited advantage is minimised. Long-run inequality is not determined by ‘class’ if access to 
capital is not constrained. (Even better if the market allows children to borrow as individuals rather than families 
on their behalf). This gives some content to Thatcher’s ‘there are individuals and there are families’ and reveals 
the self-conception of David Willetts’s The Pinch (2010) - where demographic cohorts, ‘generations’ is a third 
factor introduced to the analysis. We need to attend to familia œconomica rather than homo œconomicus.  
5 ‘Over the 10 years 1993 to 2003, average graduate earnings grew by an average 0.9% per year in real terms. 
Given the decline in real earnings associated with the recent financial crisis and recession, average graduate 
earnings actually declined over the period 1993 to 2012 – equivalent to an average 0.2% decline per year over 
the 19 years. The real growth in average graduate earnings in recent decades has therefore been lower than the 
1.1% a year real average earnings growth assumed by the OBR for the long run. However, this lack of growth in 
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Belief in the generic value of a degree and its centrality to the neo-endogenous growth theory 
of the nineties is on the wane. There is now a cross-party consensus growing around the need 
to boost tech skills, through Degree Apprenticeships and Labour’s idea of a new ‘dual track’ 
system6. The latter term was chosen to deflect any suggestion of a return to the pre-1993 
binary system of HE but in March, Vince Cable went so far as to lament the abolition of 
Polytechnics at an Association of Colleges event. 
 
Human capital theory addresses this question - the risk of undesired subsidy and mis-
investment - through Gary Becker’s redefinition of moral hazard: ‘Children can default on 
the market debt contracted for them by working less energetically or by entering occupations 
with lower earnings and higher psychic income (Becker, 1993).’  
 
In a different register, ministers have been looking back to Lionel Robbins’s 1963 Higher 
Education report for inspiring slogan that launched a key phase of expansion: ‘higher 
education should be offered to anyone who can benefit’. What needs underscoring is the 
definition of ‘benefit’ is being transformed by what in The Great University Gamble I called 
‘financialisation’ (McGettigan, 2013). Benefit now walks forward redefined in monetary 
terms as creditworthiness - of institutions and individuals. ‘If this student with these 
qualifications from this background does this course, how much should we lend them towards 
fees? Is this an institution that does provide training that increases graduate earnings?’ In 
September 2012, Willetts outlined the dream:  
 
Imagine that in the future we discover that the RAB charge [non-repayment rate] 
for a Bristol graduate was 10 per cent. Maybe some other university … we are 
only going to get 60 per cent back. Going beyond that it becomes an interesting 
question, to what extent you can incentivise universities to lower their own RAB 
charges. 
 
On the down-side, the easiest way for universities to ‘lower their own non-repayment rates’ is 
to reduce fees or alter the balance of subjects and places they offer. For the government as 
lender, removing access to the loans - ‘dedesignation’ - would represent a significant sanction 
against institutions, though the threat of any withdrawal will be stronger than the execution.  
 
In the first instance however, the evaluation data sought by that series of measures I outlined 
earlier only needs to be good enough to justify two tiers of maximum fee. A normal 
maximum and a higher one for high-cost subjects at ‘successful’ institutions. To mimic the 
vice-chancellors at the elite end of things: ‘We are losing money on our high-cost subjects 
but our graduates are good for higher borrowing, so give us dispensation to set a tuition fee 
above the current maximum.’ Friedman rejected the idea of a flat offer to all applicants: 
 
... the [repayment demanded] should in principle vary from individual to 
individual in accordance with any differences in expected earning capacity that 
can be predicted in advance--the problem is similar to that of varying life 
insurance premia among groups that have different life expectancy. 
                                                                                                                                                  
average earnings might be due to changes in the composition of graduates: as more individuals obtain degrees, 
the average quality of degrees may have declined.’ (Crawford et al., 2014) (my emphasis)  
6 Liam Byrne ‘Over the weeks to come we’ll have more to say about reform and our ambition to build a British 
“dual track” system, creating for the first time a big, wide vocational, professional and technical path to degree 
level skills for students who want to earn while they learn ...’  
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Variance of this kind would have an additional ‘benefit’ from the free market perspective of 
the Treasury: so long as there is a significant subsidy beneath the lending then the tuition fee 
is prevented from fulfilling the signalling function neoclassically associated with price.7 The 
headline fee does not provide this key function, since you cannot tell how much you are 
actually likely to repay after graduating. This means that students are prone to ‘moral hazard’ 
by making choices other than for reasons of productive investment. (Unlike Friedman’s idea 
of a voucher, the loan subsidy received by any given individual is unpredictable and 
uncertain.) 
 
If price is to be the single best indicator of quality, reflect future cost and dissuade mis-
investment, then the subsidy must be eroded as much as possible. That’s the neoclassical 
logic. The first step here is the likely freezing of the repayment threshold for the latest loans 
at £21,000 after 2016. As graduate earnings rise in the following years, ‘fiscal drag’ would 
generate more repayments and address immediate concerns about the ‘sustainability’ and 
‘generosity’ of repayment terms. Graduates though would be paying more than they would 
have anticipated in 2012. 
 
What I have outlined here, the coming wave of ‘education evaluation’, threatens to supplant 
traditional understandings of universities as communities advancing public knowledge. 
Current regulations governing the awarding of degrees aver that standards are maintained and 
safeguarded only by the critical activity of the academic community within an institution. It 
will be harder and harder to recall that fact. 
 
As a conclusion it should be recognised that human capital theory presents itself as a 
progressive theory in support of social mobility. Human capital investments ‘dominate’ (in 
the language of economics) ability and would be the preserve of the wealthy without state 
intervention. What is crucial then is access to the professions, hence the more recent concern 
with postgraduate loans. New data on the performance of institutions would then help those 
making investment decisions in a market currently saturated with proxy information and 
hundreds of rival institutions. 
 
The risk is that academics seeking to resist this further privatisation of knowledge will be cast 
as vested interests seeking to protect an old, inadequate system lacking in transparency. We 
will end up on the wrong side of the argument. The difficulty: How to articulate what is 
threatened? How to defend forms of knowledge which are not subordinate to private returns? 
Academic freedom and autonomy now face a more pressing, insidious, financialised threat 
than the traditional bugbear of direct political interference. But all this may prove too abstract 
for effective resistance. 
 
I have no glib solution to which you might sign up. But when hard times find us, criticism 
must strike for the root: the root is undergraduate study as a stratified, unequal, positional 
good dominating future opportunities and outcomes. What might find broader public support 
is a vision of higher education institutions that are civic and open to lifelong participation, 
                                                
7 Note that from a free market perspective, cross-subsidy, whether of subject to subject or teaching to research 
and vice versa, is a problem for this reason. The government is not anti arts and humanities but is very much 
exercised by fees set at £9000 rather than close to the presumed ‘cost base’. The preference for free markets also 
explains why the Treasury decided to remove Student Numbers Controls entirely from universities this coming 
Autumn: restricting places leads to unmet demand which keeps prices high.  
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instead of places beholden to the three-year, full-time degree leveraged on loans and aiming 
to cream off ‘talent’.  
 
What is needed is a recasting of the very structure of undergraduate provision, one in tune 
with concerted interventions in economic, industrial and labour market policy. This would 
upset traditional notions of higher education, but it is not clear that they were ever adequate 
to the mass, not to say, universal, public knowledge envisaged, for example, by Raymond 
William’s ‘third revolution’: 
 
We speak of a cultural revolution, and we must certainly see the aspiration to 
extend the active process of learning, with the skills of literacy and other 
advanced communication, to all people rather than to limited groups, as 
comparable in importance to the growth of democracy and the rise of scientific 
industry. This aspiration has been and is being resisted, sometimes openly, 
sometimes subtly, but as an aim it has been formally acknowledged, almost 
universally. 
 
Addendum 
 
This chapter was originally written in April 2015. One month later, the Conservative party 
won a slim majority at the UK General Election. Acting on the manifesto commitment quoted 
above, the new government published a Green Paper in November. Fulfilling Our Potential: 
teaching excellence, social mobility & student choice outlined a new Teaching Excellence 
Framework (TEF), which in its first phase would assess universities and colleges offering HE 
against a set of metrics, including (from 2017) data based on earnings and benefits made 
available by the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act.  
 
Institutions achieving the baseline performance in the TEF would be allowed to increase their 
tuition fees in line with inflation (capped by a new maximum tuition fee above the £9000 
limit frozen since 2012). In subsequent years, the government intends to introduce up to 4 
TEF ‘levels’ with the expectation that fees would ‘increasingly differentiate’ as different TEF 
levels would entitle institutions to raise their fees by different fractions of inflation each year. 
Such a scheme may not need new primary legislation, although it appears likely that a Higher 
Education Bill will be put before parliament in 2016/17. 
 
As predicted above, the government also froze the loan repayment threshold and thus 
established the principle of actively managing the loan ‘book’ (the threshold will be reviewed 
every five years). This measure was combined with changes to the calculations used to value 
loans in the government accounts - reducing the average official ‘loss’ on loans issued 
annually from 45 per cent to 20-25 per cent (new official figures have not as yet been 
published). A further saving will be achieved by abolishing maintenance grants for all new 
starters in September 2016. Those who would have been eligible for grants will now be 
entitled to more loans. 
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Chapter Nine 
 
The Coalition Government’s Cuts to Legal Aid: Who is Counting the Cost? 
 
Roger Smith 
 
The Italian poet Dante, in the middle of his life, famously found himself lost in a dark and 
overgrown wood in which he lost the direct path. In the end, things turned out well enough 
and he created one of the great works of world literature. His experience is not that dissimilar 
to anyone seeking to work through the economic, social and political consequences of what 
are often called the ‘LASPO’ (Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012) 
cuts. They are, however, unlikely to turn misfortune to such good effect. There is - indeed, 
without more work, could not be - any really authoritative examination of the consequences. 
We have some indication from authoritative sources such as the National Audit Office but 
those who argue how extreme they are need to develop better ways of demonstrating that if 
there is to be a hope of getting any successor government to reel them back to any degree 
beyond the marginal. 
 
This is not to say that the legal aid forest isle is not full of noise. Echoing through it are the 
screams of bruised providers whose funding has been cut and ire raised: they proffer a clear 
assertion - though often little proof - of the consequences in terms of human misery, the cost 
to the economy and other government departments (LASPO, 2014). But hanging in the air is 
also the deep boom of official statements, all basically making variations of: ‘We don’t know 
and we don’t care’. As it was put to the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee: 
‘The Ministry told us that it was not possible to know what the impact of the reforms might 
be outside of the Ministry. We heard from the Treasury Officer of Accounts that impact 
assessments often do not quantify costs of politic changes to the wider public sector … the 
Ministry told us that the failure to monetise potential knock-on costs of reforms is 
“representative of a common pattern seen across government”’ (HCC, 2015, para. 22). 
 
There is no shortage of voices trilling the need for more research - from the majestic thunder 
of the National Audit Office to the high pitched squeak of academics. Thus, the former:  ‘The 
Ministry of Justice is on track to make significant and quick reductions in its spending on 
civil legal aid. However, it has been slower to think through how and why people access civil 
legal aid; the scale of the additional costs to the Ministry likely to be generated by people 
choosing to represent themselves; and the impact on the ability and willingness of providers 
to provide legal services for the fees paid. Without this understanding, the Ministry’s 
implementation of the reforms to civil legal aid cannot be said to have delivered better overall 
value for money for the taxpayer’ (Morse, 2014). And, as an example of the latter: ‘There 
was universal agreement in the literature that advice results in positive outcomes for clients 
and their households. However, almost all of the evidence originated from the ‘grey 
literature’, i.e. informally published work, where the quality of the evidence was generally 
poor. For instance, only a handful of reports were able to provide detailed information on the 
data, a clear and robust methodology, and sound analysis from which they draw their 
conclusions. A clear problem throughout the literature was the lack of a consistent or 
universally adopted measure of outcome or quality’(Cookson and Mold, 2014).  
 
A debate on the consequences of the LASPO cuts segues into a wider discussion of the 
economic costs and benefits of legal aid more generally. The legal services program in the 
United States was launched as part of an explicit anti-poverty objective. And there has been 
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consistent interest in how you might measure effectiveness ever since - both in the US and 
elsewhere (Houseman and Minhoff, 2014). The jury remains out, however, and the need for 
further research acknowledged even by those in the thick of advancing the economic benefits 
of legal aid. 
 
So, the consequences of the LASPO cuts raise difficult issues of a political, theoretical and 
practical nature encountered both in this jurisdiction and abroad. Let us try to limit these by 
way of the following opening definitions and limitations: 
 
1. This paper is concerned here primarily with the effect of the “LASPO’ cuts, that is to say 
the following ways in which the government intended to make savings from the legal aid 
budget - all of which came on stream around or about early 2013: the removal of most civil 
legal aid and advice save for (tightly defined) cases of domestic violence and some other 
matters (largely those protected by the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Human Rights Act)8; the introduction of a ‘mandatory’ telephone ‘gateway’ for some residual 
areas of advice; raising the merits test; reduction in financial eligibility; tightening of the 
conditions for judicial review applications; reductions in remuneration (HoC, 2013). Thus, 
other issues such as wider restrictions to judicial review (where battles continue), costs 
reform (the aftermath of the ‘Jackson’ report) or even local authority funding cuts are not 
considered - even though obviously linked. However, the catastrophic fall in the number of 
tribunal applications is referred to below since it may, at least in part, be related to the 
reduction of legal aid availability and was abruptly manifest in the first quarter of 2013. 
 
2. Within the LASPO cuts, the paper is concerned with the consequences for those who 
would formerly have received legal aid and advice. The cuts removed around £300m from 
the public funding of providers. This has had a massive effect in terms of those providers 
who concentrated on civil legal aid both in private practice and in law centres or other NGOs. 
Many in the latter category were simply wiped out or had, at the very least, to cut back 
completely on their legal aid work. Charting the wider effect of that slashing of provision is 
being left for another day. 
 
3. Preference has deliberately been given to ‘official’ or (allegedly) ‘neutral’ sources of 
information - such as the reports of the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee or 
the Audit Office - over the assertions of providers or former providers for obvious reasons. 
But, from whatever sources, objective hard statistics are hard to find. It should, however, be 
noted that a stream of studies emanating largely from the advice sector in this country and the 
legal sector more internationally assert methodologies sufficiently good to allow reasonable 
calculation. Citizens Advice, for example, calculated the return per pound spent on legal aid 
on housing advice as £2.34 (Citizens Advice, 2010). As to the consequences of the LASPO 
cuts, let us borrow wholesale from the report of the National Audit Office for a definitive 
statement: 
 
£300m: NAO estimate of spending reduction in 2013-4 from the LASPO reforms. 
£268m: NAO estimate of expected annual reduction in spending as a result of LASPO 
reforms 
                                                
8 The remaining issues in scope contained specified matters in relation to actions against the police, clinical 
negligence (only neurological damage to infants); community care, debt, discrimination, education, family (very 
limited), housing (also very limited), immigration and asylum (again very limited), mental health, various 
miscellaneous matters, public law, and welfare benefits (very limited). 
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685,459: civil legal aid matters the Legal Aid Agency (the Agency) would have been 
expected to approve in 2013-14 without the reforms 
361,551: civil legal aid matters the Agency expected to approve in 2013-14 as a result of 
the reforms 
300,496: civil legal aid matters actually approved in 2013-14 (17% fewer than expected) 
18,519 or 30 per cent: increase in the number of cases starting in the family courts in 
which neither party had representation 
9,000: increase in family mediation assessments that the Ministry of Justice expected in 
2013-14 
17,246 or 56 per cent: decrease in family mediation assessments in the year after the 
reforms 
 
The picture, overall, is of cuts even more severe than were initially expected. The savings 
were over £30m (around 10 per cent) more than expected. The fall in the number of cases 
was greater by 17 per cent than expected. Family mediation fell by more than a half when it 
was expected to grow. Thus, the cuts themselves had a wider ‘chilling’ effect on provision 
which meant that even those theoretically still within scope failed to claim. The effect of the 
cuts (linked with related issues such as rises in tribunal fees and small claims court costs) can 
be seen in related statistics. 
 
First, all tribunal appeals (except those relating to immigration) fell off a cliff in the second 
quarter of 2013. The Ministry of Justice reported: HMCTS Tribunals recorded 74,401 
receipts in the period April to June 2014. This is down 16% on the previous quarter, and 71% 
when compared with the same period of 2013 (UK Government, 2014, p 8).  
 
To some extent, this fall is due to procedural diversion from appeals through mandatory 
review in the case of social security or referral to ACAS in employment. However, the 
Ministry was forced to acknowledge a likely explanation for the latter: Fees for Employment 
Tribunals and the Employment Appeals Tribunal were introduced for claims received on or 
after 29th July 2013, alongside wider reform of procedural rules (following the Underhill 
Review of Employment Tribunal Rules) (UK Government, 2014). As to the consequences of 
mandatory social security review, the Ministry, alas, reported: Robust data is not yet available 
to assess the impact of these changes on tribunal receipts (UK Government, 2014). 
 
Second, there is evidence of displacement. An advice structure, underfunded and under 
pressure, still exists to take some degree of overflow from the cuts to legal aid. Behold, the 
National Audit Office: 
 
Some individuals who are no longer eligible for civil legal aid may choose to pay for 
legal advice themselves. However, many who would have received legal aid are 
unlikely to be able to afford full legal advice or representation for their case. The 
Ministry acknowledged it was likely that more individuals would seek free advice from 
third-sector providers because of the reforms. It did not try to forecast the extra demand 
for these services. 
 
Our consultation with providers indicates that third-sector providers may not be able to 
meet the extra demand generated by the reforms. Among legal firms/advocate 
respondents, 49% told us they were referring more clients to third-sector organisations 
since April 2013 and 70% of third-sector respondents told us they could meet half or 
less of the demand from clients who were not eligible for civil legal aid. 
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This finding is consistent with other recent research. For example, Citizens Advice 
reports that there has been a 62% increase in people seeking advice online about help 
with legal costs since the reforms, while 92% of Citizens Advice Bureaux are finding it 
difficult to refer people to specialist legal advice since the reforms were 
implemented.13 Similarly, the Bar Pro Bono Unit reports that requests for assistance 
have increased by almost 50% since April 2013 (NAO, 2014). 
 
Third, we have evidence that increasing numbers of people are representing themselves - 
presumably from the beginning of a case - where we would have no data - through to 
litigation. This was recognised by both the Public Accounts Committee and the National 
Audit Office: this from the former: 
 
16. In the year following the reforms, there was an increase of 18,519 cases (30%) in 
which both parties were representing themselves (known as litigants in person or LIPs) 
in family courts. Within this, there were 8,110 more cases involving contact with 
children in which both parties were LIPs in 2013–14, an increase of 89% from the 
previous year. Judges have estimated that cases involving LIPs can take 50% longer 
and many legal professionals have said that they place additional demands upon court 
staff. The NAO also identified an increase in the number of contested family cases 
reaching the courts, with the figure rising from 64% in 2012–13 to 89% in 2013-14. We 
heard evidence from the Magistrates’ Association that magistrates feel that the 
significant rise in the number of LIPs in family courts has had a negative impact on the 
administration of justice (HCC, 2015, p 13). 
 
The NAO was willing to put a figure on the cost of this growth in self-representation though 
its methodology is probably somewhat rough and ready: 
 
Based on the increase in self-representation, we estimate the additional cost to HM 
Courts & Tribunals Service at £3 million per year, plus direct costs to the Ministry of 
approximately £400,000 … There may also be costs to the wider public sector if people 
whose problems could have been resolved by legal aid-funded advice suffer adverse 
consequences to their health and wellbeing as a result of no longer having access to 
legal aid’ (HCC, 2015).  
 
Fourth, some people may just lose out. The Public Accounts Committee reported: 
 
We heard from the Magistrates’ Association that some people have difficulties with the 
court forms and processes involved in family law matters. For example, the application 
form for a case involving contact with children is 24 pages long, and the guidance 
document for that form is 32 pages long. The Magistrates’ Association told us that this 
complexity may prevent people from accessing support to maintain a relationship with 
their children (HCC, 2015). 
 
The cuts have clearly had an influence beyond themselves. Solicitors evidently played a 
major role in encouraging mediation in family cases. Even though funding remains, the 
number of cases going to mediation has slumped: 
 
The Ministry continues to fund mediation through civil legal aid and expected 9,000 more 
mediation assessments and 10,000 more mediations to start in 2013-14. However, mediation 
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assessments fell by more than 17,000 and there were more than 5,000 fewer mediations 
starting in 2013-14 than there were in 2012-13 (NAO, 2014, para 10). 
 
Both the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee criticised the Ministry of 
Justice’s lack of wider perspective than simply delivering the cuts to its legal aid budget. The 
NAO recommended that: 
 
a The Ministry should develop measures to evaluate the impact of the reforms more 
fully, including estimating any wider costs to the courts system. For example, it should 
improve its data on court case duration, potentially as part of its criminal justice system 
efficiency programme. 
b The Ministry should consider what further steps it could take to meet its objective of 
reducing the number of cases going to courts in the areas of law removed from the 
scope of civil legal aid. This includes continuing to monitor the use of mediation, and 
considering what further action it should take if take-up does not increase in line with 
expectations. 
 
c The Ministry should establish the extent to which those who are eligible for civil legal 
aid are able to access it and what obstacles, if any, exist. 
 
d The Ministry should develop its understanding of the challenges facing civil legal aid 
providers and the provision of support across the country. It should use this improved 
understanding to ensure sustainability in the market and coverage across the country 
(NAO, 2014, para 17).  
 
In calling for more research on impact measures, the NAO joins just about every interested 
institution or researcher in the field. Thus, we have Professor Cookson and Dr Mold on 
evidence to the Low Commission: 
 
Primarily, there is a need for further evaluation of advice services, to determine their 
effectiveness and value for money. Currently there is an absence of good-quality 
research on the economic value of legal aid, focusing on costs of services and return of 
investment, especially research based in the UK. More quantitative, longitudinal studies 
are warranted in this area (NAO, 2014, para 17).  
 
The US study referred to above is demanding about the methodology of what needs to be 
done: 
 
Many of the economic benefit and Social Return on Investment studies make 
inadequately supported assumptions in the course of describing the cost savings 
resulting from legal services. A classic example of an inadequately supported assertion 
is the assertion that a certain percentage of people who legal services attorneys saved 
from eviction or from having their mortgage foreclosed would have had to go into 
emergency housing had it not been for the legal services intervention. Because little 
research has been done on the number of people who resort to emergency housing in 
the absence of a legal services intervention, the economic benefits studies rely on a 
single, small, outdated study from New York State to suggest that somewhere in the 
neighborhood of 20 percent of homeless people resort to emergency housing.  An 
updated study, tracking people evicted from rental housing or mortgage foreclosure, 
would offer us a much more realistic picture of what actually would have happened to 
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people evicted or whose mortgages were foreclosed. A corollary study could examine 
what happened to people who were not evicted (Houseman and Minhoff, 2014). 
 
Any comprehensive study of the impact of the LASPO cuts would require at least three 
elements. First, an analysis of the economic consequences undertaken with the rigour 
suggested above. We just don’t really have the data to go beyond assertion at the present 
time. And the truth is that we may never be able to get absolutely reliable figures but we 
should certainly try. Approaches do not have to be drily mathematical. It may be possible to 
find areas in the country where the effects have been mitigated - through the provision of pro 
bono services or with funding from local authorities or foundations - which can be compared 
with those where the cuts bit as intended. If these cuts are ever to be ameliorated we need 
more than assertion to back up argument - even if we are addressing ourselves to a more 
sympathetic government than the present.  
 
Second, we need to chart, if we can, the consequences of the cuts in terms of social exclusion 
and community (in)cohesion. What is the experience of women excluded from legal aid 
during divorce? What are the consequences for their children? Third, we need to identify the 
decline in public accountability that arises from the reduction of appeal, review and challenge 
rights. At stake here are some of the great gains of the ‘welfare rights’ movement which 
shifted the discourse from discretionary donation to legally backed entitlement. Can this be 
done? Well, undoubtedly not perfectly. But, it will help us in the struggle to preserve services 
and to regain them to do our best. And, finally, the ultimate test of a legal aid scheme for the 
poor is how well ‘justiciable problems’ might be resolved at all levels of society. We need 
something like the British Crime Survey which nationally charts whether people are finding it 
easier or harder to resolve their legal problems. Here, we do have a methodology - developed 
by Professor Hazel Genn (Genn, 1990), used by the Legal Services Research Centre before it 
was abolished as part of the LASPO cuts and followed around the world. Somebody needs to 
fund surveys that allow comparison of access to justice over time. But don’t hold your breath. 
It won’t be this government that does that. Who then will take up the role of the Dante of the 
justice system? The role is vacant: the need is pressing. 
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Chapter Ten 
 
Public Libraries in the Age of Austerity: The Gloves Are Off 
 
Ian Anstice 
 
British public libraries are, since 2010, undergoing the most difficult period in their 
peacetime history. Before the coalition government came into power, public libraries had 
been experiencing static or increasing budgets combined with stable or reduced levels of 
usage (DCMS, 2012).  Large scale projects to refurbish central libraries had restarted in 
Liverpool and Manchester and the largest ever English public library rebuild had started in 
Birmingham.  Now, the sector is facing deep and sustained budget cuts, with hundreds of 
small libraries under threat of closure or passing to volunteers and even the new Library of 
Birmingham confronted with a deep crisis (BBC, 2015). Facing this disaster, the old 
certainties have been washed away, with the role of paid staff, council involvement and even 
the library itself being called into question.  
 
Contrary to what can be gleaned from much of the media, the last five years has not seen a 
dramatic number of library closures. According to Cipfa figures (Cipfa), there were 423 
fewer libraries in 2015/16 than there were in 2010/11 out of an original total of 4,340. This 
figure, representing nearly one 10% of buildings, is quite impressive over just a five year 
period but nowhere near the massacre present in public perception. Moreover, these closures 
are not just simple reactions to budget cuts. Rather, such as in the case of Brent, they were 
part of a deliberate strategy to concentrate funding on a smaller number of branches, 
improving them and thus maintaining usage (Public Libraries News a.).  
 
That’s not to say the cuts aren’t real. In fact they’re far deeper than 10%. Indeed, there has 
been an overall reduction in budget of at least 20% over the same time period which, 
depending on how one factors in inflation, could mean a cut of up to 40% in real terms. Bear 
in mind as well that certain authorities have cut their budgets far deeper than this average. So 
what accounts for the relatively small number of closures? Public library authorities, of which 
there are 151 in England alone, have found many ways to reduce expenditure without closing 
libraries. A term commonly used by campaigners for this is the evocative “hollowing out” 
(Daily Mirror, 2013). This can include all manner of reductions, notably in opening hours, 
staffing and in book fund (Unison, 2013). Somerset, which retreated from closing 11 
branches and 4 mobiles due to a lost court case, instead lost staff, introduced self-service 
machines and volunteer staff, and moved services into co-located buildings (Public Libraries 
News b., 2015). Other authorities have gone for a mixture of these as well reducing the book 
fund.  Obviously such responses frequently lead to reductions. By not closing some of its 
buildings in a time of budget reduction, a council can simply discourage library usage, which 
then weakens the case for keeping them open overall. 
 
As well as cutting expenditure, increasing income has been tried (Public Libraries, 2014) 
also, with one of the most frequently mentioned possibilities being to install a cafe. Although 
this can be successful in popular and busy locations, the costs of running such a retail arm 
means a profit cannot be guaranteed. There are also concerns about the over-
commercialization of libraries SPPL (2012), which have long been valued as neutral 
welcoming spaces where, almost uniquely on the High Street, one does not need to spend 
money. 
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In addition, councils have been outsourcing the public library service to other organisations, 
although inroads by the private sector have been very limited. The sole example is Carillion, 
which runs four library services, albeit via a non-profit arm. Far more libraries have been 
passed to non-profit trusts, with the most prominent being GLL along with 22 others (Public 
Libraries News c.). Two library services (York and Suffolk) are run as mutuals. 
 
Along with library closures, the other response to budget cuts, attracting high media attention, 
is the passing of branches to volunteers. From a handful prior to 2010, there are now at least 
384 (Public Libraries News d.) such libraries in the UK, with more being planned. While the 
replacing of paid staff with volunteers is rarely claimed to be an actual improvement, local 
library users may reluctantly feel forced to become volunteers in order to keep their library 
open. Some have, indeed, complained of being blackmailed (BBC, 2011) by local authorities 
into the move. Councils can argue that if a local community does not wish to volunteer to run 
its local library then they don’t really want it (BBC, 2012). More tellingly, the issue of 
volunteering can split campaign groups into two or even co-opt those protesting against cuts 
on to the council side in an attempt to rescue the service. The success of some volunteer 
libraries, at least in the short term, encourages councils to withdraw from more, even though 
there are concerns about the future of such initiatives in the longer term (NFWI, 2013). There 
is also the concern that volunteer libraries (confusing called “community libraries” by many 
councils) further atomise a larger library service because each becomes run as a separate 
organisation. 
 
Public protest against public library closures has been strong but often ineffective. 
Consultations on public library closures are commonly reported to be the most responded to 
of all council consultations but also often have little effect. Within days of cuts being 
formally announced, campaign groups spontaneously form in the affected areas, either from 
library users or from pre-existing Friends of the Library groups. Such groups have a variety 
of weapons at their disposal, from placarding council offices to protest marches to petitions. 
If all else fails, campaigners can and do take councils to court via judicial reviews. This a 
time-consuming and expensive business has led to several notable turnarounds by councils 
such as Somerset or Moray. But, in other cases, decisions have gone against campaigners 
even where they have made initial wins such as in Lincolnshire recently. In all instances, the 
councils are likely to blame the campaigners for the cost of legal action, even if they are 
found to have been acting improperly.  
 
National responses to cuts in public libraries have varied depending on the group involved.  
Those organisations who see themselves as tied to government or local government have met 
the challenge with pragmatism. The Society of Chief Librarians (SCL), whose membership is 
senior library officers, tailors its publicity to promote libraries as fitting in with government 
agendas. It even welcomes the replacement of paid staff with volunteers as long as they are 
“professionally managed”. The Arts Council England (ACE) which, as well as encouraging 
best practice is funded by the Government to distribute grants for projects to libraries, can 
also be relied upon to rarely, if ever, directly challenge the Government’s position. The 
Chartered Institute of Library and Information Professionals (CILIP), on the other hand, 
while also wanting to associate libraries with government aims, in order to stress their 
importance, is more likely to protest, especially in recent years. They are a member of the 
Speak Up For Libraries coalition as well as having adopted a stance formally against the 
replacement of paid staff. The trade unions Unison and Unite are far more likely to protest 
against cuts, which directly affect their members, as is the national campaign group the 
Library Campaign. 
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Stung with criticism over cuts to library services, the DCMS response has been to either deny 
the impact of cuts (Guardian, 2012) or to conduct research into best practice within the 
sector. What it has not done, and which has caused much anger amongst campaigners, is to 
intervene in any library authority, regardless of the severity of the cuts proposed. The 1964 
Public Libraries and Museums Act gives the Secretary of State the power to order a review, 
and ultimately take over the running of a library service, if it is not meeting its obligation to 
provide a “comprehensive and efficient service”. However, the minister responsible for 
libraries throughout this period, Ed Vaizey MP, has steadfastly refused to rule against the 
actions of any authority. As such, councils consider library services a “soft” statutory service, 
with councillors even sometimes failing to know that they are statutory at all. Indeed, it is 
notable that almost all legal challenges by local groups against cuts have concentrated instead 
on other legislation, usually Equality and Human Rights. 
 
What is apparent to any serious observer of public libraries over the last six years is that, 
when push comes to the shove, the need to reduce funding normally takes precedence over 
local protest and legal protections. It does not matter how many thousand respond to a 
consultation or protest in marches, if the council has decided on a course of action then that is 
what will happen. The protection of the courts, in a service like libraries where legal 
precedent is limited and definitions are weak, is haphazard at best. Central Government has 
shown itself impervious to appeal when it comes to cuts to library services. It is also 
dedicated to allowing local councils to find their own solutions, and is unwilling to impose 
strategies or reorganisation on the multitude of local library authorities and the hundreds of 
new volunteer libraries. In other words, the old certainties of public libraries being a public 
good, protected by popularity and government, have gone. It is up to each authority how best 
to respond to budget reductions and, if it decides that cutting libraries are a way to do this, 
then there is little than can effectively be done to stop it. 
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Section Three: The Corruption of News and Information in Markets 
 
Since the financial crisis of 2007-08 the finger of blame has been pointed in several 
directions, from greedy bankers to incompetent regulators and self-serving governments. But 
clearly, the breakdown in financial news, information and communication also played a key 
part. All markets need reliable information in order to attract and service buyers and sellers. 
In theory, this should be equally distributed to all parties. However, the problem is that 
market participants always look for a market edge which often involves getting inside 
information early, spreading faulty information to others, or obscuring the true financial 
picture through clever accounting and complex financial instruments. Thus, the scandals, 
bubbles and crashes, that began to multiply after several rounds of financial deregulation in 
the 1980s and 1990s, have continued unabated since 2008 and despite various attempts at 
reform. At the same time, successful public prosecutions of individuals remain extremely rare 
and financial sector pay and bonuses continue to rise to extravagant levels. 
 
The first chapter here focuses on the corruption of information flows in the London Stock 
Exchange where, supposedly, all market participants have been given equal access to the 
same information. However, as Philip Augar argues, ever since the London Stock Market was 
deregulated in the 1980s, this has not been the case. Investment banks have been able to take 
advantage of their central positions in the trading and information chains to keep making 
large profits at the expense of all others. Even after the financial crisis and new waves of 
financial regulation, that crucial problem remains. 
 
In the next chapter, Peter Thompson shows that many years after the financial crisis hit 
problems remain as deep-seated as ever. He uncovers the details of how the Libor scandal 
came about and the failures of financial news reporters and regulators to deal with the 
problem earlier. The account, while focusing on Libor, also sheds light on the reasons why so 
few failed to spot (or report on) the coming financial crisis of 2007-08, as well as why future 
crises are also likely to be missed. The continuing problem is that both journalists and 
regulators are dependent on self-serving inside sources for key information as well as 
interpretation of that information.  
 
In the last paper here Henry Silke demonstrates how the mainstream Irish press contributed to 
the property bubble which helped crash the Irish economy in 2007-08. The rapid rise of the 
Irish economy was strongly tied to promoting the real estate boom and encouraging 
international investors and businesses to come to Ireland. In the process, a property bubble 
grew, which then made homes unaffordable for most people while also destabilising the 
economy. The media, with close links to both elite national political and international 
investment networks, first pumped up the bubble and then kept it inflated. Thus, mainstream 
media coverage of the housing market, supposedly constructed for the public, was instead 
produced by and for market-linked interests. 
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Chapter Eleven 
 
The Edge: Investment Banks and Information Flows in Public Markets.   
 
Philip Augar 
 
If there was any benefit from the recent banking crisis and great recession, it was to increase 
public knowledge of financial markets. The world learned the hard way about bankers’ greed 
and incompetence and began to understand the power conferred by the market information 
they possess. The collapse of the US investment bank Lehman Brothers in 2008 and the 
disastrous knock on effects for the world economy of the demise of this apparently peripheral 
institution brought home the central role played by investment banks in our financial 
ecosystem. Their influence is immense and any discussion of information flows within public 
markets needs to start in their dealing rooms.  
 
The deregulation of Wall Street in 1975 and the City of London in 1986 introduced an 
integrated model of investment banking that channeled powerful information flows into these 
financial institutions. Single firms were able to provide advisory services for investors who 
buy shares and also for the corporations who issue them giving them the privileged position 
of working on both sides of a trade. These same institutions were also allowed to trade for 
clients and for their own profit. It thus became possible for them to work for the buyer and 
the seller in a single deal and simultaneously to make a proprietary trading profit.  
 
Regulators have tinkered with this model over the years but the investment banks’ 
information advantage remains intact, giving them a birds’ eye view of markets. This 
privileged position is at the heart of an asymmetrical financial system in which the dice are 
loaded against the end users. Every line of market business that is tradable flows through the 
investment banks’ dealing rooms and with that information comes extraordinary market 
power. Sometimes the temptation to abuse that privileged position proves irresistible and 
insider trading and market manipulation occur but cheating is scarcely necessary for there are 
rich pickings for legitimate operators who obey the rules. 
 
There is a paragraph in Den of Thieves (Stewart, 1991, p 352), the journalist James B 
Stewart’s classic account of the Wall Street’s scandals of the 1980s, which reveals this 
advantage. Stewart describes a conversation between Robert Freeman, at the time head of 
arbitrage at Goldman Sachs, and another trader. Freeman reflects ‘that when he was younger, 
he loved to go to Las Vegas to gamble. But now, he says, he doesn’t like casino odds. ‘It’s 
not fun anymore. I guess I’ve been in this business too long’ he says, ‘I’m used to having an 
edge.’ 
 
Freeman had put his finger on it. The financial behemoths’ edge is knowledge and 
integration. At any given moment in time, giant investment banks know more about the state 
of the world economy than any other public or private organization. The remarkable thing is 
not that sometimes they abuse this power but that they fail to take more advantage of it. 
 
This last quarter of the 20th century was the golden age of investment banking and revealed 
what the model could produce. In that period, profits in the US securities industry grew by a 
towering twenty six times, quadruple the rate of increase in America’s corporate profits and 
GDP over the same period. Extending the analysis to 2004 and smoothing profits to adjust for 
annual volatility, securities industry profits grew at a compound growth rate of 10% per 
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annum. This compares with a compound growth rate of 7% per annum in both US nominal 
GDP and corporate profits and 4% per annum consumer price inflation (Augar, 2006, p 52).  
 
Whilst practitioners believe that this performance was achieved as a result of their own 
genius, the reality is that it was produced by legitimately exploiting generous rules that gave 
them superior knowledge and the ability to borrow heavily to leverage their bets. All they had 
to do to preserve this model was not to get too greedy but that was a temptation that Wall 
Street’s alpha males could not resist. 
 
The work of the New York State Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer in 2001-2, exposed the 
scams that the investment banks had been running during the dot.com initial public offering 
bubble. Following Spitzer’s revelations, tougher rules were brought in to create internal 
barriers between the different departments of investment banks. Undeterred by the rising tide 
of regulation in one area of their business, the banks looked for new places that they could 
use their edge, adopting such tactics as selling over-valued mortgage backed securities to less 
knowledgeable clients and secretly betting against them in a ‘heads we win, tails you lose’ 
trade. The banking crisis of 2007-8 exposed this malpractice and prompted regulators to dig 
deeper into banks’ activities, revealing various other dark corners including the manipulation 
of market benchmarks such as the LIBOR and other inter-bank borrowing rates. 
 
The investment banks had spoiled their own party. By over-leveraging they were financially 
ruined in the crash and by cheating, they created such a tide of adverse public opinion that 
traditionally friendly regulators and legislators had no option but to tighten the rules. Where 
does that leave information flows and probity within public markets now? 
 
As a result of more intense supervision, new regulations and the deterrent effect of 
punishments, markets are currently in a relatively clean phase. Light touch regulation, the 
non-intrusive trusting approach pioneered by British regulators in the later 20th and early 21st 
centuries, has been replaced by more intense scrutiny. Structural changes such as the post-
Spitzer separation of investor-oriented research from issuer-oriented corporate advice have 
cleaned up new issues. The dismantling of dedicated proprietary trading units after the US 
Volcker Rule banned short-term proprietary trading with effect from 2014 has prevented the 
most egregious practices of trading on the back of client order flow. Jail time for inside 
traders and current court cases for some of those involved in benchmark manipulation are 
likely to have a powerful deterrent effect within the financial community. Proving this is 
difficult but one barometer is the movement of share prices ahead of takeover deals, which 
has recently been in decline. 
 
But it is too early to claim victory in the war against financial corruption. As the veteran 
British journalist Christopher Fildes has remarked, the time of greatest danger is when the 
last person to have experienced the previous crisis retires. In an industry where senior people 
usually retire in their forties, this creates a very short corridor in which people have firsthand 
experience of how bad behaviour breaks out and what happens to people and institutions that 
break the rules. Meantime, financial markets are highly skilled at regulatory arbitrage, the 
practice of obeying the letter if not the spirit of the law by means of new techniques to exploit 
gaps in the rule book. 
 
Let us assume, however, that practitioners are mindful of the rules and are resolved to obey 
them. Even under those circumstances, the integration of conflicted services into single banks 
and the complexity of today’s deals mean that price sensitive information is bound to leak. A 
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small army of people is required to make deals happen. A relatively small stock exchange 
deal in which the author was recently involved had around one hundred people on the 
approved ‘insiders’ list’. The chances of one of those people inadvertently giving away the 
secret were high and so it proved as the deal leaked to the press a few days before it was due 
to be announced. 
 
In addition many deals require legitimate market activity ahead of any public announcement 
making it possible for seasoned market watchers to work out what is going on. For this 
reason, the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority are probably correct to say that reducing pre-
deal suspicious movements to below one case in ten is probably a target that will be beyond 
the world’s financial markets (Financial Times, 2015). 
 
And what of the investment banks? A combination of cyclical downturn in market activity 
and tougher regulations requiring them to hold more capital and curb proprietary trading have 
led many to trim their business model. There is a new focus on the cost of capital and 
unproductive assets and businesses are being shed. This has led some commentators to 
proclaim the secular decline of the industry. But the investment banks and their hedge fund 
and private equity cousins retain huge market power and a permissive business model. This 
advantage seems likely to protect their informational advantage and ‘caveat emptor’ will 
remain the best advice their customers can ever receive. 
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Chapter Twelve 
 
The Libor Scandal: Mediation and Information Issues 
 
Peter Thompson 
 
Introduction 
 
With each new legal or technical shift so financial market actors have sought to find trading 
information advantages over others in defiance of institutional attempts to make market data 
universally accessible. Such shifts and adaptions have become all the more frequent in the 
City of London since ‘Big Bang’ (1985-6). The response of financial institutions has been the 
development of increasingly sophisticated new financial instruments to permit the 
exploitation of narrow margins. In turn, the institutional opacity and technical complexity of 
these developments has made it difficult to sustain journalistic scrutiny or regulatory 
oversight independent of insider sources. 
 
The 2007-8 sub-prime mortgage crisis and ‘credit crunch’ that followed, in many ways 
reveals each of these processes and problems. Government bank bail-outs and subsequent 
public austerity measures have also generated debate about the relationships that exist 
between financial markets, their regulators and financial media (e.g. see Schifferes and 
Roberts, 2014, Murdock and Gripsrud, 2015).  
 
The shortcomings of regulators and media in failing to identify the risks of sub-prime 
mortgage securities has been disputed. Nevertheless, the crisis certainly triggered several 
regulatory changes and a more critical tone in news reporting of banking. At face value, it 
might appear that such shifts have done much to reduce future system risks. .  
 
However, that may be an over-simplistic reading of the changes that have taken place. Taking 
the Libor-rigging scandal as a focus, I want to argue that, while some aspects of financial 
reporting and banking practices have doubtless changed for the better, some deeper problems 
remain largely unaddressed. Understanding the nature of these problems requires 
consideration of the evolving institutional priorities of the media, financial institutions and 
regulatory bodies. It also needs recognition that the verification of financial facts and events 
in many ways remains dependent on disclosures from financial regulators and government 
agencies.  
 
The Libor scandal 
 
The London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) is an international benchmark for currency 
lending and FX trading originally developed in the 1980s by the British Bankers Association. 
The daily rates indicate the level of interest at which banks are able to source loans in 
different currencies over different periods. The estimated value of contracts and securities 
underpinned by Libor range from US$300 to $800 trillion (Wheatley Review, 2012). The 
range of this official estimate reveals just how complex financial securities have become. 
Libor rates directly influence the daily flows of US$5.3 trillion in forex-related trades, 
derivatives contracts (FX futures, swaps and options) and bank loans (including mortgages 
and related securities) (BIS, 2013).  
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Up to 2014, Libor rates were calculated for ten major currencies across 15 periods (from 
overnight to a year, with 3 month figures the standard reference). A panel of up to 18 major 
banks were asked ‘At what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so, by asking for and 
then accepting interbank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to 11am?’ The mean 
rate was then calculated and published by Thomson Reuters simultaneously across the entire 
market. 
 
Not well understood outside financial markets, and overshadowed by the wider post-2007/08 
crisis, the revelations of Libor rate manipulation follow a rather uneven time-line (see BBC 
News 2013). Libor only became a full-blown scandal when it hit the headlines in 2012, 
following the release of bank communication records revealing collusive activities among the 
panellist banks. But misgivings about the validity of the submitted Libor rates had begun to 
percolate through the financial sector as early as  2005 (see Brummer, 2014, Davies, 2015). 
In late 2007, regulators became aware of mass distribution emails expressing suspicions 
about Libor rates being routinely under-estimated in case they engendered market perceptions 
of institutional vulnerability. Interestingly, Barclays (which would soon become the primary 
focus of the Libor scandal) intimated its own misgivings about Libor rigging  to the BBA and 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, albeit without admitting its own complicity 
(Federal Reserve, 2012, FSA, 2012, Wheatley Review, 2012). Meanwhile a Barclays 
employee also privately communicated concerns to the Fed. (Federal Reserve, 2012, Miliken 
and Spicer, 2012). 
 
At this time, Libor did begin to receive some attention by the financial media, but the 
magnitude of the malfeasance underpinning the system was not yet apparent. For example, 
the ever-prescient Gillian Tett (2007) wrote an FT piece noting BBA concerns about Libor 
mechanisms and rate discrepencies (see Amadeo, 2014), while the Wall Street Journal 
carried similar reports (McDonald and McDonald, 2007, Gaffen, 2007). In April 2008, the 
New York Fed Markets Group contacted the Barclays employee who had phoned them 
previously. The call confirmed that the banks were worried that high Libor submissions could 
make an institution appear weak in an environment where inter-bank credit was quickly 
evaporating (Federal Reserve 2012). The Fed’s subsequent weekly briefing note led to an 
increase in news reports asking questions about the possibility of Libor manipulation (Federal 
Reserve 2012).  
 
As the credit crunch deepened in the aftermath of the Lehman brothers collapse in September 
2008, valuation models and market liquidity broke down. As the crisis deepened, and banks 
stopped lending to each other, the transactions which might have provided an empirical 
referent for Libor submissions seized up (see Kregal, 2012, Thompson, 2013). As Brummer 
(2014) notes, the credit crunch led to spreads between banks’ actual lending and borrowing 
rates widening to over 1000 base points, leading the BBA to temporarily suspend publication 
of the Libor rates (see also The Economist, 2008). Although not a direct result of the 
manipulation, Libor had effectively lost any coherent meaning and functionality as a common 
benchmark. As (then) Bank of England governor, Mervyn King, quipped to a Treasury select 
committee, “Libor is the rate at which banks don’t lend to each other” (quoted in Brummer, 
2014, p.175).  
 
The trail of electronic evidence 
 
As the rumours of rate manipulation spread, the financial media began to pick up the issue 
and raise more direct questions about the validity of Libor. However, the evidence of 
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collusion stemmed not from investigative news reports but from regulator investigations 
requiring banks to divulge electronic communication records from financial chat rooms, 
trading room phone calls and messaging services (see Wheatley Review, 2012, Bloomberg, 
2012, 2015b, Commodity Futures Trading Commission [doc b]). Although the trail of 
evidence implicated a wide range of banks, it also pointed to two somewhat different motives 
behind the Libor manipulation (see Kregal, 2012).  
 
Firstly, the reluctance of banks to issue credit to each other had led to extreme caution in 
information disclosure which might suggest liquidity problems, following collapses at 
Northern Rock, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers (FSA, 2012, Federal Reserve, 2012). 
Submitting high rates relative to other banks invited speculation about solvency with 
potentially self-fulfilling consequences. Comments in exchanges involving Barclays traders 
reveal the intention was to avoid public speculation about the bank’s liquidity. For example: 
 
‘Try to get out JPY [Japanese Yen] Libors a little more in line with the rest of the 
contributors, or else the rumours will start flying about Barclays needing money 
because its Libors are so high’.  
 
‘going 4.98 for Libor only because of the reputational risk… basically the[re] is no 
money out there’ (both quoted in FSA 2012, p.25) 
 
Secondly, on a micro-institutional level, the ‘Chinese walls’ between trading desks and the 
bank officials responsible for submitting the Libor estimates were evidently porous. Although 
rate adjustments appeared small they were significant for forex and interest rate traders who 
depended on exploiting small margins or spreads through leverage. Taking the Wheatley 
Review’s lower estimate of Libor-dependent securities of US$300 trillion, even a single base-
point shift up or down in the rate could potentially make a difference of US$30 billion to 
forex trading positions over a year (or US$82.2 million a day). Given that many traders’ 
bonuses are performance-based, the incentive for illicit collusion for personal and 
institutional gain becomes clear.  
 
Although senior management typically denied direct knowledge of the micro-level 
interactions between individual traders, it is implausible that they were unaware of the 
institutional pressure to avoid signs of vulnerability in the crisis aftermath. The electronic 
paper trail also suggest an awareness that the practices violated regulations and subterfuge 
was expected. For example; 
 
‘Careful how we speak with them about what we, how the rate is set,’ (RBS trader, 
quoted in Bloomberg, 2012).  
 
‘don’t talk about it too much ... the trick is you do not do this alone ... this is 
between you and me but really don't tell ANYBODY,’ (Barclays trader to external 
counterparty, quoted in Slater and Ridley 2012) 
 
Other electronic messages suggest Libor manipulation had become widely tolerated as 
routine practice within some institutions: 
 
‘Could we pl[ease] have a low 6mth fix today old bean?’ (Deutsche Bank trader, 
quoted in FCA, 2015, p.13). 
 
This is a pre-print accepted manuscript version of the original title from 
Goldsmiths Press http://www.gold.ac.uk/goldsmiths-press/
79 
 
‘look I appreciate the business and the calls we should try to share info where 
possible also let me know if you need fixes one way or the other’ (unidentified FX 
trader, quoted in CFTC document B, p. 6) 
 
"Dude, I owe you big time! Come over one day after work and I'm opening a bottle 
of Bollinger," (email to a Barclays banker, quoted in Slater and Ridley, 2012) 
 
The legal and regulatory response to Libor manipulation 
 
The Libor investigations led to the series of formal proceedings and sanctions against the 
banks. It was also was clear that effective manipulation of the rates required collusion across 
multiple institutions. Although Barclays was the first bank to come to the attention of 
financial regulators, eight banks have now been fined by UK and US regulators for a total of 
around US$9 billion. These include Deutsche Bank ($2.5b), UBS ($1.5b), Rabobank ($1.1b), 
RBS ($612m), Barclays, ($451m), Lloyds ($383m), ICAP ($88m) and RP Martin ($2.3m) 
(Bloomberg, 2015, June 24). 2015 also saw the first UK jail sentence imposed on former 
UBS and Citigroup trader, Tom Haynes. 
 
Although these fines are doubtless substantial, they are only a fraction of the banks’ annual 
profits, and they actively negotiated with regulators over the amounts to be paid to settle the 
matter (Bloomberg, 2015, 24 April). Recently US courts have also ruled out claims against 
banks for Libor manipulation (Bloomberg, 2015, August 5). Consequently, some critics have 
interpreted the settlements as unduly cosy and suggested links between the ‘revolving door’ 
relation between industry and regulators and the lack of court prosecutions and custodial 
sentences (e.g. Willett, 2013).  
 
It is important, however, to note that the BBA Libor system was not based on statutory law, 
but a self-regulated market system. Proving that crimes were committed is therefore more 
complex than simply demonstrating that the Libor mechanism was being gamed.  It is 
intrinsically difficult to calculate specific gains and losses in relation to any individual Libor 
submission, or indeed, to apportion blame to any specific person or institution. There are 
many other variables influencing FX-related asset values. A short term nudge of a few base 
points on a specific currency on any particular day would benefit as many investors as it 
harmed. Similarly, while Libor manipulation technically affected hundreds of trillions of 
dollars’-worth of assets, the material impact on the general public should not be overstated. 
Libor was a public scandal but the parties most affected were large financial institutions.  
 
A further complication in the Libor scandal was the question of regulator and the government 
complicity with the Libor manipulations at the height of the 2007-8 crises. . In a July 2012 
Treasury Select Committee on Libor, Bob Diamond (the recently departed CEO of Barclays) 
revealed that a few weeks after the collapse of Lehman in September 2008, the deputy 
governor at the BoE, Paul Tucker, had called him to signal that senior government officials 
had concerns about Barclays Libor submissions which were consistently higher than other 
UK banks. According to Diamond:  
 
‘Mr. Tucker stated the levels of calls he was receiving from Whitehall were senior 
and that, while he was certain that we did not need advice, that it did not always 
need to be the case that we appeared as high as we have recently’ (quoted in BBC 
2012, July 3; see also July 9 & 16).  
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Diamond discussed the call with Jerry Del Missier, Barclays Chief Operating Officer, who 
informed the select committee that he understood this to be an instruction to bring Barclays’ 
Libor rates down in line with other banks. Tucker, meanwhile, acknowledged that a Cabinet 
secretary and Treasury official had discussed Libor rates with him, but strenuously denied 
that his conversation with Diamond could be construed as an instruction to rig Barclays’ 
submissions (BBC 2012, July 9; see also Brummer, 2014).  
 
The evidence led to speculation that senior government officials regarded Barclays as 
potentially vulnerable, and were willing to overlook discrepancies in Libor reporting with the 
goal of stabilising the sector. It certainly seems implausible that the BoE and government 
knew nothing of this until 2012. However, there is no evidence to support more conspiratorial 
claims that either knew about the level of collusion that preceded the crisis (Kregal, 2012). 
The call to Diamond was perhaps better explained by Barclay’s continuing reluctance to 
accept government credit extended to stabilise the banks, rather than any complicity with 
rigging Libor (Kregal, 2012). Nevertheless, insofar as the BBA, FSA and BoE were aware of 
possible discrepancies with Libor from at least 2007, questions remain about why it took until 
2012 for the full story to be uncovered. As Brummer observes, ‘no-one thought to look under 
the bonnet to see just what was going on’ (2014, p.176).  
 
The accumulation of communications records proving the extent of malfeasance led the 
Financial Services Authority to recommend an overhaul of the BBA-run Libor model. 
(Wheatley Review, 2012). The call made for a new system to be put out to tender, which was 
won by the Intercontinental Exchange Benchmark Administration. ICE Libor now covers a 
smaller range of currencies, and although it still relies on responses from a panel of banks 
responding to the same question about borrowing rates, submissions must now reflect actual 
transactions, with legal prohibitions on making false claims. Moreover, the news model 
delays the publication of individual bank submissions to offset the risk of inviting speculation 
about liquidity. Thomson Reuters also ceased to be the collator and publisher of the Libor 
rates.  
 
Mediation issues and the aftermath of Libor 
 
Given that the evidence about Libor manipulation began to emerge in the midst of arguably 
the most serious systemic financial crisis since 1929, the delays in investigation and 
resolution are perhaps understandable. The banks responsible have been sanctioned, and the 
shift to ICE Libor was a significant reform. Indeed, the FSA has itself been restructured into 
the Prudential Regulation Authority and Financial Conduct Authority (overseen by the Bank 
of England’s Financial Policy Committee) which are intended to render financial activities 
more transparent and prevent recurrences of such collusion and manipulation.  
 
The media coverage of the financial crisis and Libor scandal, evidenced a willingness to be 
critical of the financial sector (banks in particular) and avoid financial elite capture (see 
Picard et al., 2014). The fact that Libor became a public scandal and that the reforms to the 
system have been pushed through is in large part attributable to the news media. However, 
the key revelations of inter-bank collusion still relied on the disclosures from regulatory 
investigations. This suggests that financial media remained dependent on elite sources for 
information about internal market processes. 
 
Such limitations do not stem primarily from a lack of journalistic endeavour. Financial events 
are not publicly accessible in the same way that, say, a public protest or a natural disaster 
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would be. They are ontologically embedded in networks of shared meanings and information 
flows to which only market participants have direct access. Libor rates themselves are an 
epistemic construct derived from the metrics and methods of calculation. Ironically their truth 
value depends not only on whether the panellist banks submit honest estimates but on 
whether the rates are collectively recognised as valid by the market as a whole. Although 
some journalists could discern problems with Libor from the anomalous spreads in the 
published data, the underlying causes of those anomalies were not apparent to them. The 
networks of information exchange which underpin professional financial market activity are 
not usually accessible to outsiders (see Thompson, 2013, Davis, 2015).  
 
However, it would be premature to suppose that the Libor reforms (and those from the more 
recent FX fixing scandal), combined with a more critical media , will prevent a recurrence of 
such problems. The authors’ recent interviews with both financial wire service 
editors/reporters, and investment bank traders/executives in the City of London (in 2014) 
suggest a shift in the relations between news media and the banking sector. Now keen to 
minimise the risk of further reputational damage and regulator scrutiny, investment banks 
have introduced new restrictions on both internal and external communications. Internally, 
trading room protocols now routinely record all communications and regulate interactions 
with counterparties in other institutions. In some cases personal cell phones and social media 
have been prohibited. These measures are understandable, but it remains unclear how this 
would affect the kind of informal communications among traders in a crisis scenarios when 
benchmarks like Libor break down and price activity cannot be discerned from brokerage 
screens (see Thompson, 2014). There is therefore concern that the new rules restrict entirely 
legitimate trading room communications. Some representative comments from bank 
interviews include: 
 
‘In terms of observations and exchange of information, that’s one of the things that 
the regulatory regime now has, actually in terms of unintended consequences, 
nobody will share information with you any more…’  
 
‘One of the customers made some comments about them checking pricing with 
other customers about what the other banks were offering. If the banks did that it 
would be called collusion or rigging the market. If I ring up [other banks named] 
and say “hey, how are you pricing [company name]?” and that’s recorded, that’s 
collusion’ 
 
Meanwhile, in regard to bank interactions with the news media, there has been a significant 
reinforcement of gatekeeping protocols to manage who responds to journalistic enquiries. 
The referral of reporters to PR departments and communications managers is far from new, 
but the tighter rules make navigating these channels more complicated and serve to restrict 
access to traders at the coal-face, as these comments from wire service reporters suggest: 
 
‘Access to traders, decision-makers, deal-makers on the floor have become much, 
much more difficult, for a whole host of reasons. Obviously all the banks and 
institutions have tightened up massively on who they allow to speak to the press 
freely.’  
 
‘There was a time, eight to ten years ago, where you would ring up the internal 
communications person and say can I talk to x y or z, Now they want to be in on the 
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call and they will intervene if there’s a question asked that’s sensitive and they 
demand checking of quotes afterwards.’ 
 
Conclusion 
 
There is no question that the Libor scandal revealed widespread unethical practices, although 
it is important to differentiate between cases where reputational damage control was the 
motive as opposed to personal greed. Many bankers are now weary of what they regard as 
relentless and (in some cases) unfair media criticism, although one might argue that the 
banking sector has invited this upon themselves.  
 
The more complex question is whether the measures introduced to prevent recurrences of 
such malfeasance have adequately recognised the constructed nature of metrics such as Libor. 
The new communication restrictions will arguably make it more difficult for traders to 
validate price action in a crisis scenario when the shared confidence in benchmarks like Libor 
break down (especially given that ICE Libor is now based on the very transactional data 
which dried up at the height of the credit crunch). Meanwhile, journalists may find it more 
difficult to access the financial sources who have direct experience of the events being 
reported. As with so many responses to financial crises and scandals, the solutions may 
inadvertently carry the seeds of future problems. 
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Chapter Thirteen 
 
The Press, Market Ideologies and the Irish Housing Crash 
 
Henry Silke 
 
Introduction 
 
There is a growing symbiotic relationship between business, communication networks and 
the mass media. Business depends on communication networks and the mass media in 
numerous ways; in the actual conduct of business, in the need for market information, for 
advertising and market creation, and as ideological apparatuses which acts to naturalise 
market economies and defend business interests. Such trends have been exacerbated in the 
media industry in recent decades as media has been increasingly consolidated into massive 
transnational corporations with interests far wider than journalism. In fact it is argued that the 
contemporary mass media, rather than simply reporting on economic issues, have become an 
integral part of economic processes.  
 
A clear example of this, and the growing links between business and journalism, is the 
coverage of housing and the property market in Ireland. The Irish property market suffered 
one of the greatest crashes in modern history, directly costing the state tens of billions in bank 
bailouts and hundreds of thousands of mainly working class livelihoods. A key discursive 
element of housing and property news has been the framing of housing as a commodity rather 
than a social need, as well as a privileging of market needs over society ones. This was the 
case in much of the coverage of the housing market by the Irish media in the run up to the 
housing crash of 2007/2008. This framing, as well as ignoring key social problems such as 
affordability, included an insidious and dogmatic belief in the primacy of the market that 
blinded much of the Irish media to the possibility of the crash, thus acting both to encourage 
and elongate the bubble. There is little evidence that this framing of housing as a commodity 
rather than a social need has changed as most discourse continues to be around ‘fixing the 
market’ rather than thinking outside of it. 
 
The Irish Housing Crisis 
 
The roots of Ireland’s economic crisis are long and deep. Ireland after independence 
remained a dependent economy, concentrating on the export of non-value added commodities 
and the enticement of foreign direct investment into the Irish state, rather than the 
development of indigenous industry. The service economy and the various sections of the 
property industry became key, state-supported investment activities during the ‘Celtic 
Tiger’s’ boom years. This had very serious repercussions for many Irish people struggling 
between a diminishing social housing supply, a Dickensian private rental market and now 
unaffordable homes. The process also led to a skewed domestic economy and eventually the 
development of a massive asset price bubble in property. 
 
By 2007 even middle class home buyers were being priced out of the housing market. The 
deregulated banking system filled the gap with innovative ‘products’ such as speculative 
‘100%, loans’, ‘interest free mortgages’, and ‘buy to let schemes’. At the same time that 
consumer demand was dipping, huge amounts of vacant and half-finished properties were 
coming on stream, often in places with no manifest demand for housing at all. Like all Ponzi 
schemes (as the Irish property market had begun to resemble) the market was fictitious. 
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Eventually in 2007, property prices began to dip and, following the ‘credit crunch’, the 
residential and commercial property markets collapsed entirely. This then uncovered huge 
holes in banking balance sheets, none more so than the poster boy for Irish ‘entrepreneurship’ 
and ‘innovation’, Anglo Irish Bank. However, unlike an ordinary Ponzi scheme this crash 
brought down a whole generation of home buyers, the Irish economy, hundreds of thousands 
of jobs and the living standards of most of the populace. 
  
The crisis in housing has continued since despite the apparent upturn in the Irish economy. 
Thousands of people continue to be unable to pay mortgages, often trapped in negative equity 
(FinFacts). Public and private investment in new housing remains low (Irish Times 2014b). 
Private rents continue to rise well above those of inflation or average incomes, especially in 
Dublin. Unsurprisingly, by the middle of this decade, the city was witnessing an 
unprecedented wave of evictions of individuals and families who are unable to pay, and we 
are witnessing what has been termed a ‘tsunami of homelessness’ (Irish Times 2014a, 
2014c). 
 
The Irish Business-Media Nexus 
 
The Irish media sphere is becoming increasingly linked to international investor and political 
interests. Three distinct trends have developed fairly recently. The first has been the 
consolidation and concentration of Irish Media groups. Second is increased foreign 
ownership and penetration. Third has been journalistic practice affected by technological 
change (Horgan, McNamara and O'Sullivan 2007, p. 35). RTE, the prominent broadcaster, 
although state funded, is also dependent on advertising revenue. Within the print media sector 
the multinational Independent News and Media (INM) group has developed a dominant 
position. Its interests range across Irish national, evening and Sunday titles as well as the 
regional market. It was estimated in 2002 that the INM group publishes about 80% of all 
indigenous national newspapers in the Republic of Ireland (Truetzschler 2010).                         
 
But the connections between Irish news media and business, most particularly finance, are 
widespread and entrenched as a study of Irish director and board networks (2005-07) has 
shown (Clancy, O'Connor and Dillon 2010). Through this network, Independent News and 
Media directly interlocks with Allied Irish bank, Eircom and other interests. Indirectly this 
‘director network’ places INM close to the heart of Irish capitalism which raises the question 
of absolute neutrality or objectivity in reporting the Irish economic crisis. Moreover, INM’s 
major shareholder Denis O’Brien has huge interests in Irish private radio and international 
telecommunications, as well as an overly close relationship with Ireland’s ministry of 
communications (Irish Times 2011). 
 
RTE also has (Julian Mercille, 2013b) connections with the financial oligarchy such as 
former RTE chairman Patrick J. Wright (who was also a director of Anglo Irish Bank 
throughout the boom years) and Mary Finan (who was a director of the ICS building society). 
While Ireland’s ‘newspaper of record’ the Irish Times is a trust it too has connections with 
finance capital. For example, David Went, the former chairman of the board of trustees 
(2007-2014), has also been Chairman of Irish Life and Permanent, Chief Executive of Ulster 
Bank, and a non-executive director of Goldman Sachs.  
 
The Irish News Media and the Property Crisis 
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The Irish media system, especially the press, played an important role in the Irish property 
bubble and following crisis. Newspapers are one of the main sources of market information 
and act as the main advertising source for property companies. Newspaper groups have also 
adapted to the online advertising challenge by using their websites as portals in property 
listings (for example the Sunday Business Post and the Irish Independent), or even buying up 
property websites. The Irish Times for example purchased www.myhome.ie in 2007 for 50 
million euro (RTE Business 2006). Newspapers are also an important point of information on 
the property market, property sales and planning issues.  
 
Although there is some evidence that news media did ask questions about the property 
bubble, the wider evidence suggests they most often took a cheerleading role. So, RTE, the 
Irish public service channel, (and arguably the only media company not overly dependent on 
property advertising), did belatedly produce a documentary on the possibilities of a housing 
crash (RTE, 2007). One important article did get published as an opinion piece in the Irish 
Times in December 2006 written by the academic Morgan Kelly (Kelly, 2006, Irish Times 
2006). The paper and op-ed piece did warn in no uncertain terms of the oncoming crisis. 
 
Newspapers and editors have also defended their role. For example, former editor of the Irish 
Independent, Gerry O’Regan, in his evidence maintained that there was no ‘hidden agenda’ 
to ‘artificially bolster the property market’, while former Irish Times editor, Geraldine 
Kennedy, claimed that the property sections in the newspapers maintained the same level of 
editorial standards as were applied to the rest of the paper (The Journal, 2015). Tim Vaughan, 
former editor of The Irish Examiner stated; ‘We are reliant on agents of the State to be 
competent, professional, open, honest and reliable in what they do and say, and then we 
report on that ... we believed and accepted that institutions, such as the financial regulatory 
authorities, were doing their jobs …’ (Irish Times 2015). 
 
At the same time the RTE documentary and Kelly pieces were widely derided across the Irish 
press. The Taoiseach himself, infamously in a public speech made clear his sentiments 
towards those who ‘talk down the economy’ (Finfacts 2014), declaring ‘don’t commit 
suicide’. Alongside the documentary, RTE also produced two series of a reality TV show 
where an estate agent turned presenter shamed the populace onto the property ladder in the 
insidiously named ‘I’m an adult, get me out of here!’ (RTE/Animo Productions. 2007). RTE 
also produced and broadcast the standard property improvement reality television shows and 
more recently began running a ‘property porn’ series entitled ‘Home of the Year’, sponsored 
by the Permanent TSB bank (RTE2015). 
  
Thus far there has been little discussion about the news media’s role in the property bubble in 
the Irish mass media itself. The media did get a dishonourable mention in the 2011 Nyberg 
Irish state report on the Irish housing crash (Nyberg 2011 pp. ii, 6, 50). The media’s role is 
also being investigated by the state inquiry into the banking crisis (see Critical Media Review 
2015 for video of inquiry proceedings).  
 
In addition, there is a small but growing area of academic research into the role of the media 
in the Irish economic crisis (Fahy, O’Brien and Poti, 2010, Cawley, 2010, Preston and Silke, 
2011, 2014, Mercille, 2013a, 2013b, 2014). Cawley’s (2010) study found news coverage 
framed the public sector as a cost, while presenting the market economy as the sole ‘reality’. 
Preston and Silke (2011) argued that the media took part in an ideological re-framing of what 
was a private banking crisis into a fiscal crisis, which then helped lay the political 
justification for severe austerity measures (Preston and Silke 2014, see also Mercille, 2013a). 
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Mercille (2013b, 2014) found a hugely favourable view of the property market before 2008, 
which helped sustain the rise in house prices. Some of my own PhD research, on financial 
journalism and the housing crash between 2007 and 2009, supports these studies and is 
discussed below (Silke 2015). 
 
The Role of the Irish Times and Irish Independent in the Property Bubble 
 
As part of a doctoral thesis I investigated the Irish Times’ and Irish Independent’s coverage 
of issues around housing and property between May 1st and May 25th 2007. This period 
coincided with the start of the drop in house prices and the May 24th general election. This 
election was probably the last major opportunity for debate in the ‘public sphere’ on the 
property bubble before the crash, and certainly it was the last opportunity for people to vote 
before the crash. The key search words ‘property’, ‘housing’, ‘stamp duty’, ‘rent’ and 
‘mortgage’ were used to find articles from the Irish Times and Irish Independent in the Lexis 
Nexis database. Altogether in the Irish Times 446 relevant articles were found between the 
dates in all four sections and in the Irish Independent 410 relevant articles were found.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: New and Second Hand House Prices Nationwide 1990-2010 – Source Central 
Statistics Office. 
 
As can be seen in Table 1 the Irish Times and Irish Independent gave approximately equal 
attention to the issue and generally in the same manner. Most articles where housing or the 
property markets were discussed appeared in the property supplements, followed by the news 
sections and then closely by business sections and finally by opinion and editorial. This in 
itself suggests that housing is treated as a commodity, being discussed predominantly in the 
business and advertising sections rather than elsewhere. 
 
 
Table 1: Total Number of Articles featuring property or housing 1-25 May 2007 
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In the coverage of property in the Irish Times and Irish Independent a key finding was the 
dominance of elite sources connected with the property and finance industries as compared to 
ordinary sources such as home buyers and renters. The greatest total single overall source on 
the issue of housing is comprised of estate agents, accounting for some 28% of total sources 
and 29% of sources by frequency. In the residential property sections 64.5% of sources in the 
Irish Times and Irish Independent are estate agents, while in the commercial property 
sections estate agents make up 72.5% of sources, 78% and 65% respectively. In the combined 
business sections banking and finance sources make up 35% of sources while property 
industry sources (including estate agents) make up 13%.  
 
In the news sections official sources, especially politicians are most prevalent with 69% of 
total sources. 17% of articles also included sources from the finance and property industries. 
In party political sourcing, the parties with pro-market polices make up the vast majority of 
sources in the papers although it may be argued this reflected party political support at the 
time. When compared, the Irish Independent and Irish Times have a roughly similar ratio of 
party political representation. Economically right wing political sources make up the majority 
with approximately 65% of representatives being openly free market parties (Fianna Fail, 
Fine Gael and the Progressive Democrats). If we include Labour who had a 2007 policy of 
subsidising the market by offering large grants to be used to buy private housing (the number 
would go up to approximately 77%). Representatives of parties that call for non-market 
solutions to housing make up just under 9% of sources (Sinn Fein, The Socialist Party and 
People Before Profit Alliance), while the Green Party, which called for stricter market 
regulation, come in at 10.5%. Most party political sources appeared in the news sections. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Total Sources Irish Independent and Irish Times Combined 
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The most striking figure is that of what we term user sources, that is sources such as renters 
and home buyers who are interested in the property solely for its use, i.e. to live or work in it. 
User sources make up only 2% of total sources and appeared in only 2% of all articles. This 
compares to ‘exchange value’ sources (from the property and finance industries) making up 
43% of total sources and appearing in 44% of all articles.  
 
This overly skewed sourcing could be described as a manifest ‘capturing’ of the press by 
property and finance sources and may help to explain the downplaying of the oncoming 
crisis, and the lack of critique of the massive inflation of the cost of housing as will be 
discussed below.  
 
Treatment and Framing 
 
The research also documented an overall market-orientated frame around property: that is 
that housing was primarily looked at from the point of view of the market rather than society. 
Elements of this included the privileging of ‘exchange value’ over ‘use value’, and non-
critical reporting of markets and market sources. For example, while corruption on housing 
issues such as rezoning was heavily covered in the news sections on the political side, the 
industrial side of the corruption was completely ignored and corruption itself was not covered 
in business or property sections of the papers. Similarly, the state was either presented 
positively when serving market aims, or blamed as a cause of instability in the markets. 
 
The residential property supplement in both newspapers displayed an uncritical, aspirational 
and advertorial discourse when reporting individual properties. At times, advertorial type 
articles also find their way into the business and news sections. Not one article questioned 
whether an individual property might be overpriced. Overall, even in the main news sections, 
the key issue was ‘the market’ and ‘market stability’, rather than either consumer or social 
good. In the property and commercial sections the rental property market is framed from the 
perspective of landlords and investors. Even social housing is framed on a market basis from 
the point of view of private companies or developers involved in the supply of public 
housing. In Op-Ed articles, market stability was the major issue, again trumping the crisis of 
affordability or the social need for housing. The only questioning of rental prices was from 
the point of view of business focusing on the danger of wage demand inflation arising from 
higher rents. 
 
The discussion around state policy played into the neoliberal trope of state ‘interference’ 
distorting a functioning market. Material issues such as overproduction and price inflation 
were ignored and assumptions of market self-regulation (without state interference) appeared 
implied. This is an important finding as it reflected the neo-classical economics viewpoint 
that markets work and are self-regulating, and that the crisis came not from markets 
themselves but from behavioural, psychological and political interferences. Again, given the 
non-critical sourcing of both papers from orthodox neo-classical economists and the lack of 
any evidence of independent fact checking or investigation, this is probably not surprising.  
 
Both newspapers acted defensively when it came to the question of future property price 
trends. Both privileged a market slowdown (in positive growth) rather than crash with many 
articles denying that house prices themselves would be affected. The business sections 
especially acted to play down the dangers of a crash with some articles even going so far as to 
attack those who said otherwise.  
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Many articles considered the problem to be political interference, specifically over stamp 
duty reform and expected a post-election ‘normality’ to resume. This framing held the direct 
implication that the markets, left to themselves, would be fine, while ‘interference’ from 
government and even discussion itself was the problem. This was seen clearly in critical 
responses to anyone ‘talking down the economy’, where any critique was itself blamed for 
causing the crisis. At best, this response ignored the material basis of the property market 
crisis and, at worst, both silenced critics and elongated the crisis.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The research demonstrates that Irish newspapers covering the property industry did not report 
objectively or fulfil their public interest ‘watchdog’ role. Rather, their key function was to act 
as advertisers for the industry, facilitating exchanges of uncritical information between 
industry players. In the process, they normalised the hyperinflation of housing, celebrated 
high property prices and, crucially, acted to play down the contradictions in the Irish system 
that were directing it towards a crash. With some exceptions, particularly in a few opinion 
pieces, they reported not for the public but instead for rather narrow sectional and 
economistic interests. The main reporting patterns and frames point to a ‘captured press’; that 
is a press in the service of a narrow elite class-based interest, operating under key structural, 
institutional and ideological biases.  
 
A key element to this process was the framing of housing not as a social need but as a 
commodity, used to create wealth rather than supply housing. This celebrated rather than 
questioned the hyperinflation of housing and rental costs. The market-orientated framing also 
supported the neo-classical and idealistic belief in market self-regulation, either denying or 
playing down the possibility of a crash. The lack of critique may well have helped to both 
build and prolong the bubble itself. That is not to say the media caused the crisis. There were 
long term material and political structural issues at its core. However, the newspapers did 
play the role of facilitator, supplying ideological and political cover to an economic elite who 
profited greatly from the hyperinflation of housing and the sale of associated financial 
products. This assisted in laying the grounds for the housing crash, the economic crisis and 
the subsequent financial bailout, alongside the severe austerity policies that then followed.  
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Section Four: Private Interest Encroachments on Public Policy-Making  
 
One of the most disturbing and covert means by which public knowledge is being eroded is in 
the public policy-making environment, a space often lacking transparency. Not only have 
private sector companies increasingly taken on state sector roles, through a mixture of 
privatization and out-sourcing, so they have increasingly taken over the decision-making 
process itself. Commercial lobbyists, think-tanks and consultants provide a stream of reports, 
data and policy information that feed into government departments. Legal, accounting and 
other experts are seconded from the private to the public sector, to develop new laws and 
regulations, before returning to exploit such knowledge for their long-term private employers. 
Everywhere one looks, from defence to health, education to finance, the policy-making 
process has been captured by vested interests. 
 
In the first chapter here, Bong-hyun Lee outlines the ways and means chaebols (Korean 
conglomerates) have taken over multiple forms of public policy-making and discourse about 
the economy itself. Their dominance has come through strong influences over think tanks, 
state-centred policy networks, business journalism and public relations units. It is by such 
means that economic power has shaped discourse which, in turn, has reshaped the economy 
in Korea. Consequently, its previous state-sponsored development model has been 
reconfigured towards a more neoliberal capitalist template, bringing instability and extreme 
inequalities along the way. 
 
In the second chapter, Michael Moran and Karel Williams take a close look at the growing 
outsourcing industry – another means by which the private sector encroaches on the state. 
They ask why does outsourcing continue to expand despite ongoing fiascos, frauds and cost 
over-runs? Answers lie somewhere between public and institutional financial illiteracy, 
market ideology and sleight-of-hand public discourses. The combination means that 
outsourcers keep profiting and growing and at a cost to the public purse. 
 
Janine Wedel takes a close look at the new American influence elites, their modes of 
operation, and the vehicles and structures they co-create in order to advance their individual 
agendas. As traditional institutions and hierarchies become more fragmented so the new 
breed of influence elites and flexible networks move in to the policy-making spaces that open 
up. Such elites have moved far beyond “the standard revolving door”, as they move 
effortlessly between public legislative and regulatory bodies, private contractors, think-tanks, 
consultancies and media outlets, leveraging inside knowledge and contacts as they go. 
Ultimately, these same elites have a powerful input into numerous policy-making areas, from 
defence decisions and contracts to financial regulation. Their personal gain is often the 
public’s loss. 
 
Colin Leys outlines a major shift in the way UK health care policy is constructed. From the 
1920s, health care was debated very much within a public sphere made up of the professions, 
universities, media and government. This linked policy to the public interest. However, after 
the late 1970s this model was slowly dismantled. Instead, management consultancies and 
privately funded think-tanks took over the policy-coordinating function of the Department of 
Health. It is this transition which has aided the shift towards the privatization and 
marketization of the NHS. 
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Chapter Fourteen 
 
The Corporate Takeover of Economic Discourse in Korea 
 
Bong-hyun Lee 
 
Introduction 
 
This piece illustrates how chaebols, a type of conglomerate particular to South Korea, have 
enhanced their influence over government policy via their growing control over multiple 
forms of public economic discourse. In this case, chaebols have deployed their significant 
economic resources to strategically dominate both public media and state-generated policy 
debates about the economy. Their success in this area of public culture has meant that 
chaebols have a greater say over economic policy than the state itself which, in turn, has 
contributed to a significant undermining of the democratic process. 
 
The Role of Chaebols in Korean Economic Growth 
 
Chaebols, such as Samsung, Hyundai and LG, are a specific type of conglomerate, most 
commonly associated with Korea. They developed during the country’s period of ‘condensed 
economic growth’. In most of the literature, Korean chaebols are defined by three distinctive 
characteristics: corporate governance (family ownership and control); market position 
(monopolistic or oligopolistic); and organizational structure (business groups with multiple 
ownership and managerial links). These characteristics are very similar to those of the 
zaibatsu before the defeat of the Japanese empire in 1945. 
  
Chaebols emerged and evolved when the Korean economy surged forward from the mid-
1960s onwards. This period of rapid economic growth coincided with a massive 
consolidation of capital by the chaebols, working in tandem with the government as it 
pursued a state-driven developmental model. In fact, Amsden (1989) attributed the 
impressive achievements of the Korean model to this evolving state-chaebol partnership. 
Initially, in this partnership, the state took the initiative by harnessing institutional support 
and economic discipline.  
 
But by the late 1970s this state-driven developmental model was reaching its limits. It 
became increasingly clear that the state no longer dared to orchestrate everything. A new 
paradigm was evolving to prolong economic development. It was economic globalization, 
motivated by the ‘boundless dynamics of capitalism’ (Coals 2005, p 73), that supplied the 
new ‘frame of reference’ (Said 2003) for this paradigm shift. Liberalism, resuscitated in the 
face of the ‘structural crisis of capitalism’ (i.e. the falling rate of profit) in the 1970s 
(Campbell 2005, p 189), has since appropriated globalization as a means for expanding 
capitalist activities unchecked across national boundaries. Both transnational corporations 
(TNCs) and global financial capital have played a pivotal role in making ‘the capitalist global 
system the dominant global system’ (Sklair 2002, p 7). 
 
Neoliberal ideas and neoliberal policy regimes were voluntarily adopted by the Korean State 
and chaebols, replacing the economic ideas of developmental era. Consequently, the decade-
long partnership between the state and the chaebols started to change with the state no longer 
acting as the dominant partner. 
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The chaebols, consistent with their nature as capitalist, monopoly-seeking entities, have 
pursued freedom and expansion in the course of the neoliberal transformation of Korean 
society. Once established, they aspired towards greater freedom from state regulation, a 
restructuring of labour-capital relations, and the marketization of multiple areas of society. 
Since the early 1980s, they have demanded that the government ease financial regulations so 
they could access cheaper international sources of capital. By the mid-1990s, through a 
combination of acquisitions and enhanced access to global capital, they had gained 
considerable financial autonomy. At this point they began publicly demanding that the state 
retreat from the economic sphere (Ha Y-S 2003, p 10).  
 
The Korean economic crisis in 1997 was a direct consequence of state withdrawal from 
economic coordination. This included a rapid relaxation of cross-border capital movement 
controls and the abolition of industrial policy, both without establishing state regulatory 
systems. Furthermore, the general turn towards neoliberal restructuring (based on IMF 
programmes) of the Korean economy, following the 1997 economic crisis, has accelerated the 
ascendancy of capital over state  
 
Chaebol Economic Influence Based on Growing News and Information Dominance 
 
The chaebols, with their extensive links to umbrella associations, in-house think-tanks and 
extensive social networks, constitute a most influential site of discursive power in 
contemporary Korean society. The contrasting corporate discourses promoted by chaebols set 
them apart from their conglomerate counterparts in Western economies. On the one hand, 
they are fairly modern economic institutions, publicly-listed transnational companies 
producing world-class goods and services. On the other hand, they have an oddly pre-modern 
corporate governance system, which is the legacy of small, start-up family businesses, 
strongly controlled by the family members of all-powerful chairman who own tiny 
proportions of the company’s stock. Many of the resources of the chaebols – ideas, personnel 
and money – have been mobilized in order to consolidate this family dominance. In those 
organizations, fealty to the chairman is as important as ability when it comes to staff 
promotions. 
 
Many practices, beliefs, discourses and forms of culture emanate from this peculiar chaebol-
centred system and permeate into every corner of Korean society. To create a favourable 
business environment and to cover over their deficiencies, chaebols deploy extensive 
resources to manage their political, legal and social environment. They systematically 
cultivate extensive elite networks of politicians, journalists, lawyers, scholars and artists. 
They abhor the power of the state, arguing that government regulations suffocate the free 
market. But their relentless request for deregulation, in effect, also reflects their desire to 
prevent state reforms of the archaic chaebol system which, itself, inhibits competition.  
 
The social vision of the chaebols determines that social advancement is only achieved 
through economic growth. They present themselves simultaneously as locomotives of growth 
and as part of a national team in the global economic battle. In this, the state is relegated to 
the role of cheerleader for business activities. The political leanings of the chaebols are 
highly conservative, mirroring their authoritarian organizational ethos. Their social vision is 
too narrow to accept liberal pluralism. Their belief is that all forms of collectivism (e.g. 
industrial action, political ascendancy of labour groups) and distributive social policies are 
only hindrances to economic growth. 
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Communication within chaebol-centred networks is intensive. The senior staff of chaebols 
and their umbrella associations actively meet various elites (e.g. politicians, government 
officials, journalists and businessmen) during their lunch or dinner hours. The information 
garnered from these meetings is not held privately but keyed into the on-line information 
archive systems of their companies. This information is later integrated, analysed by 
specialists and circulated to the senior personnel. What’s more, many chaebols operate a task 
force team which is solely dedicated to collecting inside information from various elite 
networks. Different chaebol task forces then have regular meetings with their counterparts 
and exchange information. 
 
With this system, some chaebols are said to have greater information-gathering power than 
the government intelligence agency itself (one famous anecdote is that Samsung, in 1998, 
received information of the death of the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping through their 
international elite networks several hours before the first world wire news came out). The 
information, concerns and ideas gathered are widely discussed across chaebol networks, in 
many cases leading to a rough chaebol-wide consensus. This consensus then provides the 
rationale for chaebol public arguments or actions, especially when they interact with external 
elite groups.  
 
Chaebols are very good at managing the media as a means of achieving and sustaining their 
power in society. The chaebols’ in-house PR units have considerably augmented their 
personnel and resources in recent decades. Professional PR is now seen as a critical means of 
gaining direct or longer term strategic advantage in business, and chaebol PR departments 
have become a route for staff to be promoted to the executive. When a crisis or conflict 
breaks out, PR personnel are deployed not only to foster favourable public opinion, but also 
to persuade or dissuade related elite groups.  
 
In ordinary times, however, a more sophisticated and fundamental type of PR is mobilized. 
The aim of this ‘strategic PR’, is to spread a business-friendly version of knowledge on 
specific economic, social and political issues. Many in-house chaebol think tanks or umbrella 
associations competitively produce issue-related research papers every day. Ironically, in 
contemporary Korea, it is chaebol-affiliated research institutes that engage most actively and 
in the most timely way with social, and economic issues, while many public research 
institutions are too under-resourced to offer much. The target of ‘strategic PR’ is, by nature, 
non-corporate elites groups or opinion leaders. Chaebol in-house institutions distribute their 
research papers through their own email lists. Some of these, usually those dealing with 
sensitive issues, are only distributed to members of elite groups (e.g. high-ranking 
government officials or top management) and several days before being published more 
widely. Think tanks generally work in close cooperation with PR departments. PR 
departments then promote the research papers when deemed strategically useful and 
sometimes they request specific research to advance a PR objective. 
 
Mass news media is closely intertwined with the communication process constructed by 
chaebols. Chaebols are the most important advertisers for newspapers and for broadcasting. 
Because of worsening financial conditions, quite a lot of media corporations have abandoned 
the ‘principle of a fire wall’ between their editorial and management departments. At the 
same time, many media corporations are closely linked to chaebols through their ownership 
structures. For these reasons, journalists often mobilize self-censorship mechanisms in their 
reports on chaebol-related issues. Very frequently, chaebols PR personnel directly harass 
journalists in an attempt to block unfavourable news. In most cases, they are successful. 
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However, a corporate ‘mobilization of bias’ comes equally from day-to-day organisational 
relations which means that censorship does not have to be directly imposed. Most business 
journalists are stationed in press rooms which chaebols or their umbrella associations supply. 
Hovering around the press room, journalists regularly have contact with PR staff or senior 
managers of chaebol groups during their lunch or dinner hours. From time to time, PR 
departments organize conferences or tours in which several key managers from chaebol 
headquarters stay for one night with business journalists, editors or economic columnists. 
Major chaebol groups even support overseas study programmes for journalists for a year and 
keep in contact with their so-called ‘Samsung fellow’ or ‘LG fellow’ after they return. In this 
respect, the level of interaction that business journalists’ have with chaebol staff is far higher 
than that with small and medium company managers or the representatives of labour unions. 
By such means, journalists unknowingly internalize the perspectives and values of chaebols.  
 
The dependency of journalists on chaebol PR departments has grown as media companies 
have struggled to fill space in an era of declining revenues. Few now have the resources to do 
an in-depth or investigative piece on businesses. Access to senior chaebol personnel is strictly 
controlled through the PR department. Reliance on chaebol-crafted press releases, think tank 
reports and comments is widespread. The similar orientations of business journalists to these 
same chaebol sources then leads to ‘pack journalism’ in which all news producers follow 
similar story lines, frames and opinions. In appearance, reporters seem to engage in intense 
competition but outcomes seldom vary much. 
 
Chaebols Mobilize Discourse Against the Korean State and Society 
 
The exaggeration of bad economic conditions by chaebol and media, with a view to 
influencing economic policy, has been a recurrent issue since late 1990s. This argument has 
appealed directly to individuals while ignoring macro-economic indicators which have 
continued to show sound growth in the Korean economy. The larger depression discourse has 
had two socio-political purposes. One was to put pressure on the government to take a more 
‘business-friendly’ stance as ‘negative economic conditions’ were continually attributed 
mainly to government regulation and interference in the economy. Thus, the discourse 
implied if government and politicians leave the business (especially chaebols) to their own 
course, the economy would naturally become robust. The other purpose was to argue that 
‘economic redistribution’ was best left to the market and achieved through economic growth. 
Korea has shown a steady deterioration of income distribution since it began forcefully 
adopting neoliberal policies after economic crisis in 1997. People’s sense of economic 
depression mainly comes from this growing inequality, increasing casualization of work, the 
rapid appreciation of asset values such as real estate, and the ever-increasing expense for 
private education. But the discourse of depression only highlighted under-investment 
implying that once hesitant chaebols and business leaders were encouraged to invest, then 
everything would go well.  
 
The power of chaebols to dominate economic discourse became evident in 2003-04. 
Chaebols and the mainstream media simultaneously argued that the economic situation was 
terrible and relentlessly played up a sense of depression, thus forcing the newly-inaugurated 
Roh Moo-Hyun government into a political corner. This took place in spite of the fact that 
major economic indicators, such as GDP growth, the Industrial Production Index and rises in 
per-capital income were all sound and the economy was clearly recovering from its 2001-
2002 depression. Once again, deregulation and entrepreneurial inducements were the things 
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that the government was publicly told it should do. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Bresser Pereira (1984), explored a similar democratization processes in Brazil, whereby the 
emerging bourgeoisie that grew up dependent on state patronage, then developed their own 
autonomy. As soon as they gained enough power to accumulate capital without state 
assistance, they then moved to acquire hegemonic power over the state. In contemporary 
Korean society, very few people would disagree with the argument that the hegemony of 
chaebols has become firmly established. As the power of the chaebols has grown so 
increasingly they have undertaken a quasi-state role, expanding to take the place of a 
retreating state.  
 
In the case of Korea, the culture and communication environments of chaebol-centred 
networks have become a significant weapon for achieving corporate policy goals. This has 
had a significant material impact on Korea as the perspectives, voices and strategies of 
chaebols overwhelm wider society. The voices of labour, reformist civil society groups and 
small and medium companies are systematically omitted. Within this imbalance of 
communicative power, chaebols have emerged as the most powerful social group in Korea 
whose influence often appears to surpass that of government. Economic globalization has 
provided great momentum for chaebols to inflate their social legitimacy and influence on 
society to the best of their ability. What corporate elites and pro-business experts promote in 
the era of globalization is a set of seemingly ambivalent ideas and discourses. On the one 
hand, they postulate themselves as ardent supporters of the supremacy of the market. They 
relentlessly call for the deregulation and the retreat of the state in the economic sphere. The 
idea of footloose capital provides their new identity in this era. On the other hand, they 
portray the globalized world as an economic battlefield among nation states. Evoking 
nationalistic sentiment, they represent themselves as defenders of the national interest against 
foreign capital. Juggling these two arguments – globalism and nationalism – what corporate 
elites garner from society and the state is in fact a race to the bottom in order to support our 
corporations. 
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Chapter Fifteen 
 
The Tropes of Unlearning: UK Responses to Outsourcing Fiascos9 
 
Michael Moran and Karel Williams 
 
We have elsewhere described the unlearning state (Bowman et al., 2014) and how liberal 
democracy in the United Kingdom can, like the restored Bourbons, learn nothing and forget 
nothing as it persists with the unsuccessful thirty year experiment in competition and markets. 
Generalisations about neo-liberal policy making and austerity politics, or pervasive 
conditions like the financial illiteracy of electorates, do not entirely explain such unlearning 
in this kind of polity which authors like Crouch (2004) describe as post democratic. Here, in 
various policy areas, the political classes need tropes which both serve as alibis for failure 
and suggest lessons learned; so that everything can carry on much as before, until the next 
time when the same tropes will be reused to convey an impression of purposive response to 
the challenge of events.  
 
We are here dealing with the corruption of liberal democracy which should have a developed 
capacity to learn from failure. Liberalism should promote open debate about policy options, 
their alternatives and their consequences; and democratic institutions should ensure 
accountability of governments in the face of failure. These safeguards should not be 
rubbished because they are worth something. The great domestic policy disasters of the last 
century – genocides and famines – have occurred in non-democratic regimes, and are directly 
connectable to the institutional and ideological arrangements in those regimes. Liberal 
Democracies have not inflicted suffering on anything like this scale – at least, not on their 
own citizens.  But liberal democracies are not immune from blindness in the face of failure, 
and this chapter illustrates this point by considering how the UK political classes respond to 
fiascos about service delivery, cost over-runs and fraud in outsourced public services. 
 
The case is particularly important for some very obvious reasons. Outsourcing itself is now 
one of the most important economic and political developments in the United Kingdom in the 
last three decades, and the practice is now being imitated in many other countries. The scale 
of the outsourcing boom in the UK has produced a new industry with £100 billion turnover 
and what we have called a ‘franchise state’ – a configuration in which private outsourcing 
giants assume responsibilities for core state functions like security and welfare (Bowman et 
al., 2015).    
 
Failing to prevent recurrent outsourcing fiascos, or to learn from them, thus constitute major 
failures of public responsibility. And the failure to learn is, as we explain below, tied to a 
series of tropes or devices which allow the political classes to explain away each new failure 
as a set-back which does not justify halting outsourcing or imposing much tighter conditions 
on outsourcing contractors. This failure to reflect creatively on the causes of fiascos, and how 
they might be avoided, stymies public debate and criticism and undermines the institutions 
dedicated to public oversight of outsourcing: the National Audit Office and the system of 
Select Committees in the House of Commons, notably the Commons’ Public Accounts 
Committee.  
 
                                                
9 This short argument draws on our recent book (Bowman et al., 2015) which presents a broader overview of 
outsourcing that combines follow the money research and political analysis 
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Official reports have dissected successive outsourcing fiascos including fraud over prisoner 
tagging, failure to provide security guards at the London Olympics and many mundane 
failures of service delivery on GP out of hours services, court translation services and such 
like. Here are three tropes that stand in the way of governmental learning from such 
outsourcing fiascos.  They are important learning blocks because with minor variation they 
recur in different responses to various fiascos; and because they are connected to wider 
features of a policy-making system whose ill-considered hyper activity produces many other 
failures. Readers are invited to consider how similar tropes recur in other policy areas in other 
high income countries.  
 
Trope 1: ‘It’ll be lovely when it’s finished’ the receding market utopia. 
 
The oldest joke about Manhattan – ‘it’ll be lovely when it’s finished’ – underlies also one of 
the commonest responses to the failures of utopian projects: the problem always lies with the 
failure to realise to the full the underlying conditions needed for the project to succeed.  The 
mindset created by the pursuit of the utopian ideal has been explored in Scott’s famous study 
of human catastrophes inflicted by authoritarian high modernism -  the utopian fiascos of, for 
instance, Stalinist and Maoist utopianism (Scott 1998).  Outsourcing in the UK takes place in 
a liberal democratic society but it has the key features of a utopian project: it aims at the 
fundamental reconstruction of the state according to an imaginary map of an ideal social 
order – one in which government services are delivered as a result of  bidding in a freely 
competitive market.  And when the competitive process fails to deliver,  the cause is therefore 
ascribed to the failure to realise the required conditions for reaching the utopian destination, 
and a further reconstruction of institutions is embarked on to reach the ever receding market 
utopia. Here, as an example, is how the National Audit Office responded in December 2013 
to numerous instances of the failure of the outsourcing system to create a defensible system 
for pricing outsourced services.  It created an ideal set of outsourcing principles which need 
to be put in place for a pricing system to work: 
 
‘Principle one: The relevant department understands national supply and demand 
and intervenes to remedy problems  
Principle two: The relevant department understands the national market structure 
and intervenes in the event of market failure  
Principle three: The relevant department should understand the role of, and work 
with, the competition authorities and relevant quality and sector regulators, to 
raise awareness, standards and enforce rules and the right market behaviour  
Principle four: The local authority understands its impact on local public and 
private markets as a purchaser of services, and how to encourage the right market 
behaviour  
Principle five: The local authority knows the costs of service provision 
Principle six: The price sustains supply at acceptable levels 
Principle seven: Quality is acceptable 
Principle eight: Users are well informed about quality.’ 
 
(National Audit Office 2013, p 9ff). 
 
It is not that any of these conditions are unacceptable; nor is it the case that they are in some 
instances not partly realisable (indeed the NAOs own report cites individual instances where 
some institutions have succeeded in putting some into effect).  It is the way they cumulatively 
amount to a utopian imaginary – a set of conditions that could never in practice be achieved 
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but which can be used to explain why the kind of real live pricing failures which prompted 
the NAO report can be explained. It easy to see that the realisation of all these conditions 
fully and simultaneously is a utopian mirage – but the vision of the mirage can be used to 
legitimise the continuing pursuit of a society where government services are outsourced 
despite the recurrence of fiasco.  
 
Trope 2: ‘That’s life’ fatalism 
 
The utopian mirage is one end of the spectrum of responses to failings in the outsourcing 
system. A very different response, at the other end of the spectrum, is fatalistic: quite contrary 
to the utopian aspiration it assumes that not only is perfection incapable of achievement, but 
that failure and fiasco are the normal lot of government, and indeed of life. Utopianism is 
revolutionary; fatalism is conservative. It is one of the commonest tropes in British 
government when faced with fiasco (see Moran 1991 and 2007). The world is a complicated 
place. The complexity of life is such that mistakes must always happen. History is lived 
forward but studied backward.  It is only smart alec journalists, academics who study things 
after the event, and Parliamentarians who want to make partisan points at the expense of 
those who actually have to implement policy who think that failures should have been 
foreseen.   In outsourcing, organisations are large and complex; it is practically impossible to 
control every last operating detail in a giant firm. We learn as best we can from these 
mistakes, but cannot rule out the possibility of future failure (on the route of our onward 
march).   
 
This in human terms is a perfectly understandable response that grows out the lived 
experience of those who actually have to make the outsourcing system work, because they 
confront the hard realities of institutional organisation and policy delivery.  It is therefore not 
surprising that fatalism is a common explanation for failure offered by those who have to 
actually run outsourcing programmes. It is  one of the most frequent  responses by hapless 
senior executives of outsourcing companies being roasted for failures before the Public 
Accounts Committee.  Consider as absolutely typical the explanations offered by their 
leading executives  for one of the most widely publicised fiascos of recent years: the failure 
of anyone to spot that two of the outsourcing corporate giants (G4S and Serco) were billing 
for services (tagging prisoners) that had never been carried out. Ashley Alemanza, at the time 
of the hearings (December 2013) Chief Executive of G4S, offered the following:  
  
I think it was a judgment that was flawed. It was just a flawed judgment…. We 
got it wrong….We did not have the systems in place that we needed to have. 
(House of Commons Public Accounts Committee 2014a, Qs 113 and 116.) 
 
And a similar line was taken by the then Chairman of SERCO on the same occasion: 
  
‘As far as we are concerned (it) might have been a contractual interpretation of 
what the lawyers might argue, but that still does not make it right’. (ibid, Q115) 
 
One reason fatalism is so often invoked in this way is that those at the sharp end of the 
outsourcing system – executives responsible in the last instance for implementing 
programmes – are in the first line of criticism when fiascos occur.  And they are in the first 
line because of the third, commonest, response to fiasco in the outsourcing system: blame 
shifting. 
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Trope 3: ‘Whose fault is it anyway?’ blame shifting 
 
As the work of Hood and his colleagues demonstrates, blame shifting is a standard response 
to policy failure in British government (Hood 2002, Hood and Rothstein, 2001). It is 
profoundly inimical to efficient policy learning because it transforms systemic defects into 
human failings, creating a trail of stigmatised public servants and executives who are publicly 
scapegoated for failure, in official reports or (more vehemently) in the tabloid press. The 
summary below by the Public Accounts Committee of the whole outsourcing experience 
catches this kind of reasoning in its most sober and balanced form: here is a lament for the 
incapacity of firms and civil servants who must both do better: 
  
Government is clearly failing to manage performance across the board, and to 
achieve the best for citizens out of the contracts into which they have entered. 
Government needs a far more professional and skilled approach to managing 
contracts and contractors, and contractors need to demonstrate the high 
standards of ethics expected in the conduct of public business, and be more 
transparent about their performance and costs. The public’s trust in outsourcing 
has been undermined recently by the poor performance ... high profile failures 
illustrate contractors’ failure to live up to standards expected and have exposed 
serious weaknesses in Government’s capability in negotiating and managing 
private contracts on behalf of the taxpayer (House of Commons Public Accounts 
Committee, 2014, p 3). 
   
Two particular features of the outsourcing policy system reinforce this propensity towards 
blame shifting. The first is the historically established system for ensuring accountability 
which is built round two institutions, the National Audit Office (a descendant of 19th century 
institutions concerned with auditing for value for money in public spending) and the system 
of Select Committees in the House of Commons which react to NAO reports to hold public 
hearings and issue their own critical reports. Of these Select Committees the most important 
is the Public Accounts Committee, itself a 19th century ‘value for money’ institution of 
accounting scrutiny. The incentive structures of parliamentary life encourage the 
development of an inquisitorial investigative style in which publicity is generated for Chairs 
of the Committee and for Committee members by aggressive cross questioning of witnesses, 
and the publication of reports which equally aggressively criticise the public servants who 
wrote the original outsourcing contracts, and the executives of the companies who tried to put 
them into effect. The activities of the Committee, under two particularly successful recent 
chairs (Edward Leigh, 2001-10 and Margaret Hodge, 2010-15) have been shaped to the needs 
of modern media management: brief stylised confrontations in Committee hearings ideal for 
news bulletin clips, and media interviews with Chairs at launches of Committee reports to 
highlight the ‘headline’ messages of those reports.  
  
A second feature of the outsourcing system reinforces blame shifting. In recent years 
outsourcing has moved on from contracting out utility services, like waste management and 
transport, to contracting out historically core state functions, like the management of security 
and the management of welfare claimants. These include some of the most sensitive and 
politically toxic tasks of the state: for instance incarcerating, and sometimes deporting,  failed 
asylum seekers, and scrutinising welfare claimants for their ability to undertake employment.  
Although justified in the language of efficiency and competitiveness, outsourcing here 
involves shifting to the private sector tasks which are so politically toxic that elected 
politicians would prefer not to manage them. The result is that when things (fairly 
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predictably) go wrong the blame can be shifted to the outsourcer. In that case, government 
ministers have two options: first, they can either harrumph about “completely unacceptable” 
failures in duty of care in secure institutions; or, second, they can simply let the outsourcers 
as enforcers take the punishment for operating what is government  policy (but not explicitly 
so)   
 
The way in which enforcers can be used to take the punishment is nicely illustrated by the 
series of outsourced contracts connected with work capability assessments (fitness for work 
assessments for disabled benefit claimants). In March 2014 the Department of Work and 
Pensions and the outsourcing specialist Atos announced that the contract signed by Atos with 
the previous Labour government to carry out work capability assessments was to be cancelled 
a year early. The staff of Atos had been required to make brutal judgements about individual 
cases; underqualified, time pressured and poorly incentivised staff made judgements which 
did upend lives and could be challenged. In giving reasons for walking away, Atos explained 
how it had as enforcer taken the punishment:  
 
The key ones were the very toxic environment in which their staff were being 
asked to work, including threats and security incidents, the lack of public 
understanding of the separate roles of Atos, DWP and tribunals in the process, 
leading to Atos being blamed for withdrawal or refusal of benefit; and the 
contract becoming less viable financially. (House of Commons Work and 
Pensions Select Committee 2014, p 29)  
 
And this is how government washed its hands of the toxic experience. In the words of the  
then Minister for Disabled People to the  Work and Pensions Committee:  
 
when I arrived in the Department eight months ago, on my desk were an awful 
lot of letters from my colleagues – let us be perfectly honest about it – from 
across the House who had real concerns about how the assessments were being 
done and how Atos was performing … it did become pretty obvious that Atos’s 
confidence as to whether they could perform what we were asking them to do; 
our confidence; and the public’s confidence was not sufficient, and so I did ask 
the team to negotiate with Atos as to whether or not Atos could leave the 
contract. (House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee 2014, Q447) 
 
Blindsided by tropes: unlearning and outsourcing 
 
Although blame shifting is the most common response to outsourcing fiasco, the most 
important source of knowledge blockage is the utopianism identified above: for nearly three 
decades now the management of contracting has been in thrall to an ideological vision about 
competition and markets. The failures in the ramshackle outsourcing system have been 
nothing as catastrophic as those in the old command systems that were guided by 
authoritarian collectivist ideologies. But, the inability to learn from failure is strikingly 
similar: it is hardly surprising that Ron Amman, who spent the first part of his career studying 
the pathologies of the Soviet command system, and the second as a senior manager in the 
British policy system, ended up finding strong similarities between the two (Amman, 2003). 
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Chapter Sixteen 
 
Meet the New American Influence Elites: How Top Players Sway Policy and Governing 
in the Twenty-First Century 
 
Janine R. Wedel 
 
A new breed of influence elites has emerged in recent years, spawned by a sea change over 
the past several decades. As a social anthropologist, I have been mapping these elites’ modus 
operandi and organization and the vehicles they set up to help organize their influence. These 
novel elites follow a 21st century playbook, holding sway through flexible and often informal 
means; they are less stable, more mobile, more global, and less visible than their forebears of 
living memory. And, as I demonstrate in Unaccountable: How Elite Power Brokers Corrupt 
Our Finances, Freedom, and Security, they largely defy democratic oversight. Yet these 
players and their practices are systemic in the United States in arenas ranging from finance 
and military policy to energy and health care.  
 
Understanding how American influence elites operate is crucial because their practices are 
far-reaching and they influence decisions that affect the entire world. And, because these 
elites appear to have played a role in widening inequality and also because they have 
morphed beyond conventional concepts explaining influence – lobbies, revolving doors, 
interests groups, and ‘kitchen cabinets’ – it is all the more urgent to explicate their modus 
operandi, organization, and impact.   
  
From Power Elites to Influence Elites 
 
The way elites organize influence today – their modus operandi and organization – differs 
from ‘power elites’ as described by sociologist C. Wright Mills 60 years ago (1956). Mills 
famously coined the term power elite to describe the interlocking constellation of government 
officials, military leaders, and corporate executives, who, he contended, effectively controlled 
major domestic political and social decision making. The strength of Mills’s power elite rests 
on command and control, where hierarchical structures are distinct and bureaucrats wield 
executive power (see also Domhoff, 1967).  
 
However, contemporary influence elites have moved away from these structural positions. 
Hierarchies co-exist with forms of power grounded in networks.  Network-based power 
derives from players’ positions in informal social networks and links to organizations and 
venues that, much more than in the past, connect elites across a global plane. Elites serve as 
connectors (see Savage and Williams, Wedel, 2009).  
 
What created the space that this new breed of elites now controls? In short, the sea change – 
an unprecedented confluence of transformational developments over the past few decades: 
financialization, which multiplies lucrative intermediary positions in finance, while, at the 
same time, weakening the role of managerial elites; the privatization, deregulation, and 
governmental ‘reform’ fervor that began to take hold in the United States and the United 
Kingdom in the early 1980s; the Cold War’s end a decade later, dispersing global authority 
and opening up sparsely governed arenas; and the rise of the Internet soon after (see Wedel, 
2009, Wedel, 2014, Davis and Williams, forthcoming). 
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These developments have reconfigured the organizational ecosystem. They have created 
opportunities for all manner of players – from transnational networks laundering money or 
promoting human rights to consultants doing work previously performed by government 
employees and international organizations. In the United States three quarters of the people 
working for the federal government now work directly for private companies, sometimes 
with a lot of influence and often with little oversight. Contractors run intelligence operations, 
control crucial databases, screen airport security and law-enforcement officials, choose and 
oversee other contractors, and draft official documents (see Wedel, 2009). The developments 
have spawned vehicles of influence that are set up or mobilized by elites: consulting, think 
tank, nongovernmental, and “grassroots” organizations, ad-hoc advisory groups and 
PR/lobbying firms.  The sway of elites substantially resides in social networks that operate in 
and around these entities and venues.  Thus, in contrast to C. Wright Mills’s institutions as 
pillars of power, today influence elites themselves can be seen as pillars of power. 
 
A look at elite practices today provides a window into why traditional, still-dominant 
frameworks fall short. The following four characteristics suggest ways to revise our 
understanding of how influence works in modern democracies.    
 
A Novel Modus Operandi 
 
First, influence elites often operate off-the-grid. On the world stage crucial policies ranging 
from finance to media to technology are framed, sometimes even forged, outside the 
bureaucracies of governments, international organizations, and companies. A case in point is 
the Group of Thirty (G-30), the Consultative Group on International Economic & Monetary 
Affairs. Its member list is a Who’s Who of global economic policy influencers, including 
many Americans.  Tsingou, who studied the group, describes it as ‘part think tank, part 
interest group, and part club’ (Seabrooke and Tsingou, 2009, p. 20) of ‘actors who write the 
rules’ (Tsingou, 2012, p. 4, 249). Its executive director told me ‘We don’t make policy … but 
you can see our recommendations ending up in policy.’ (Wedel, 2014, pp 20-3). One example 
of this is the hugely consequential issue of derivatives trading. In the 1990s, big banks didn’t 
welcome increased regulation on their fast emerging profit centers. Here, the G30’s study 
group and report on derivatives in the early 1990s, run by senior investment bankers such as 
JP Morgan’s CEO Dennis Weatherstone, helped solidify the standards for ‘best practices’. 
This laissez-faire approach, made informally and then enshrined as policy, allowed 
derivatives to lay dynamite throughout the global financial system.   
 
With regard to individual influence elites, too, much lobbying in the United States has gone 
underground. While registered lobbyists and interest groups remain powerful, they are joined 
by less visible power brokers – I call them ‘shadow lobbyists’ – who choose not to register as 
lobbyists (see Wedel, 2014).  Where once a former high official might have sought the title 
‘lobbyist’ to display influence, today he may choose to call himself a ‘strategist’, ‘adviser’, or 
‘government affairs specialist’, and not register at all. The business of influencing has 
changed so much that the main trade association for lobbyists, the American League of 
Lobbyists, decided in 2013 to adopt a more innocuous name, the Association of Government 
Relations Professionals. The number of registered lobbyists declined by nearly 23 percent 
from 2007 to 2015 (OpenSecrets).  But who would argue that this means a decline in 
lobbying per se as unregistered shadow lobbyists take their place?  
 
The second characteristic of modern influencing is that players perform a plethora of 
professional roles, some of which overlap, and it’s difficult to tell where one ends and 
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another begins. Players assume more roles, in more venues of influence, with more flexibility 
and movement, and within a far shorter time frame than their predecessors.   
 
Take, for instance, retired generals and admirals. As recently as 20 years ago, the majority of 
them retired to, say, play golf. Now, when these powerful (mostly) men retire, the majority 
remain in the defense arena. They embark on sprawling, post-military careers that mix 
advisory roles with private sector work (Bender, 2010). Some, like General Barry McCaffrey, 
have been dubbed by the New York Times a ‘One Man’s Military-Industrial-Media Complex’ 
(Barstow, 2008).  
 
Generals like McCaffrey often consult with defense companies or even set up their own 
(eponymous) firms. At the same time, a retired general might serve on government advisory 
boards shaping policy or procurement directions. In the process he likely gains access and 
proprietary information. He can then employ information he gleans from his advisory board 
roles to the benefit of his defense clients. The general can plausibly deny that the advice he 
offers his clients is related to the information and access he garners in his government role, 
and we, the public, have little means of knowing what is actually the case. Further, some 
retired generals and admirals add a think tank or university affiliation, building an image of 
gravitas and incorruptibility. And some include media commentator appearances, in which 
they are nearly always identified by their retired general title, not their more current and 
lucrative consultancy roles.  
 
Clearly, the system has moved beyond the proverbial ‘revolving door’. That model has only 
one exit point – the regulator or congressman joins a lobbying firm. The revolving door now 
features multiple entry and exit points. A player exits to a business, think tank, consultancy 
firm, university, or media outlet and straddles two or more roles at the same time. While the 
conventional (revolving door) player passing from point A to B and back again remains an 
important staple, his avant-garde counterpart is more elusive. He may wield more influence – 
and is less accountable.   
 
Vehicles of Influence 
 
Think tanks, consulting firms, nonprofits, and grassroots organizations have proliferated in 
recent years. Many are empowered or even established by influence elites to sway policy and 
public opinion. Thus a third characteristic of today’s influence elites is that they create their 
own organizational vehicles. While they help shape important policy decisions, they are not 
registered lobbyists, interests groups, or other conventional influencers. To wit:   
 
Think tank-corporate/billionaire-government-media complex: Think tanks lend an impartial, 
scholarly imprimatur, through which influence can be laundered. By at least one estimate, the 
United States has upwards of 1,830 such organizations today, a figure that’s more than 
doubled since 1980 (McGann, 2015, p.10, 54), and actually may be far higher (Bender, 
2013).  
 
Neither think tanks nor think tanks with ideological bents are new. Yet while they have 
traditionally conducted serious, even multiyear studies, today many have become partisan 
fighters, armed with media-friendly reports and minute-to-minute messaging. They prize 
‘impact’ and metrics to show donors, sometimes sole benefactors. They are often populated 
by former journalists. Their stars create buzz on social media and TV and organize invitation-
only conferences of power brokers. Not only is the time horizon of this new-style outfit 
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shorter than its older-style counterpart: many have only been around for only a few years. A 
new species has been born that, while it might still be called a think tank, is enmeshed in a 
new ecosystem (McGann, 2015).   
 
With a scholarly veneer and journalists at the ready, think tanks are perfect vehicles through 
which influence elites can drive consensus in a certain direction. Take, for instance, the 
COINdinistas (COIN stands for counterinsurgency) and their influence on the conduct of 
U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. To pursue their strategy of engagement with local 
populations to counteract insurgencies, a collection of generals, including David Petraeus, 
influential military reporters, scholars, defense contractors, and policy makers coalesced 
around COIN. At times they circumvented the bureaucracy, using as their vehicle of 
influence a new Washington think tank, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), 
substantially funded by defense companies.  With CNAS as a mouthpiece and site of power, 
the COINdinistas played a key role in making and justifying the military policy for recent 
years of the Afghanistan war. Deploying CNAS-affiliated reporters across the media, they 
swayed public and policymaker opinion to their side. By effectively sidelining the 
bureaucracy and enlisting the media to help, they won the fight and left their colleagues with 
little choice, but to walk with them. 
 
Consulting-corporate-government complex: In the past consulting firms engaged primarily in 
private sector work. Today they sometimes stand in for government, performing core 
government functions, often with little or no oversight from actual government employees.  
Contractors run intelligence operations, control crucial databases, choose and oversee other 
contractors, and draft official documents (Wedel, 2010).  
 
Ambiguity is an important quality that affords consulting firms that do government work – or 
serve as an interface between government and companies – deniability. Take, for instance, 
Promontory Financial Group. Shrouded in ambiguity, Promontory performs multiple, and 
potentially overlapping, roles. An American Banker profile used these phrases: ‘. . . sort of 
ex-regulator omnibus’, ‘shadow network between banks and regulators’, ‘an auxiliary . . . 
private-sector regulator’. Or, even more category-defying: ‘a kind of arbitrage and 
interlocution between regulators and banks’ (see Horwitz, J and Aspan, M, 2013). 
 
With 19 offices from Toronto to Tokyo, Washington, D.C. and beyond, Promontory has 
served as a private consultant to Bank of America, Morgan Stanley, Wells Fargo, PNC, 
Allied Irish, and the Vatican bank. Promontory is hired for crisis-management or to navigate 
new regulations meant to rein in some of the banks’ forays into exotic derivatives and 
proprietary trading.  Almost two-thirds of Promontory’s approximately 170 senior executives 
have been employed by regulatory agencies (see Protess and Silver-Greenberg, 2013).  
 
One of Promontory’s potentially overlapping roles is that of ersatz regulator. The U.S. 
government has dispersed and diluted its own authority by enlisting Promontory and similar 
firms. The most common variant of this, an informal one, appears to be that when banks hire 
Promontory, that act carries informal weight which they can use to suggest that they are in 
compliance. In another variant, the formal outsourcing of authority, sometimes the 
government itself mandates that banks use Promontory or a similar firm to do financial 
oversight, which, in the past, the government itself did (Douglas, 2013). 
 
Among Promontory’s other roles is that of ‘shadow [unregistered] lobbyist’ on behalf of its 
banker clients. With very recent government experience with regulations under consideration 
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(by virtue of its ex-regulator employees), the firm has worked to defang the implementation 
of the Dodd-Frank legislation passed after the 2008 financial crisis and (shadow)-lobby 
former regulatory colleagues to do so (Calabrese, 2013). When the Dodd-Frank legislation 
eventually passed in 2010, after Wall Street poured huge amounts of money into blocking 
financial reform, the new game became implementation and the dense fine print of Dodd-
Frank.   
 
In addition to shadow lobbying on behalf of specific clients, Promontory weighed in on the 
Volcker Rule, which holds that banks should be barred from investing depositors’ dollars for 
institutional profit. This was part of the Dodd-Frank legislation, designed to rein in risky 
trading by U.S. banks. Indications are that Promontory was indeed at least somewhat 
involved when financial firms and regulators were hashing over the much-disputed rule 
(Calabrese, 2013). Moreover, the New York Times, analyzing data from a nonprofit that 
studied the issue, found in 2013 that although Promontory hadn’t been a registered lobbyist 
for four years, ‘the firm’s executives have met with regulators at least 10 times in the last two 
years on thorny issues like the . . . Volcker Rule’ (Protess and Silver-Greenberg, 2013). Of 
course, Promontory insisted to the Times that meetings do not necessarily constitute 
‘lobbying’. 
 
Promontory exemplifies entangled allegiances and shifting roles as the firm bends with the 
whims of its clients (at times even standing in for regulators as overseers and auditors). It has 
served as sort of a proxy for government auditors, paid by those it audits.  The firm also acts 
as an unconventional lobbying outfit, intervening with regulators on behalf of its clients and 
buffering clients from regulation through shadow lobbying.   
 
The issues highlighted by Promontory are emblematic of new-style entities used by influence 
elites. It is not a registered lobbyist, accounting firm, or government regulator. With no fixed 
identity, it can flex to suit the occasion. The enigma that is Promontory serves itself and its 
clients’ purposes well; but can the same be said for public accountability? 
 
Grassroots (or nonprofit)-corporate/billionaire-media complex: Many ‘grassroots’ and 
nonprofit entities are equally steeped in ambiguity and lack accountability. Some campaign 
fundraising groups pose as nonprofits or grassroots organizations, promoting the cause of an 
unseen backer in ways that make it appear to be a grassroots movement (Wedel, 2014). The 
phrase ‘dark money’ conjures up untraceable campaign financing, but elections aren’t the 
only way to influence policy. Donors and corporate interests fund purported grassroots 
organizations or nonprofits, which lend the veneer of civic action, often in nearly untraceable 
ways. These entities range from ‘patient-advocacy’ groups funded by pharmaceutical 
companies to ‘safe energy’ organizations supported by the nuclear industry. What in common 
parlance is called ‘front groups’ or ‘astroturfing’ is not new. But the digital age has made it 
infinitely easier to mimic a grassroots campaign for a wide audience.   
 
The advent of the Internet and social media, as well as the near gutting of investigative 
journalism, have also nurtured simulacra—things that look or feel like the real thing, but 
aren’t.  Big donors and corporations are creating the simulacrum of a real, organically created 
movement that just happens to serve their interests. This can be seen on the Facebook page of 
the Koch Industries-supported group Americans for Prosperity, which boasts a more than 
one-million-strong ‘standing army’ of anti-tax activists without any mention of its billionaire 
sponsors.   
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The signposts include the following:  
 
Innocuous-sounding names, evoking citizens’ advocacy or genuine do-it-yourself 
efforts.  
 
Organizations and efforts staged from the top – be they by a handful of billionaires or 
a cadre around a charismatic leader (for example, Barack Obama’s 501c4 group 
Organizing for Action)  
 
Entities that morph their purposes as convenient for their unseen sponsors. 
 
Organizations to create an echo chamber and make it appear that there’s a ‘there 
there’ when there scarcely is. 
 
The use of big names or former top officials to give organizations heft. 
 
Sponsorship and funding sources that are indirect and almost impossible to track.  
 
In short, an enterprise whose influence is steeped in obscurity, lending itself deniability. 
 
While these new-style think tanks, consulting firms, nonprofits, and grassroots organizations 
are not typically included in the framework of political influence, they should be. They have 
become a crucial part of the repertoire of influence elites.   
 
The Clinton Playbook 
 
These novel means of wielding influence – and more – are on full display when it comes to 
high-profile elites such as ex-President Bill Clinton (former British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair exhibits a similar pattern). Clinton’s player status has called into question policy 
decisions made by his wife while secretary of State and guaranteed further questions should 
she take the White House. Bill Clinton’s playbook consists of several boundary-blurring 
strategies, employed together.   
 
Clinton employs the  two that I’ve already introduced in spades: crafting overlapping roles 
and creating entities of influence. He established the sprawling Clinton Foundation and its 
nonprofit Global Initiative, while serving as a paid adviser to a private equity/consulting firm 
called Teneo (among other business ventures). Teneo co-founder Douglas Band reportedly 
recruited donors to be Teneo clients and vice versa.  
 
Clinton has not only set up vehicles of influence; the criss-crossing entities are tailor-made 
for deniability, one (or sometimes two or three) steps removed from themselves. This former 
statesman enlists friends and allies. When donations come even one step removed, the 
recipient can distance himself when it’s expedient to do so. The Clinton Global Initiative, for 
instance, advises companies on philanthropy instead of doling out the money itself, providing 
distance should questions arise over possible conflicts of interest. And when the entities are 
subject to different laws, even more deniability is possible. We saw that in spring 2015 when 
reports surfaced of more than a thousand undisclosed donors to a Clinton-affiliated charity in 
Canada that also had uranium-mining deals needing approval from Hillary Clinton’s State 
Department. The Clinton Foundation could conveniently argue that Canadian law protects 
donors’ anonymity to charities.  
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Another playbook strategy is celebrity branding. The Clinton Global Initiative’s annual 
meeting skillfully employs the lure of celebrity-hood. It has a five-figure entrance fee that 
brings the powerful together to network and hash out global issues, in the style of the annual 
Davos meeting. The New Republic has described it thus (MacGillis, 2013): 
 
‘For corporations, attaching Clinton’s brand to their social investments offered a 
major PR boost … There’s an undertow of transactionalism in the glittering 
annual dinners … the fixation on celebrity, and a certain contingent of donors 
whose charitable contributions and business interests occupy an uncomfortable 
proximity.’  
 
Clearly, conventional notions of political influence cannot begin to chart the flexibility of 
roles and criss-crossing entities of today’s top players and the deniability these afford, the 
role of branding and celebrity status in their success, and the players’ potential impact beyond 
accountability.   
 
Power Cliques 
 
That impact beyond accountability is magnified when influence elites work together in social 
networks toward mutual agendas. Today’s influence elites often form tight-knit, trust-based, 
enduring networks. 
 
I have chronicled the organization and effect of several of these power cliques, including:  the 
Wall Street-Washington circle that has had a huge impact on the global economy through its 
decisions about the regulation of exotic derivatives trading (see Wedel, 2014); and the 
‘Neocon core’, who had been working together in various incarnations for several decades, 
and helped take the United States to war in Iraq in 2003 (Wedel, 2009), as well as the 
COINdinistas discussed earlier here.  
 
What I call ‘flex nets’ are the ultimate power cliques. Flex nets are trust-based groups 
powered by shared ideology and noted for their members’ loyalty. They coordinate influence 
from multiple, moving perches, inside and outside official structures. They thwart both 
bureaucratic and professional authority by creating within government network-based 
structures and personalized practices while circumventing standard ones and marginalizing 
officials who are not part of their network. They relax both governments’ rules of 
accountability and businesses’ codes of competition, thereby challenging principles that have 
defined both modern democratic states and free markets (Wedel, 2009, pp. 15-21).    
 
Flex nets are a paradox in terms of political influence: more amorphous and less transparent 
than conventional political lobbies and interest groups, yet also more coherent and less 
accountable.  Thus, while administrations come and go, flex nets persist. They are not the 
instruments of any particular administration even when their members occupy official 
positions within it. As members spin overlapping roles at the nexus of official and private 
power, they create a virtually closed loop that challenges accountability – often far removed 
from public input, knowledge, or potential sanction.  
 
Today, many conditions that facilitated Mills’s power elite – stable positions at the top of 
enduring institutions exerting command and control – no longer prevail. These hierarchies 
have not vanished. But they have transmuted amid the transformational developments here 
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outlined. Flexible, mobile, and multi-positioned, influence elites serve as connectors, 
intermeshing hierarchies and networks in complex ways. In contrast to the greater and more 
predictable role of hierarchies in Mills’s day, some levers of influence have moved several 
steps away from them, rendering public input and accountability more inscrutable. The way 
influence elites are organized and the modus operandi they employ to wield influence enable 
them to evade public accountability, a hallmark of democratic society.		 
	
Today’s influence elites and the vehicles they use to help organize sway do not fit 
conventional notions of political influence. Clearly, we need to update our understanding.     
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Chapter Seventeen 
 
‘Public Knowledge’ and Health Policy 
 
Colin Leys 
 
Introduction 
 
Aeron Davis’ succinct overview of the contemporary determinants of the quality of public 
knowledge provides many of the elements needed for understanding what has happened to 
public knowledge about health policy since 1980. But knowledge about  health care is not 
merely subject to the general impact of global market forces outlined by Davis (the internet, 
inequality, neoliberal ideology, austerity, the audit culture), and the increased complexity of 
modern knowledge. Being almost entirely state-funded in Britain, and therefore a prime 
object of state policy, health care is also subject to a critical shift that has simultaneously 
taken place in the way policy is made. The end of the hegemony of social democracy in the 
UK in the late 1970s saw the end of the liberal/social democratic ‘policy regime’ that had 
been in place since the 1920s, if not earlier.10 The neo-liberal policy regime which has 
replaced it effectively rejects – in intention and increasingly in practice –  the concept of a 
‘public sphere’, to which the concept of public knowledge is necessarily linked, and this is 
nowhere more evident than in relation to health policy. 
 
The institutional Foundations of the Public Sphere 
 
The ‘public sphere’ was above all a construct of the institutions through which social, 
economic and political knowledge was produced and assessed, and policies were endorsed, 
independently of the influence of private interests. These institutions were the professions, 
insulated from both commercial pressures and from government; the universities, funded 
through arms-length arrangements to preserve their freedom to do disinterested teaching and 
research; press freedom, to allow for the exposure of official dissimulation or lies; public 
service broadcasting, to give the electorate valid information and a platform for public debate 
on how it should be interpreted; judges, funded from the civil list to make them able to stand 
up to governments; and the senior civil service, dedicated to ensuring that policy was made in 
light of the public knowledge made possible by these arrangements.  
 
The idea of a public sphere was thus closely linked to the idea of the public interest. At a 
minimum, the concept of the public interest is something distinct from, or which transcends, 
private interests, and involves commitment to a norm of disinterestedness; but it could also 
connote substantive values, such as that human happiness should be maximised, or that 
everyone should be as healthy as possible, etc. As soon as this is acknowledged it is obvious 
that the idea that ‘public knowledge’ is something universally shared is inherently 
problematic. At any given time there is typically a body of conventional wisdom, the 
dominant ideas and norms of the day, which can be described as shared. But this set of ideas 
and norms is always contested; and in the case of health what we are witnessing is a drive to 
devalue and if possible eliminate a former body of ‘common sense’ and replace it with one in 
which, instead of policy being produced in the public sphere to serve the public interest it 
should be produced by whatever means will simply make markets efficient. Rupert 
Murdoch’s statement, in relation to broadcasting, that ‘the public interest is what interests the 
                                                
10 This is outlined in my essay ‘The Cynical State’ Leys (2006)  
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public’ was a fair representation of the neoliberal viewpoint: i.e., the elite who have occupied 
the key roles in the public sphere are unrepresentative and their claim to uphold an interest 
shared by everyone is undemocratic and invalid. The only valid ground for any statement 
about interests is consumer preferences.  
 
Dismantling the Public Sphere in Health Policy 
 
The NHS was a priority target for neoliberals for several reasons. First, accounting as it did 
for about 15% of state expenditure, it was seen as a potentially major field for private capital 
accumulation. Second, being tax-funded and equally accessible to all it was a bastion of 
social-democratic values and a constant reminder of the advantages and popularity of non-
commodified services. Moreover since there is a steep class gradient in ill-health, spending 
on health care necessarily also involves some income redistribution from rich to poor, not just 
from the well to the ill. For all these reasons the NHS was one of the first branches of the 
state to feel the effects of the new neoliberal policy regime, beginning with a radical 
reorganisation of the Department of Health (DH). 
 
The erosion of the Department’s policy-making function has been the most complete of any 
government department. Since the creation of the NHS Executive in 1989, which shifted 
effective power over policy more and more into the hands of health service managers, the DH 
has been steadily run down, declining from 4,795 staff in 1996 (UK Gov) to 2,422 in 2013, of 
whom only 164 were in the senior civil service (a further cull of 650 Department of Health 
posts was announced in February 2016, BBC, 2016), and almost all of these had been 
recruited from hospital management or, increasingly, from private sector sources, especially 
management consultancies. Of the 32 members of the ‘top’ team in 2006, 18 were drawn 
from NHS management and 6 from the private sector; only one was a career civil servant 
(Greer, S and Jarman, H (2007, Table 1).  And from 2003 to 2010 a 180-strong Commercial 
Directorate, consisting almost entirely of ‘interims’ seconded from the private sector, infused 
the DH with a market-oriented culture, while senior DH personnel moved in the opposite 
direction, into senior jobs with private health companies, as did several former Labour 
ministers following the 2010 election.11  
 
In this way the defence of the public interest in health policy that was formerly provided by 
the senior civil service’s role in policy-making was effectively abolished; instead, during the 
years 2000-2010 the development of health policy was in practice largely outsourced to a 
mixture of management consultancies and two well-funded think-tanks, the Kings Fund and 
the Nuffield Trust, the latter of which had strong ties with the private sector. McKinsey and 
Co. in particular played a major role in Labour’s health policy thinking in those years, and is 
credited with shaping much of the detail of the Coalition’s 2012 Health and Social Care Act.  
A further effect of the market-creation drive was to reduce the amount of information on the 
basis of which policy can be evaluated. For example details of how the £60+bn a year, now 
channelled through Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) to pay the providers of 
secondary care, is spent are no longer centrally collected.12 Moreover most CCGs have 
                                                
11 The revolving door in health policy is discussed in Leys and Player (2011), pp 90-95, and the revolving door 
as a mechanism for the abolition of the civil service as a bastion of the public sphere generally is discussed in 
Leys (2012), ‘The Dissolution of the Mandarins: the sell-off of the British state’, Open Democracy: 
OurKingdom, 15 June 2012, https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/colin-leys/dissolution-of-mandarins-
sell-off-of-british-state 
12 See for example Lord Howe’s reply to Lord Owen: HL Deb, 12 May 2014, c463W, cited at   
http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2014-05-12a.463.3 
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outsourced the making and management of the contracts for these services to Commissioning 
Support Units (CSUs), embryonic management companies formed by the remaining staff of 
the now disbanded PCTs, with the effect that many details of the expenditure of even a single 
CCG are not obtainable by public researchers (CHPI, 2015). The combination of these factors 
means that the information needed for the critical evaluation of the outsourcing of acute and 
community care scarcely exists.  
 
These developments in health policy took place in the context of another general 
development in the erosion of the public sphere: the  normalisation of spin (see Cave and 
Rowell, 2014, chp 4). The advent of new techniques for influencing public opinion coincided 
with the arrival in office in 1997 of a Labour leadership determined not to allow the right-
wing press to repeat the savaging that had been meted out to the party between 1981 and 
1992. In office the party invested heavily in media management. Government  publications 
became like corporate publications, designed to convey positive feelings and downplay bad 
news; Lord Darzi’s 2008 report on healthcare for England, to which McKinsey staff also 
made a large input, was a prime example of this style (HQC, 2008). Another was McKinsey’s 
2009 report on ‘Achieving World Class Productivity’ (McKinsey, 2009). This report, in the 
form of power point slides, called for a programme of ‘efficiency savings’ based on 
manifestly unrealistic assumptions and financial projections for which no accessible sources 
were provided. Yet it became the basis of policy, whereby NHS managers were called on to 
maintain or even improve services while losing £20bn in funding over five years. By 2010 no 
one seriously concerned with health policy any longer placed great confidence in the value of 
statements or claims emanating from the DH.13  
 
As for the production of public knowledge by the fourth estate, the negative pressures 
itemised by Aeron Davis apply in spades to health policy. Health policy is complex and 
undramatic, and unattractive to editors at a time when newspapers are desperate to stem the 
loss of readers, while simultaneously cutting editorial staff and making those who remain 
work longer and across more media. The temptation to rely on government press releases is 
nowhere stronger than in health policy.  
 
On top of these general pressures there is the threat to public service broadcasting represented 
by the demand from private broadcasters for a slice of the television licence fee. Following 
the brutalisation of the BBC by Alastair Campbell for exposing the Blair government’s 
duplicity over the ‘dodgy dossier’ on Iraq, successive Directors General and BBC trustees 
seem to have concluded that the corporation’s future depends on recognising that the mid-
point of the party political spectrum had moved decisively to the right. How far the BBC’s 
startlingly uncritical treatment of the 2011 Health and Social Care Bill was conscious policy, 
as opposed to the more or less unconscious internalisation of the new ideological reality by 
senior BBC staff, it is impossible to say. As Oliver Huitson notes in his review (Huitson, 
2013) of the failure of the media to provide a critical understanding of the Bill, the real aim of 
the legislation was too obvious to be overlooked and a very large gap opened up between the 
mainstream discourse on health policy and that of the social media. This raises an interesting 
question: in the era of globalised capitalism, how far does the operation of representative 
government need shared public knowledge? Do voters increasingly expect to be told nothing 
they can really trust, and how far does their resulting indifference pose a significant threat to 
the legitimacy of the government and the representative state?  
                                                
13 On official mendacity about health policy between 2003 and 2010 see Leys and Player, The Plot Against the 
NHS, ch.8. 
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Two other notional pillars of the public sphere have proved fatally weak in relation to health 
policy: the medical profession, and academic experts. Mrs Thatcher’s view that the 
professions were market-constraining monopolies that needed to be brought to heel led to a 
new culture of criticism and to considerable inroads into the independence and prestige of 
doctors. In 1945-6 the BMA had come close to refusing to operate the new health service; in 
1987 the presidents of the three biggest Royal Colleges of medicine took an opposite stand, 
this time in defence of the NHS, writing a joint open letter to the Prime Minister protesting 
against the financial strangulation to which the NHS was being subjected. By 2010-12 such 
confident behaviour was no longer thinkable. The BMA and the Academy of Royal Colleges 
were in a position to make it politically impossible for the Coalition to push through the HSC 
Bill, and over the months from July 2010 (when the White Paper outlining the Bill was 
published) to the Bill’s passage into law in 2012 a majority of doctors became more and more 
opposed to it. But their leaders refused to adopt a position of categorical opposition, or to 
actively communicate their members’ views to the public. Among many possible 
explanations the most likely, as well as the most charitable, is that the leaders were ultimately 
more committed to the interests of the profession than to those of the public, and judged that 
they could not afford to lose government patronage (see Davis and Wrigley, 2013). 
 
As for health policy academics, there too there is now an alignment of interest towards 
government policy rather than to the public interest. The conversion of universities into 
institutions primarily concerned with producing trained manpower for corporations and 
research useful for making money has been underpinned by their reconfiguration as 
businesses (McGettigan, 2013). Research funding from the Economic and Social Research 
Council is explicitly oriented to the promotion of economic competitiveness, and much 
academic work on health policy is directly financed by the DH.14 There is strong pressure 
from university administrators to secure research grants and there are few charitable funding 
sources that are not themselves aligned with government policy. In this context few 
academics working on health policy, even among senior tenured staff, have been willing to 
become outspoken critics of the market-based model, even though both theory and empirical 
research show that in health care market-based provision leads to higher costs and lower 
quality. The pages of health policy journals contain plenty of critical analysis of particular 
health policies, but it is mainly ‘immanent’ criticism relative to the expressed aims of policy, 
rather than critique based on any alternative conception of how the public interest might be 
served. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, rather than seeing the issue in terms of the existence or non-existence of shared 
public knowledge, I am inclined to see it more in terms of competing visions of the public 
interest, and competing knowledge paradigms derived from these; and to question how far the 
‘sufficient legitimacy’ of election-based governments now depends on the paradigm favoured 
by the government of the day being widely shared. What is clear, though, is that in health 
policy the conditions for the maintenance of a concept of the public interest independent of 
politically dominant private interests have been largely destroyed, and with them the 
possibility of any coherent public discussion of health policy.  
 
                                                
14 In 2012-13 the DH spent almost £240m on policy research: see Annual Report and Accounts 2012-13, Annual 
report and management commentary, paras 2.38-39. 
This is a pre-print accepted manuscript version of the original title from 
Goldsmiths Press http://www.gold.ac.uk/goldsmiths-press/
120 
 
To take just one of many possible examples, consider the issue of cost, which is currently at 
the top of the election agenda. The question asked is whether the NHS is ‘affordable’. But 
affordable by whom, and with reference to what standard of reasonableness? In relation to the 
present government’s austerity spending plans? Or to the proportion of GDP spent on health, 
which remains so much lower than that of comparable countries?15 How valid are the 
assumptions underpinning the claim that the NHS faces a £30bn financial shortfall? What 
portion of this predicted shortfall is accounted for by the administrative and legal costs of 
operating the service as a market, compared with those of non-market provision? What 
evidence is there that the costs of opening the NHS up to competition from private providers 
have been offset by increased efficiency? How far is the problem one of the scale of the 
resources needed, as opposed to resistance by corporations and wealthier taxpayers to raising 
the needed resources from taxation? Given the stakes these are not unreasonable questions, 
but even if there was a shared willingness to seek objective answers to them – which there 
clearly is no – neither the data required, nor adequate resources to study them, any longer 
exist.  
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Chapter Eighteen 
 
Conclusion: Manifesto for Public Knowledge 
 
Des Freedman and Justin Schlosberg 
 
This book has comprehensively identified the ways in which the institutions that have 
traditionally delivered shared forms of public knowledge have been undermined. It has 
argued that neoliberal principles, austerity-related economics and online content provision 
have shrunk and distorted the spaces through which citizens have come to know each other 
and learn about the world: through spheres of communication and media, education, politics 
and public affairs. This has led to a situation in which we are less able to exercise oversight 
over the structures and processes that shape our societies, and therefore less likely to be 
informed by and participate in matters of huge public interest. 
 
Public knowledge is not simply the mirror image of private provision and is not reducible to 
the production and circulation of a range of commodities that the market may, or may not, 
support. Its main goal is not to sell user data to digital intermediaries or audience attention to 
advertisers. Instead, it refers to a sphere of information and culture that is predicated on the 
need to serve the public interest, precisely because wholly market transactions are likely to 
favour the circulation of knowledge that privileges elite networks and private channels. 
Public knowledge is the property of all citizens whose needs ought to be met irrespective of 
their purchasing power, geographical location or social background. 
 
Public knowledge is therefore a classic ‘public good’: a phenomenon that is ‘non-rivalrous’ 
in the sense that one person’s consumption does not limit anyone else’s enjoyment and that 
its social benefit is maximized the more people have access to it. Typical public goods, 
according to Onora O’Neill (2016: 174) include ‘a sound currency, a non-corrupt judiciary, a 
medical database, a common language, flood controls systems, lighthouses and street 
lighting.’ To which we might add: an impartial news system, public service broadcasting, free 
and accessible higher education, a well-funded library service and non-proprietary digital 
networks that are free at the point of use. 
 
We are concerned that public goods are being circumscribed by their for-profit counterparts. 
We want to help wrest back control of knowledge-producing and decision-making from 
structures that are not only largely unaccountable to their users but also explicitly intertwined 
with the powerful interests that need regulating in the first place.  
 
We acknowledge both the scope and limits of participatory and networked forms of 
resistance that can and have engendered new communicative spaces where public knowledge 
goods thrive. But they are constrained by repressive forces of audience segmentation, 
atomization and surveillance, as well as enduring divides in media access and literacy.  
Progressive reforms must be oriented towards publicising these spaces through forms of 
regulation that promote privacy rights, meaningful diversity of exposure, and genuine 
equality of access.    
 
At the same time, old bottlenecks and traditional forms of gatekeeping power persist. There is 
still a knowledge agenda – one which transcends fragmented and polarized social groups – 
and one which the prevailing empirical evidence suggests is still dominated by a handful of 
institutional megaphones. In attempting to address and challenge both new and old forms of 
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concentrated communicative power, we need to ask who are the megaphones? How do their 
voices come to be amplified? What is the extent of their influence over public knowledge and 
debate? 
 
In order to achieve this, we will need to do three things. 
 
First, we will have to demystify prevailing narratives about the knowledge society and 
associated civic empowerment. The bulk of available empirical evidence suggests that we 
have not entered, and are not entering, a golden age in which information flows freely and in 
which citizens are the exclusive determinants of the forms of knowledge, information and 
culture that achieve salience in the public domain. We have not witnessed the 
democratisation of gatekeeping power once vested in the owners and managers of news 
organisations, universities, publishers, film studios, record companies, television networks 
and other incumbent producers of knowledge and culture.  
 
Second, we need to pay heed to the emergence of new forms of gatekeeping power vested in 
digital monopolies that control the means by which we encounter and engage with 
information, public knowledge and culture. But whilst the prevailing critical narrative of the 
knowledge society suggests that digital monopolies have supplanted the power of ‘old 
media’, this misses a crucial point: that behind the discursive struggles and legal battles 
between dominant producers and intermediaries is a reality of growing interconnectedness 
and mutual dependence. Content is the bread and butter of search and social media industries 
whilst the network ‘switch’ that they control – connecting that content with users – has 
become the lifeline of the content industries.  
 
Finally, we need to reject an overarching instrumentalist logic about the efficiency of markets 
and crude audits, and to put in its place a different logic: one that is based on the adoption of 
progressive principles that are aimed at securing the conditions in which public knowledge 
can be protected and nurtured. These might include the following: 
 
• Independence: the ability to be meaningfully autonomous of vested interests; 
• Diversity: the recognition of minority interests and groups and a commitment to 
articulate differences rather than to impose an artificial consensus; 
• Universality: the need to cater to all groups irrespective of geography, background 
and status and to challenge any attempts to exclude users on the basis of their inability to pay;  
• Plurality: the provision of multiple sources of public knowledge rather than 
monopolistic or oligopolistic control over knowledge markets; 
• Redistribution: the commitment to address structural barriers to participate in 
knowledge sectors and to highlight funding streams that better allocate funds on the basis of 
need and ability to pay; 
• Transparency: the requirement for public knowledge producers to declare any 
interests that may impede their ability to provide independent and trusted services; 
• Accountability: the ability for publics to scrutinize and influence the services carried 
out on their behalf. 
 
These principles could be realized in the following mechanisms and commitments. 
 
• The ringfencing of public funds to support the creation and dissemination of public 
knowledge and to nurture an education and knowledge infrastructure that can help grow the 
economy; 
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• Where production is carried out by private bodies, these organizations should make an 
explicit commitment to the maximization of human capital and public, rather than 
shareholder, value; 
• The provision of broadband infrastructures that are designed and operated as public 
utilities rather than gated communities; 
• The passage of strong ‘net neutrality’ rules to ensure that online channels remain non-
discriminatory and open to all; 
• The protection of privacy and the safeguarding of data. Just as there is a requirement 
in many cities for private developers to provide affordable housing in any new complex, 
digital intermediaries should be required to provide spaces that are entirely free of cookies 
and tracking devices that undermine the privacy of users and commodify their data; 
• The use of taxes and levies on the profits of private information intermediaries to 
support non-profit knowledge producers, for example new forms of public interest 
journalism, public education, specialist legal support and digital content creation; 
• Enhanced transparency for meetings and relations between senior media, public 
affairs and political figures in which details of interactions are published in a more timely, 
accessible and comprehensible manner. 
 
Conclusion 
 
A truly progressive reform agenda requires attention to both nurturing new vehicles of public 
knowledge production and delivery, as well as reconfiguring old ones in ways that make 
them more democratic, accountable and sustainable. In regard to the former, there is a 
particular pressing need to examine the effects on public knowledge caused by intensifying 
collaboration between dominant players in the supply of news and information. Tech giants 
have become the means by which some news brands are reaching greater audiences than ever 
before, but also the cause of enveloping market failure in the business of news. In the shadow 
of this interplay, particular vehicles for public knowledge goods are facing acute and in some 
cases existential pressures.  
 
This is especially the case when it comes to developing local and long form journalism 
outside of both state and market control. Regenerating these critical spheres of knowledge 
and cultural production will not provide a panacea to the problems discussed in this volume. 
But it does offer a starting point since news is the principal means through which most people 
in advanced capitalist societies relate to and engage with civic life.  
 
Beyond the news, institutions that have delivered public knowledge such as universities, 
libraries and public service broadcasting have rightly been criticized for being, at times, too 
elitist, too paternalistic, too cautious or too distant. In addition, these institutions have often 
been forced to compete with commercial providers or to discipline themselves to act more 
decisively as neoliberal subjects. What should be a wonderful idea – of an emancipatory and 
non-proprietary form of culture – has therefore been distorted by the pressures under which it 
is forced to operate. We want to secure opportunities for public knowledge that are truly 
independent of state and market and that facilitate instead a critical and expansive 
engagement with the world in which we live. 
 
All of this requires extensive efforts in organization and translation so that the evolving 
constraints on public knowledge become more visible, and ideas for progressive reforms 
more audible in both policy and public debate.  There is a need to draw connections too with 
wider reform movements in the spheres of economic, environmental and social justice, and in 
This is a pre-print accepted manuscript version of the original title from 
Goldsmiths Press http://www.gold.ac.uk/goldsmiths-press/
125 
 
the struggle against the iniquities and injustices of global capitalism. 
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